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One of the foremost concerns of supply chain managers today is building supply
chains that can handle supply disruptions. There are a number of reasons why supply
chain managers are becoming increasingly preoccupied with supply risk. First, supply
disruptions are more likely than before, because the widespread use of outsourcing is
not only stretching supply chains further geographically, but it is also turning supply
networks into intricate webs of highly interdependent players. In fact, in a 2008 survey
of 138 companies, 58% reported that they suffered financial losses within the last year
due to a supply disruption.1 Second, outsourcing to external vendors is making supply
risks harder to foresee and, therefore, harder to prepare for. Third, the consequences
of supply risks have arguably become more costly than before. Successful initiatives
such as lean manufacturing, quick response, and postponement proved beneficial in
maintaining high fill rates while squeezing inventory out of the pipeline, but they also
reduced the buffers that a firm could fall back on in the case of a supply disruption,
thus accentuating the costly effects of disruptions.
This dissertation focuses on supply-risk management in decentralized supply chains,
in which suppliers may have private information about their odds of experiencing a
disruption. In the Introduction (this chapter), we first illustrate several types of sup-
ply risk, and then briefly review operational tools used to manage those risks. Next,
1For more details, see http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/09/17/Most companies lag in
supply chain risk management 1.html.
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we discuss the challenges in supply-risk management arising from the decentralized
nature of the supply chain. In particular, we focus on asymmetric information about
supply disruption risk, and highlight how it influences the interactions among firms
in the supply chain. Lastly, we define the research questions and outline this disser-
tation.
1.1. Types of Supply Risk
When a buyer experiences a supply disruption, the key ramification is the inability
to meet customer demand, resulting in costs ranging from loss of customer goodwill
to non-performance penalties, from loss of revenue to reduced market capitalization.
Within these fairly large boundaries, supply risks come in many forms. In particular,
the causes for supply disruptions are myriad: an accident at a supplier’s facility,
natural disasters, bankruptcy of a key supplier, defective parts or components, labor
strikes, etc. Despite the diversity of causes, supply risks by and large fall into four
categories depending on how they manifest themselves.
Shortage of a critical part or the product itself : Oftentimes a buyer experiences a
supply risk in the form of a shortage of a critical part (or a shortage of the product
itself in cases where the entire product is outsourced). For example, in late 1990s,
Boeing had trouble keeping up with the demand and missed several delivery deadlines.
The poor delivery performance was blamed mainly on shortages of parts such as tie
rods and bearings (Biddle, 1997b).
Loss of finished goods inventory due to the use of a defective part : Another form
of supply risk is the use of a defective input, which results in finished goods that
do not meet standards. Such supply risks can have very serious consequences and
can result in the recall of the entire finished goods inventory. For example, following
the deaths of numerous pets in 2007, pet food producer Menu Foods Corp. had to
recall more than 60 million cans and pouches of dog and cat foods for more than
100 pet-food brands (Myers, 2007). The deaths were later linked to melamine, a
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poisonous industrial chemical. The melamine was traced to wheat gluten, which
Menu Foods (a Canadian firm) had bought from ChemNutra (a U.S.-based supplier),
who, unbeknownst to Menu Foods, had decided to outsource it to Xuzhou Anying
Biologic Technology Development Co. Ltd. (a Chinese supplier). In the past few
years there have been many other similar recalls: the spinach recall in the US upon
the discovery of batches contaminated with e.coli (Wall Street Journal, 2007), Mattel’s
recall of toys due to the use of lead paint (Casey, 2007), several brands recalling their
laptops due to defective batteries produced by Sony (Morse, 2006).
Loss of supplier capacity : The loss of supplier capacity can stem from a variety
of reasons such as a shift in the supplier’s business strategy, supplier bankruptcy,
and accidents or natural disasters. An example of the former is the medical device
manufacturer Beckman Coulter’s loss of its supplier Dovatron, who produced cus-
tomized chips for Beckman Coulter.2 After Dovatron was acquired by Flextronics in
2000, the company was restructured to focus on higher volume products, and Flex-
tronics decided it would no longer serve Beckman Coulter, who was purchasing a
low-volume specialty product. There are abundant examples of supplier bankrupt-
cies that threatened to cut the supply of critical parts, e.g., the bankruptcy of UPF-
Thompson, the sole provider of chassis for Land Rover’s Discovery model (Jennings,
2002); the bankruptcy of automotive supplier Collins & Aikman, which led to a halt
in the shipment of parts to Ford’s Fusion plant (McCracken, 2006). Likewise, there
are several examples of accidents and natural disasters resulting in temporary loss
of suppliers’ facilities, e.g., the 1999 earthquake in Taiwan, causing disruptions at
semi-conductor plants, which made 70% of the world’s graphic chips and 10% of the
world’s memory chips (Savage, 1999; Papadakis, 2003); the fire at a plant of Aisin
Seiki, the sole supplier of a key component used in the brake system of many Toyota
models (Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998); the fire at a Phillips chip plant, which served
2For more details, see http://www.callahan-law.com/verdicts-settlements/fraud-beckman-
coulter/index.html.
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both Nokia and Ericsson, exposing the competitive advantage that Nokia had over
Ericsson thanks to the robustness of its supply chain (Sheffi, 2005).
Supply cost risk : Another type of supply risk is related to the uncertainty about
the cost of inputs. For example, a part that is procured from a distant supplier may
quickly become more expensive if rising oil prices lead to a hike in shipping costs.
Supply costs risks can also arise in connection with shortages. For instance, in 2000,
the price of palladium increased sharply when Russia, who is the main source of this
precious metal, held up its supply. Consequently, automotive manufacturers, who use
palladium in catalytic converters, suffered a $100 increase in the productions cost per
vehicle (White, 2000).
1.2. Operational Tools to Deal with Supply Risk
Firms use several operational tools to manage the risk of supply disruptions. We
next discuss them briefly.
Multi-sourcing : In many cases a buyer will have the option to source the same
part from not one, but multiple suppliers. When such an option is exercised, i.e.,
when the buyer diversifies, the buyer is less vulnerable to risks associated with any
one supplier. As such, diversification can help make the buyer more resilient to supply
risks such as shortages, defective parts or loss of supplier capacity. On the other hand,
when the buyer chooses not to diversify, having multiple suppliers results in increased
supplier competition, thus yielding benefits to the buyer.
Creating external or internal backup sources of supply : In the face of a disruption,
the buyer can scramble to create an alternate source of supply. For example, when the
fire at Aisin Seiki threatened to halt the production of many Toyota models, the two
companies worked together with many other suppliers to create an alternate source.
Likewise, when Beckman Coulter lost its supply of chips from Dovatron, it chose to
replace the lost supply by building an in-house production line.
Using non-performance penalties : Most supply contracts include provisions for
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penalties that will be imposed on a supplier in the event that the supplier fails to
deliver on its promises. As a last resort, a buyer can choose to sue the supplier to
enforce such penalty clauses.
There are other tools that the buyer can employ to reduce risk: a buyer can
perform qualification screening when selecting a new supplier or can audit its existing
suppliers; the buyer may induce the supplier to invest in itself to reduce the odds of a
disruption. In this dissertation, however, we focus on the use of dual-sourcing, backup
sources of supply and non-performance penalties.
1.3. Asymmetric Risk Information in Decentralized Supply Chains
In a decentralized supply chain, the supplier’s priorities and interests are not
necessarily well aligned with those of the buyer’s. Such misalignments may result
in increased supply risks. For example, the parts shortage that resulted in Boeing’s
troubles was partly due to suppliers not keeping up with Boeing’s major overhaul
of its production process to improve its cycle times (Biddle, 1997a). Likewise, in
the case of Beckman Coulter, the part which was highly critical to Beckman Coulter
was simply an unprofitable specialty product for Dovatron, which is why Flextronics
dropped the part after acquiring Dovatron.
As a consequence of misalignment of interests, the supplier will not necessarily
volunteer to the buyer the information about the supplier’s vulnerability to a disrup-
tion. When dealing with the buyer, the supplier is unlikely to reveal the details of its
true financial status, operational capability, or the identities of its own suppliers.
Not having access to the supplier’s reliability information may be very detrimental
to a buyer. It is interesting to note, for example, that Land Rover was not aware of
the looming bankruptcy of its supplier UPF-Thompson. Hence, once the bankruptcy
arrived, Land Rover was unprepared and had few options (Jennings, 2002). Likewise,
Menu Foods was not aware of the second-tier supplier utilized by its first-tier supplier
ChemNutra and, eventually, it was this second-tier supplier’s product that resulted
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in the contamination of pet food (Myers, 2007).
Such asymmetric information about supply risk affects how the buyer manages
its supply risk. For example, Menu Foods would likely have heightened its risk-
management measures, had it known in advance that its first-tier supplier in U.S.
had outsource production of wheat gluten to a Chinese supplier.
1.4. Research Questions and the Plan of the Dissertation
Most research in the extant supply-risk management literature assumes that the
buyer and the supplier are equally knowledgeable about the likelihood of a supply
disruption. This dissertation contributes to the literature by studying the effects of
asymmetric information regarding supplier reliability. In particular, this disserta-
tion explores the interaction between asymmetric information about the supplier’s
probability of disruption and a manufacturer’s (buyer’s) use of supply-risk manage-
ment tools, namely, backup production option, dual-sourcing option and non-delivery
penalty.
We explore the following research questions:
• What is the effect of asymmetric risk information on the manufacturer’s use of
risk management tools?
• What is the value of information about the supplier’s reliability?
• What is the value of risk management tools under asymmetric information?
The dissertation consists of three essays. In Chapter 2, we model a supply chain
with one manufacturer and one unreliable supplier, in which the supplier’s reliabil-
ity is either high or low and is the supplier’s private information. Upon disruption,
the supplier chooses between paying a penalty to the manufacturer for the shortfall
and exercising its backup production option to fill the manufacturer’s order. Using
a game-theoretic approach (mechanism design theory), we derive the optimal con-
tracts offered by the manufacturer. We find that asymmetric information about the
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supplier’s reliability may cause the manufacturer to stop using backup production
with the low-reliability type of the supplier while the manufacturer continues to use
it with the high-reliability type. Consequently, asymmetric information makes the
backup production option less valuable for the manufacturer when backup produc-
tion is moderately expensive. However, the converse is true when backup production
is cheap. Hence, information and the backup production option can be either substi-
tutes or complements. Surprisingly, under asymmetric information the value of the
backup production option may increase even as the probability of drawing the more
reliable supplier type increases. In addition, information about the supplier’s relia-
bility could become more valuable for the manufacturer even as both supplier types
become more reliable. Thus, higher supplier reliability need not be a substitute for
better information.
In Chapter 3, we examine the manufacturer’s strategic use of a dual-sourcing op-
tion, which enables a precautionary approach (diversification) to managing supply
disruption risks. We find that asymmetric information about the suppliers’ reliabili-
ties effectively makes diversification more expensive and pushes the manufacturer to-
wards sole-sourcing to leverage competition. Consequently, information becomes more
valuable for the manufacturer when the underlying business environment changes in
ways that encourage diversification, such as higher product revenue, lower correlation
between the suppliers’ disruption processes, and smaller reliability gap between sup-
plier types. Surprisingly, the additional cost that asymmetric information imposes on
diversification may cause the manufacturer to cease diversifying, even as the supply
base reliability erodes. Furthermore, the dual-sourcing option may be more or less
valuable under asymmetric information, compared to under symmetric information.
In Chapter 4, we study a problem where the manufacturer delegates its procure-
ment of a part to one of two unreliable suppliers, who form a coalition to fulfill the
manufacturer’s requirement. Under delegation, the manufacturer loses some control
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over the procurement process. Hence, if the manufacturer wants to reduce its supply
disruption risk, it can only indirectly induce both suppliers to produce by imposing
a high non-performance penalty on the coalition. The results show that, compared
to direct contracting, delegation may encourage the manufacturer to induce diversi-
fication with one high-type and one low-type, but may discourage the manufacturer
from doing so with two low-type suppliers. We find that delegation may decrease or
increase the manufacturer’s profit, depending on the modeling parameters such as the
cost of disruption and the probability of drawing a high-type supplier. In contrast,
delegation would not change the manufacturer’s profit, if the suppliers’ reliabilities
were common knowledge in the supply chain.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and discusses future directions.
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Chapter 2
Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information and a Backup
Production Option
2.1. Introduction
In March of 2007, following the deaths of numerous pets, Menu Foods Corp., a
producer of pet food, had to recall more than 60 million cans and pouches of dog and
cat foods for more than 100 pet-food brands. Myers (2007) reports that the deaths
were linked to melamine, an industrial chemical suspected of causing kidney and liver
failure. The melamine was traced to wheat gluten, which Menu Foods (a Canadian
firm) had bought from ChemNutra (a U.S.-based supplier), who, unbeknownst to
Menu Foods, had outsourced it to Xuzhou Anying Biologic Technology Development
Co. Ltd. (a Chinese supplier). This example illustrates that, as supply chains are
extended by outsourcing and stretched by globalization, disruption risks and lack of
visibility into a supplier’s status can both worsen. The possible causes for supply
disruptions are myriad, for instance, supplier bankruptcy, labor strikes and machine
breakdown (Sheffi, 2005).
As supply risks increase, it is crucial for manufacturers to learn how to anticipate,
prepare for, and manage potential supply disruptions. The losses due to supply
disruptions can be huge. For example, shortly after initial recalls were issued on
March 16, 2007, the market capitalization of Menu Foods Corp. lost about half of
its value, dropping to $70 Million. Generally, Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a,b)
find that firms that experienced supply glitches suffer from declining operational
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performance and eroding shareholder value (e.g., the abnormal return on stock of
such firms is negative 40% over three years).
A manufacturer has a number of choices when managing its supply risk, includ-
ing supplier qualification screening, multi-sourcing, flexibility, and penalties levied
for supplier non-performance. Intuitively, the effectiveness of risk-management tools
used by a manufacturer depends on information the manufacturer has about the
supplier. For example, risk-management measures put into place by Menu Foods
would likely have been different, had it known that ChemNutra was outsourcing to a
Chinese supplier. In practice, suppliers are often privileged with better information
about their likelihood of experiencing a production disruption than the manufactur-
ers they serve, because of the suppliers’ private knowledge of their financial status,
state of operations, or input sources. However, most of the extant research on supply
disruptions assumes that the manufacturer and supplier are equally knowledgeable
about the likelihood of supply disruptions. The majority of papers that incorpo-
rate asymmetric information do so in the context of suppliers’ costs, and only a few
model asymmetric information about supply disruptions. There is a crucial difference
between asymmetric information about suppliers’ costs and asymmetric information
about supply disruptions. Supply disruptions affect not only the manufacturer’s cost,
but also the manufacturer’s risk profile (risk-return tradeoff). As a consequence, to
handle uncertainty about supply disruptions, the manufacturer can not only design
information-eliciting contracts (as considered in the economics literature), but can
also avail itself of various operational risk-management tools.
To address these gaps in the current literature, in this chapter we investigate the
interaction between risk-management strategies and asymmetric information about
supplier reliability. We address the following questions:
Research Question 1 How do a manufacturer’s risk-management strategies change
in the presence of asymmetric information about supply reliability?
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Research Question 2 How much would the manufacturer be willing to pay to elim-
inate information asymmetry?
Research Question 3 Are risk-management tools more, or less, valuable when there
is information asymmetry?
Research Question 4 How do answers to the above questions depend on changes
in the underlying business environment, such as supply base heterogeneity,
or the manufacturer’s contracting flexibility?
In answering these questions, we limit our consideration within the set of possible
risk-management strategies. We examine penalties for non-delivery, and an ability
of the manufacturer to offer contract alternatives to a supplier. Penalty clauses in
contracts are a common means for buyers to recover damages for non-delivery.1 The
penalty amount is mutually agreed upon at the time of contracting as a proactive way
to avoid costly litigation for damages in the event of non-delivery. We assume that,
had litigation occurred, the supplier would have been found to be at fault for the
disruption.2 As an alternative to the penalty clause, one could use a canonical, two-
part tariff (fixed plus variable payment) contract and obtain the same equilibrium
outcome as in our contract with penalty clause. Either the variable payment or
the penalty provides an incentive to the supplier to look for alternative means of
satisfying its obligations. In our model, we call such alternatives backup production.
Backup production could take many forms. For the Menu Foods Corp. example, upon
disruption a supplier like ChemNutra might re-source its wheat gluten from a different
second-tier supplier (not Xuzhou Anying, who was the culprit of the disruption),
1What we call penalties in this chapter are known, in precise legal terms, as “liquidated damages.”
To be court-enforceable, liquidated damages must not exceed damages that the buyer reasonably
expects to suffer as a result of supplier non-performance (Corbin, 2007). The penalties studied in
this chapter satisfy this requirement. For more on non-performance remedies and contract law, see
Plambeck and Taylor (2007) and references therein.
2An example of this is the suit brought by medical device manufacturer Beckman Coulter against
its circuit board supplier Flextronics, after Flextronics exited the medical device circuit board busi-
ness without delivering the units promised to Beckman Coulter (Beckman Coulter v. Flextronics,
OCSC Case No. 01CC08395, September 24, 2003 Orange County Superior Court), described at
http://www.callahan-law.com/verdicts-settlements/fraud-beckman-coulter/index.html.
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install different quality controls, produce the wheat gluten itself, or perhaps use a
combination thereof. Backup production sometimes involves heroic efforts by the
supplier. For example, in 1997, when a fire at one of Toyota’s suppliers — Aisin Seiki,
threatened to halt production at many Toyota plants, Aisin Seiki was able to avert
disruption by shifting production to its own suppliers and other firms (including some
outside of automotive industry, see Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998). Where backup
production is infeasible or implausible, we capture this by including in the model the
possibility that backup production is prohibitively expensive and hence never used.
In addition, we extend our analysis to the case where the manufacturer has access to
its own backup production option.
We use a single-period, single-supplier, single-manufacturer model where the sup-
plier is subject to a random production disruption, the likelihood of which is the
supplier’s private information. There are two supplier types, according to their relia-
bility: high and low. In case of a production disruption, the supplier has two choices:
use a perfectly reliable (but costly) backup production option to fulfill the manufac-
turer’s order or pay the manufacturer a penalty. Using mechanism design theory, we
find the optimal menu of contracts offered by the manufacturer to the supplier, and
obtain answers to our research questions. We emphasize a few of our results below.
Because backup production at the supplier improves the chances of products being
delivered to the manufacturer, one might intuitively expect that the manufacturer
is more likely to encourage the use of this tool when working with a less reliable
supplier. However, under information asymmetry, we observe that this need not be
true, addressing research question 1. In an effort to correctly set incentives for a more
reliable supplier, the manufacturer may force a less reliable supplier to pay penalties
in case of a disruption, while asking a more reliable supplier to use backup production.
Addressing research question 2, the value of perfect information for the manufac-
turer depends on the cost of the supplier’s backup production option. Where backup
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production is cheap, the value of information is small. The value of information is
the greatest for moderately costly backup production, where the manufacturer, in an
attempt to control the incentives of a more reliable supplier, decides to deviate from
the risk-management strategy optimal under symmetric information. Furthermore,
jumping to research question 4, as the reliability gap between the two supplier types
increases, the value of information for the manufacturer increases as well. Interest-
ingly, the value of information may also increase as supplier types become uniformly
more reliable. Thus, higher reliability need not be a substitute for better information.
Intuitively, the better the manufacturer’s information about the supplier’s relia-
bility, the more precisely it can execute risk-management actions such as ensuring
the supplier would exercise its backup production option, and the more valuable the
presence of such an option is for the manufacturer. In contrast to this intuition, we
find that the supplier’s backup production option may become less valuable if better
information about the supplier becomes available, addressing research question 3.
The chapter is organized as follows. We briefly review related literature in the next
section. The model is described in §2.3. In §2.4, we present the optimal contracts un-
der symmetric information as a benchmark for our study of asymmetric information.
The optimal menu of contracts under asymmetric information is presented in §2.5.
Value of information, value of backup production and the interaction between them
are explored in §2.6. We conduct a sensitivity analysis in §2.7. In §2.8 we extend our
model to allow for the manufacturer’s backup production option. §2.9 summarizes
managerial implications, discusses model limitations, and suggests future research
directions. Proofs can be found in the chapter’s appendix.
2.2. Literature Review
Supply chain risk management has attracted interest from both researchers and
practitioners of Operations Management. Chopra and Sodhi (2004) and Sheffi (2005)
provide a diverse set of supply disruption examples. Various operational tools that
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deal with supply disruptions have been studied: multi-sourcing (e.g., Anupindi and
Akella, 1993; Tomlin, 2005; Babich et al., 2005, 2007), alternative supply sources
and backup production options (e.g., Serel et al., 2001; Kouvelis and Milner, 2002;
Babich, 2006), flexibility (e.g., Van Mieghem, 2003; Tomlin and Wang, 2005), and
supplier selection (e.g., Deng and Elmaghraby, 2005). For a recent review of supply-
risk literature see Tang (2006b).
These, and the majority of other papers in the supply-risk literature, assume that
the distribution (likelihood) of supply disruptions is known to both the suppliers and
the manufacturer. In contrast, we assume that the supplier is better informed about
the likelihood of disruption. There are few papers that consider the issue of the
manufacturer not knowing the supplier reliability distribution. For instance, Tomlin
(2008) studies a model where the manufacturer faces two suppliers, one with known
and the other with unknown reliability. The manufacturer learns about the latter
supplier’s reliability through Bayesian updating. In our model, information is also
revealed, but through a contract choice rather than through repeated interactions. In
Gurnani and Shi (2006), a buyer and supplier have differing estimates of the supplier’s
reliability. Unlike our setting, the buyer’s beliefs about reliability are not affected by
knowing the supplier’s self-estimate. Depending on whose estimate is larger, the
authors employ contract terms incorporating either downpayment or non-delivery
penalty.
Disruptions in supply chains could be caused by quality problems and several pa-
pers have examined information asymmetry in quality control. For instance, Baiman
et al. (2000) study a moral hazard issue surrounding the fact that both the supplier
and the manufacturer can exert costly effort to prevent (requiring supplier effort) or
weed out defective items. Lim (1997) examines a problem where the manufacturer
can inspect incoming units at a cost to identify defects. If inspection is not done
and a defective unit is passed on to the consumer, the channel incurs warranty costs.
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The central theme in this literature is how to allocate quality-related costs among
the channel partners and/or how to motivate several parties to exert costly quality
improvement efforts.
In the operations contracting literature, prior work has examined situations in
which cost information is private, be it the manufacturer’s cost (Corbett et al., 2004)
or the supplier’s cost (Corbett, 2001). In addition, the latter is extensively studied
in the literature on procurement auctions under asymmetric information (Rob, 1986;
Dasgupta and Spulber, 1989; Che, 1993; Beil and Wein, 2003; Elmaghraby, 2004; Chen
et al., 2005; Kostamis et al., 2009; Wan and Beil, 2008). However, as we discussed in
the introduction, there is a crucial difference between asymmetric information about
suppliers’ costs (studied in those papers) and asymmetric information about supply
disruptions (studied here).
2.3. Model
We model a stylized supply chain, in which a manufacturer purchases a product
from a supplier to satisfy market demand. The supplier is unreliable in that its
regular production is subject to a random disruption. We assume there are two types
of suppliers in the market: high reliability and low reliability. These types differ from
each other in their likelihood of a disruption and their cost of regular production. Let
the fraction of high-reliability suppliers in the market be α ∈ (0, 1). We hereafter refer
to high- and low-reliability suppliers as high-type and low-type, and distinguish them
with labels H and L. For a type-i supplier, i ∈ {H,L}, we represent the random yield




1 with probability θi
0 with probability 1− θi,
(2.1)
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where probability θi can be interpreted as a measure of the supplier’s reliability. The
success probabilities are θH = h and θL = l, where 1 > h > l > 0. We assume that it
costs a type-i supplier ci (per unit) to run regular production, regardless of whether
the run is disrupted or not. Although we allow cH and cL to be different, the high-
type is assumed to be the more cost-efficient supplier, that is, the expected cost of
successfully producing one unit using regular production is smaller for the high-type
supplier:3
Assumption 1. cL/l > cH/h.
In addition to a regular production run, the supplier has access to a backup pro-
duction option in case of disruption. We assume that backup production is perfectly
reliable, with unit cost b.4 We make the following assumption on b:
Assumption 2. b > cH/h.
In other words, the cost of backup production is greater than the high-type supplier’s
expected cost of successfully producing one unit using regular production. As ex-
plained in §3.3.1, this assumption avoids the uninteresting situation in which neither
type of supplier uses regular production before running backup production.
To focus on the effects of supply risk without additional complications due to
demand uncertainty, we assume the manufacturer faces a deterministic demand, D,
for the product. In other words, demand is known at the time the manufacturer
places its order. The demand is infinitely divisible, and without loss of generality, we
normalize it to D = 1. The manufacturer collects a revenue of r per unit sold. We
restrict r as follows:
Assumption 3. r > cH/h.
3Note that, for one unit of input going into regular production, the expected output of a type-
i supplier is θi. Hence, were repeated regular production attempts allowed, the expected cost of
successfully producing one unit using regular production would be ci/θi.
4The analysis would go through if one assumed that the unit cost of backup production were a
random variable, whose value is realized after the supplier commits to using it. In such a case, the
parameter b would represent the expected value of the random unit backup production cost.
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If this assumption does not hold, the manufacturer would not order from either sup-
plier type, because the unit revenue would be less than the expected cost of producing
one unit.
To capture the manufacturer’s lack of visibility into the supplier’s reliability and
cost, we assume that the supplier’s type is its private information. All other infor-
mation is common knowledge. The manufacturer designs a contract menu without
knowing the type of the supplier, who can act strategically and take advantage of
its private information. We find the manufacturer’s optimal menu of contracts using
mechanism design theory. This approach dates back to the seminal work by Myerson
(1981). Invoking the Revelation Principle (Dasgupta et al., 1979; Myerson, 1979),
the mechanism design problem can be solved by focusing on incentive compatible,
direct revelation mechanisms. Therefore, the manufacturer offers two contracts, one
for each type of supplier, and the supplier truthfully reports its type. In our model, a
contract consists of three terms: an upfront transfer payment, Xi ≥ 0, an order quan-
tity, qi ≥ 0, and, because of the possibility of supplier non-delivery, a unit penalty,
pi ≥ 0, for delivery shortfall, where i ∈ {H,L}.
The timing of events is shown in Figure 3.1. The problem can be divided into two
stages: contracting and execution. At time zero, at the beginning of the contracting
stage, nature reveals the supplier type to the supplier, but not to the manufacturer.
Then, the manufacturer designs a menu of two contracts, (Xi, qi, pi), i ∈ {H,L}.
The supplier then selects a contract (signals its type), concluding the contracting
stage. In the execution stage, the supplier receives its transfer payment from the
manufacturer, runs regular and/or backup production, makes delivery, and pays a
penalty, if necessary.
We solve the problem by working backward from the execution stage. The next
subsection presents the analysis of the supplier’s execution stage decisions.
2.3.1 Supplier’s Production Decisions
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Nature reveals the 
type to the supplier
Manufacturer offers a 
menu of two contracts 
to the supplier








Contracting stage Execution stage
Figure 2.1: Timing of events.
For notational convenience, in this subsection we suppress the supplier’s subscript
i from the parameters ρi, ci, θi, Xi, qi, and pi. In the execution stage, given a contract
(X, q, p) offered by the manufacturer, the supplier chooses its regular production size
and delivery quantity to maximize its expected profit. The supplier first decides on
z, the size of its regular production run. After the completion of regular production,
which has yielded ρ z, the supplier decides the total quantity to be delivered to the
manufacturer, y. Subsequently, the supplier engages backup production to make up
the difference, (y − ρ z)+, and/or pays a penalty for the shortfall (q − y)+. The +
operator is defined such that x+ = x if x > 0 and x+ = 0 if x ≤ 0. The following
is the optimization problem of the supplier whose probability of successful regular
production is θ:
πS(X, q, p|θ) = max
z≥0
{





b (y − ρ z)+ + p (q − y)+
]}}
. (2.2)
Let z∗ and y∗ denote the optimal decisions. Solving this problem, we observe that,
when deciding how much to deliver, the supplier either uses backup production (i.e.,
y∗ = q), if b < p, or pays a penalty (i.e., y∗ = ρ z∗), if b ≥ p. When choosing z∗,
the supplier trades off the cost of regular production, c z, against the cost of recourse
(backup production cost or penalty). The supplier will run regular production only
if its expected cost of successfully producing one unit using regular production, c/θ,
is lower than both backup production cost, b, and unit penalty, p. The following
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proposition formalizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1. For a given contract (X, q, p), the size of the supplier’s optimal reg-
ular production run, z∗, the delivery quantity, y∗, and the supplier’s expected profit,
πS, are:
Case z∗ y∗ πS(X, q, p|θ)
(1) p > b, b < c/θ 0 q X − b q
(2) p > b, b ≥ c/θ q q X − c q − (1− θ)b q
(3) b ≥ p, p < c/θ 0 0 X − p q
(4) b ≥ p, p ≥ c/θ q ρ q X − c q − (1− θ)p q
Notice that in case (3) of Proposition 1 the supplier makes no effort to produce.
As we will see later, this situation never arises under the manufacturer’s optimal
contracts. In case (1) of Proposition 1 the supplier does not use regular production,
instead finding it more economical to use backup production to produce and deliver q
units. Note that, per Assumption 2, this situation does not arise with the high-type
supplier, who will always give regular production a try. However, Assumption 2 does
not rule out the possibility that b ≤ cL/l, in which case the low-type supplier would
bypass regular production.
Proposition 1 shows that the supplier’s profit is increasing in its reliability, θ. (In
this chapter, we use increasing and decreasing in the weak sense.) We extend this
observation and show that, given the same contract, a high-type supplier would earn
a larger profit in expectation than a low-type supplier. We denote the difference
between the high- and low-types’ optimal profits, given the manufacturer’s contract,
by Γ.
Definition 1. Γ(q, p)
4
= πS(X, q, p|h)−πS(X, q, p|l) is the benefit of being a high-type
supplier over a low-type supplier, given the manufacturer’s contract, (X, q, p).
19
Notice that Γ is not a function of the transfer payment, X, because the transfer
payment term cancels out in the calculation. Applying Proposition 1 to the definition
yields the expression for Γ(q, p).
Corollary 1. For given q and p, the expression for Γ(q, p) is given by the following




b < cL/l (h b− cH)q
b ≥ cL/l [(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)]q
b ≥ p
p < cH/h 0
cL/l > p ≥ cH/h (h p− cH)q
p ≥ cL/l [(h− l) p+ (cL − cH)]q















Γ(q, p) reflects the high-type supplier’s reliability advantage over the low-type
supplier. We will carefully consider this advantage when solving the manufacturer’s
contract design problem, as described in the next subsection. With Corollary 1,
Γ(q, p) can be shown to be increasing in b, p, q, and h, and decreasing in l. These
properties of Γ(q, p) will be instrumental in developing insights about the effects of
asymmetric information on the manufacturer’s optimal contract.
2.3.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Design Problem
Recall that we model the manufacturer’s decisions as a mechanism design problem,
using a standard information-economics approach (e.g., see Laffont and Martimort,
2002), and, by the Revelation Principle, we focus on incentive-compatible, direct
revelation contracts.
For shorthand, we define πH(X, q, p)
4
= πS(X, q, p|h) and πL(X, q, p)
4
= πS(X, q, p|l).
In addition, given contract (Xi, qi, pi), we denote the optimal delivery of the type-i
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supplier by y∗i (Xi, qi, pi), i ∈ {H,L}. Where convenient, we suppress the explicit
dependence of y∗i on the contract terms. The expressions of πH , πL and y
∗
i can be
obtained from Proposition 1.
Using these definitions, we present the manufacturer’s contract design problem as















(I.C. H) πH(XH , qH , pH) ≥ πH(XL, qL, pL), (2.3b)
(I.C. L) πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ πL(XH , qH , pH), (2.3c)
(I.R. H) πH(XH , qH , pH) ≥ 0, (2.3d)
(I.R. L) πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ 0, (2.3e)
XH ≥ 0, XL ≥ 0, qH ≥ 0, qL ≥ 0, pH ≥ 0, pL ≥ 0. (2.3f)
The objective function (2.3a) of this problem is the sum of the manufacturer’s
expected profits from the high and low supplier types, each weighted by the proba-
bility of drawing that type of supplier. Constraints (I.C. H) are (I.C. L) are incentive
compatibility constraints, which ensure that a supplier does not benefit from lying
about its type to the manufacturer. Constraints (I.R. H) and (I.R. L) are individual
rationality constraints, which reflect the fact that a supplier accepts the contract only
if its reservation profit is met. We assume that both supplier types have the same
reservation profit, normalized to zero. This assumption is common in mechanism
design problems, and has been used in both the economics literature (e.g., Myerson,
1981; Che, 1993) and the operations management literature (e.g. Lim, 1997; Corbett
et al., 2004).
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2.4. Optimal Contracts under Symmetric Information
To explore the influence of asymmetric information, as a benchmark we first derive
the optimal menu of contracts when the manufacturer knows perfectly the reliability














“High” and “Low” refer to the supplier’s type.
“Penalty” and “Backup” refer to the manufac-
turer’s choice of inducing the supplier to pay a
penalty or use backup production in case of dis-
ruption.
“No order” indicates that the manufacturer does
not order from the supplier.
Figure 2.2: Supplier’s actions induced by the manufacturer’s optimal menu of con-
tracts under symmetric information.
Under symmetric information, nature reveals the supplier type to the supplier
and the manufacturer simultaneously. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints
(2.3b) and (2.3c) in the manufacturer’s problem (2.3) are no longer required, and the
manufacturer’s choice of the contract for one supplier type does not interfere with
the choice for the other type. At optimality, the individual rationality constraints in
the manufacturer’s optimization problem will be binding, and either type of supplier
earns zero profit. This is formalized in Proposition 2 below, which describes the
optimal menu of contracts and resulting profits.5 Let π̌M |i(Xi, qi, pi) and π̌i(Xi, qi, pi)
denote the manufacturer’s and supplier’s profits, given that nature draws a supplier
of type i, i ∈ {H,L}, and the manufacturer offers contract (Xi, qi, pi) to the supplier
of type i. Thus, α π̌M |H + (1− α) π̌M |L is the manufacturer’s expected profit prior to
nature drawing the supplier type, where we have suppressed the contract terms. Let
5The legal requirement that penalties (or “liquidated damages”) do not exceed a reasonable
estimate of the buyer’s damages translates to p ≤ r in our model. This condition is satisfied by the
buyer’s optimal contracts derived in this chapter.
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π̌∗M |i and π̌
∗
i denote the manufacturer’s and supplier’s profits under the manufacturer’s
optimal contract. Figure 2.2 illustrates the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The manufacturer’s optimal contract under symmetric information
is
Region Penalty Quantity Transfer Payment
(i): r > b
any pH ∈ (b, r) qH = 1 XH = cH + (1− h)b
any pL ∈ (b, r) qL = 1 XL =

b b < cL/l
cL + (1− l)b b ≥ cL/l
(ii): b ≥ r > cL/l
any pH ∈ [cH/h, b] qH = 1 XH = cH + (1− h)pH
any pL ∈ [cL/l, b] qL = 1 XL = cL + (1− l)pL
(iii): b ≥ r, cL/l ≥ r
any pH ∈ [cH/h, b] qH = 1 XH = cH + (1− h)pH
any pL ∈ [0, r) qL = 0 XL = 0
Furthermore, the supplier’s profit is zero, that is, π̌∗H = π̌
∗
L = 0, and the man-
ufacturer extracts the entire channel profit (π̌M |i is the manufacturer’s profit if the
supplier is of type i, i ∈ {H,L}), given in the following table:
Region π̌∗M |H π̌
∗
M |L
(i) and b < cL/l r − cH − (1− h) b r − b
(i) and b ≥ cL/l r − cH − (1− h) b r − cL − (1− l) b
(ii) h r − cH l r − cL
(iii) h r − cH 0
From Proposition 2, in region (i), backup production is cheap relative to the
product’s market revenue, so the manufacturer uses backup production with both
types of suppliers. In the sequel, if the manufacturer’s contract induces the supplier
to use backup production in case of disruption, we will refer to this by the shorthand
term “using backup production”. In region (ii), backup production is costly, and the
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manufacturer induces both types to pay a penalty in case of disruption. In the sequel,
if the manufacturer’s contract induces the supplier to pay penalties, we will refer to
this by the shorthand term “paying penalty”. In region (iii), the unit revenue, r, is
too low to justify ordering from the low-type supplier.
Per Proposition 2, under symmetric information, the manufacturer extracts all
channel profit. Let πC|i(Xi, qi, pi), i ∈ {H,L}, denote the channel’s profit when nature
draws a supplier of type i and the manufacturer offers this supplier contract (Xi, qi, pi),
and let π∗C|i denote the channel’s optimal profit. Hence, π
∗
C|i is given by π̌
∗
M |i, and the
optimal contract under symmetric information also maximizes the channel’s profit.
It will be of interest in the following section to examine the channel’s profit loss when
the manufacturer offers a contract different from the contract in Proposition 2. In
particular, we define the following.
Definition 2. ∆(X, q, p)
4
= π∗C|L − πC|L(X, q, p) is the channel loss given that nature
draws a low-type supplier and the manufacturer offers this supplier contract (X, q, p).
2.5. Optimal Contracts under Asymmetric Information
In this section, we first overview the procedure of solving the manufacturer’s
problem (2.3) by describing the tradeoffs involved in the solution. The solution is
presented in Proposition 3 below. We then compare the optimal contract with that
under symmetric information.
The fundamental tradeoff. We first notice from re-arranging equation (3.2)
that −Xi + piE(qi − y∗i )+ = −πi(Xi, qi, pi) − ci z∗i − bE(y∗i − ρi z∗i )+ for i ∈ {H,L},
where z∗i is the optimal size of the regular production run for the type-i supplier.
We suppress the dependence of z∗i on the contract terms (Xi, qi, pi) for notational











r Emin(y∗L, D)− πL(XL, qL, pL)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L)+
]
 . (2.4)
Second, as an outcome of the mechanism design problem (see the proof of Propo-
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sition 3 in the appendix of this chapter), at the optimal solution, the high-type
supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint is binding, that is πH(XH , qH , pH) =
πH(XL, qL, pL). Combining this observation with the definition of Γ(q, p) (Defini-
tion 3), we have πH(XH , qH , pH) = πL(XL, qL, pL) + Γ(qL, pL). At the same time,
the low-type supplier’s individual rationality constraint (2.3c) is also binding, that
is πL(XL, qL, pL) = 0. Therefore, at optimality, the profit of the high-type supplier,
πH(XH , qH , pH), equals Γ(qL, pL), which is a function of the contract terms offered to
the low-type supplier. In addition, at the optimal solution, the individual rationality
constraint for the high-type supplier (2.3d) and the incentive compatibility constraint
for the low-type supplier (2.3c) turn out to be non-binding. Hence, we can roll bind-
ing constraints (2.3b) and (2.3e) into the objective function (2.4) by substituting
πH(XH , qH , pH) = Γ(qL, pL) and πL(XL, qL, pL) = 0 into (2.4) and separating terms



















Third, we observe that the bracketed expressions in (2.5a) and (2.5b) are the
same as the profit of the channel with a high-type and low-type supplier, respec-
tively. Therefore, when the manufacturer chooses (XH , qH , pH) to maximize (2.5a),
the resulting profit equals π∗C|H . Furthermore, applying the definition of ∆ (Defini-
tion 4), we can rewrite the manufacturer’s objective function (2.5) as
απ∗C|H + (1− α) π∗C|L − min
(XL,qL,pL)
{
αΓ(qL, pL) + (1− α) ∆(XL, qL, pL)
}
. (2.6)
Observe from (2.6) that the manufacturer’s profit is the optimal channel profit under
symmetric information minus two types of losses due to asymmetric information:
Γ(qL, pL), which can be interpreted as the incentive payment to the high-type supplier
to represent itself truthfully, and ∆(XL, qL, pL), the loss in the channel profit. Thus,
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the manufacturer’s decision boils down to selecting a contract, (XL, qL, pL), offered
to the low-type supplier, to minimize the sum of these two losses. To mitigate the
loss due to the incentive payment, the manufacturer deviates from the contract that
is optimal with the low-type supplier under symmetric information, causing channel
loss (per Definition 4). This tradeoff between Γ(qL, pL) and ∆(XL, qL, pL) is the
fundamental tradeoff in our analysis.
Optimal contracts under asymmetric information. Following the steps
outlined above, we derive the optimal solution to problem (2.3). We divide the (b, r)
plane into five regions using five lines, as illustrated on the right panel of Figure 2.3.




























Stop ordering from 
low-type supplier










Figure 2.3: The supplier’s actions induced by the manufacturer’s optimal menu
of contracts under symmetric information (left panel) and asymmetric information
(right panel). The effects of asymmetric information are indicated on the right panel.
Region (i) is the union of regions (I), (II) and (IV); region (ii) is the union of region
(III) and the shaded portion of region (V); and region (iii) is the unshaded portion
of region (V).
The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows the salient features of the menu of optimal
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contracts under asymmetric information. The optimal contract terms vary by region,
and details are provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under asymmetric information, the optimal unit penalties, pH and
pL, order quantities, qH and qL, and transfer payments, XH and XL, offered to the
high- and low-type suppliers are:
Region Penalty Quantity Transfer payment
(I)
any pH ∈ (b, r) qH = 1
XH = XL =

b b < cL/l
cL + (1− l) b b ≥ cL/lany pL ∈ (b, r) qL = 1
(II)
any pH ∈ (b, r) qH = 1 XH = h (cL/l) + (1− h) b
pL = cL/l qL = 1 XL = cL/l
(III)
any pH ∈ [cL/l, b] qH = 1 XH = h (cL/l) + (1− h) pH
pL = cL/l qL = 1 XL = cL/l
(IV)
any pH ∈ (b, r) qH = 1 XH = cH + (1− h) b
any pL ∈ [0, r) qL = 0 XL = 0
(V)
any pH ∈ [cH/h, b] qH = 1 XH = cH + (1− h) pH
any pL ∈ [0, r) qL = 0 XL = 0
Furthermore, the low-type supplier’s profit is zero, π∗L = 0. The high-type sup-
plier’s profit, π∗H , and the manufacturer’s expected profits of sourcing from the high-
and low-type suppliers, π∗M |H and π
∗
M |L, are provided in the following table:
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Region Manufacturer’s profit High-type supplier’s profit
(I)
b < cL/l π
∗
M |H = π
∗
M |L = r − b π
∗
H = h b− cH
b ≥ cL/l π∗M |H = π
∗
M |L = r − cL − (1− l) b π
∗
H = (h− l) b+ (cL − cH)
(II)
π∗M |H = r − h(cL/l)− (1− h)b
π∗H = (h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)
π∗M |L = l r − cL
(III) π∗M |H = h(r − cL/l), π
∗
M |L = l(r − cL/l) π
∗
H = (h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)
(IV) π∗M |H = r − cH − (1− h) b, π
∗
M |L = 0 π
∗
H = 0
(V) π∗M |H = h r − cH , π
∗
M |L = 0 π
∗
H = 0
Effect of asymmetric information on the optimal contract. Using Propo-
sitions 2 and 3, we compare the manufacturer’s optimal risk-management policies un-
der symmetric and asymmetric information and highlight the difference in Figure 2.3,
addressing research question 1. Specifically, in region (II), under asymmetric infor-
mation, the manufacturer induces the high-type supplier to use backup production
in case of disruption, but (unlike the optimal contract under symmetric information)
makes the low-type supplier pay a penalty. This is, perhaps, counterintuitive, be-
cause the manufacturer uses backup production as a quantity-risk management tool.
Therefore, one might expect that the less reliable the supplier is, the more the man-
ufacturer prefers that the supplier uses backup production. In regions (IV) and (V),
as in the symmetric-information case, the manufacturer orders from the high-type
supplier. However, in region (IV) and the shaded portion of region (V), information
asymmetry causes the manufacturer to stop ordering from the low-type supplier.
To gain intuition for this behavior, note that the manufacturer deviates from
the symmetric-information risk-management policies in order to reduce the incentive
payment to the high-type supplier. Specifically, in region (II), had the low-type sup-
plier used backup production, the resulting transfer payment to the low-type supplier
would have been large, because backup production is relatively expensive. Conse-
quently, the incentive payment to the high-type supplier would have been large as
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well. Therefore, the manufacturer curtails this large incentive payment by forcing the
low-type supplier to pay penalty (less than the cost of backup production). Similarly,
in region (IV) and the shaded portion of region (V) the incentive payment is avoided
by simply not ordering from the low-type supplier.
As a consequence of the deviation from the symmetric-information contract, we
have the following result.
Corollary 2. The quantity received by the manufacturer from the supplier under
symmetric information is stochastically larger than the quantity received under asym-
metric information.
The manufacturer deviates from the symmetric-information risk-management poli-
cies in order to reduce incentive payments. In doing so it incurs channel loss, as
captured by the fundamental tradeoff in equation (2.6).
Informational rent and channel loss. Using the optimal contract terms from
Proposition 3, we can evaluate the incentive payment to the high-type supplier,
Γ(qL, pL), and channel loss, ∆(XL, qL, pL), at the optimal contract (XL, qL, pL) of-
fered to the low-type supplier. Hereafter, we denote the incentive payment at the
optimal contracts by γ and refer to it as informational rent, as is customary in in-
formation economics. In addition, let δ denote the channel loss under the optimal
contracts. The expressions of γ and δ are provided in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 reveals that under the optimal contract, in all regions except region
(II), the manufacturer incurs either informational rent or channel loss, but not both.
Intuitively, the manufacturer chooses the less onerous type of loss. For example, in
regions (IV) and (V), revenue is so low that the channel loss due to not ordering from
the low-type supplier is small. In return for this sacrifice, the manufacturer avoids
paying what would have been relatively high informational rent. In region (I), backup
production is so cheap that the channel loss due to not using backup production with
the low-type supplier is large. On the other hand, in region (III), backup production
29
Region Informational rent, γ Channel loss, δ
(I)
b < cL/l h b− cH 0
b ≥ cL/l (h− l) b+ (cL − cH) 0
(II) (h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH) (1− l)(r − b)
(III) (h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH) 0
(IV)
b < cL/l 0 r − b
b ≥ cL/l 0 r − cL − (1− l) b
(V)
r > cL/l 0 l r − cL
r ≤ cL/l 0 0
Table 2.1: Informational rent, γ, and channel loss, δ, at the optimal contracts under
asymmetric information.
is so costly that it would not be used with symmetric or asymmetric information,
while high unit revenue entices the manufacturer to order from either supplier type.
Therefore, there is no channel loss incurred in regions (I) and (III). In region (II) the
manufacturer incurs a mixture of informational rent and channel loss.
2.6. Values of Information and Backup Production
In this section, we address research questions 2 and 3, examining how the value
of information and the value of backup production depend on important problem
parameters: backup production cost b and unit revenue r. As in the previous sections,
all the figures in this section represent analytically derived results.
Value of information for an entity of the supply chain is the difference between
its optimal expected profits under symmetric and asymmetric information.
The manufacturer earns the entire channel profit under symmetric information.
However, under asymmetric information, it loses informational rent, γ, if the supplier
is of high-type and suffers a channel loss, δ, if the supplier is of low-type (see the
fundamental tradeoff in equation (2.6)). Therefore, the value of information for the
manufacturer equals αγ + (1 − α)δ (where expressions for γ and δ are provided in
Table 2.1).
The supplier makes no profit under symmetric information, regardless of its type.
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Under asymmetric information, the low-type supplier continues to make zero profit.
Therefore, the value of information is zero for the low-type supplier. In contrast,
the high-type supplier earns an informational rent, γ, under asymmetric information.
Hence, the value of information for the high-type supplier is −γ.
The channel loses a profit, δ, under asymmetric information, when the manu-
facturer offers the low-type supplier a contract that differs from what an integrated
channel would offer, as discussed earlier. The value of information for the channel
(prior to nature choosing supplier type) is (1−α) δ, where 1−α is the probability of
drawing a low-type supplier.
Value of information and the cost of backup production. We first study
how the value of information for the manufacturer, channel, and supplier change
in the unit backup production cost, b. The results are shown on the left panel of
Figure 2.4, which follows from Table 2.1 with unit revenue fixed at r = r0 above line
5 (marked on the right panel). The behavior for smaller values of r (below line 5) is
similar.
Value of information for the channel
b0
0b̂ r 0rcH /h cL /l
Value of information for the manufacturer
b0
0b̂ r 0rcH /h cL /l
Value of information for the high-type sup-
plier
b0
Region (I) Region (II) Region (III)




















( )0b̂ r 0r
0r
cL /l
Figure 2.4: Value of information reaches its peak at the rightmost border of region
(I), given a fixed r. b̂(r) is the union of line segments 1, 2, and 3.
For the manufacturer, the channel, and the supplier, the effect of information
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is most pronounced for moderate values of b. To gain intuition for this, consider a
large r (above line 5). For small values of b, backup production is so cheap that the
manufacturer would like both supplier types to use it. Similarly, if b is very expensive
the manufacturer does not want either type of supplier to use it. At these extreme
values of b, the manufacturer does not care to distinguish between supplier types and
can offer them the same contract, as formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Per Proposition 3, under asymmetric information, in regions (I) and
(III) the manufacturer can offer the same optimal contract to the two supplier types
by letting pH = pL.
In contrast, at medium values of b, the tradeoffs are more intricate and the man-
ufacturer may choose to stop using backup production with the low-type. Therefore,
this is the region where the manufacturer benefits the most from knowing the sup-
plier’s type.
Value of information and the unit revenue. We now study how the value of
information for the manufacturer, channel, and supplier changes in the unit revenue,
r. The results are shown on the left panel of Figure 2.5, leveraging Table 2.1. We
examine the value of information at a fixed backup production cost b = b0, where
b0 is marked on the right panel of Figure 2.5. The behavior for other values of b is
similar.
From Figure 2.5, observe that the value of information for the channel and the
high-type supplier is non-monotone with jumps at r̄ and r̂, where r̄ corresponds
to line 5 and b̂(r̂) = b0. Each discontinuity coincides with a strategic decision by
the manufacturer to change whether it incurs informational rent, channel loss, or
both, as captured by Table 2.1. For example, for r ≤ r̄ the manufacturer avoids
paying an informational rent by not ordering from the low-type supplier, but once
r > r̄ the low-type receives an order and informational rent is incurred (along with
channel loss). Finally, observe that the value of information is always increasing
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Figure 2.5: Value of information versus unit revenue, r. b̂(r) is the union of line
segments 1, 2, and 3.
for the manufacturer, and is increasing within each region for the channel. From
Corollary 2, the quantity received by the manufacturer and hence the quantity sold
are stochastically smaller under asymmetric information. The larger the unit revenue,
the larger loss the manufacturer would suffer due to the reduction of sales. Similar
reasoning applies for the channel, within each region.
Value of backup production. For the manufacturer, supplier and channel, we
examine the value of the backup production option, defined to be the difference be-
tween profits with and without backup production (where the latter can be computed
by setting b = r, making backup production economically unattractive). The expres-
sions for the value of backup production in Table 2.2 (see the Appendix) are derived
from Proposition 3. It can be verified using Table 2.2 that the value of backup produc-
tion for the manufacturer and the value for the channel are decreasing in the backup
production cost b, increasing in the revenue r, and nonnegative under asymmetric
information.
As shown in Figure 2.6, the value of backup production for the high-type supplier
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Region Manufacturer High-type supplier
(I) (r > r̄)
b < cL/l (r − b)− θ̄ (r − cL/l) h (b− cL/l)
b ≥ cL/l [r − cL − (1− l) b]− θ̄ (r − cL/l) (h− l)(b− cL/l)
(I) (r ≤ r̄) b < cL/l (r − b)− αh (r − cH/h) h b− cH
b ≥ cL/l [r − cL − (1− l) b]− αh (r − cH/h) (h− l) b+ (cL − cH)
(II), (IV) α (1− h)(r − b) 0
(III), (V) 0 0
Table 2.2: Value of backup production for the manufacturer and high-type supplier
under asymmetric information. θ̄ = αh+(1−α)l is the average reliability of suppliers
and r̄ is defined by line 5 in Figure 2.3.
is non-monotone in backup production cost, b, and could be negative. Recall that
the profit of the high-type supplier comes from informational rent. For small r (i.e.,
r ≤ r̄), the high-type supplier earns zero informational rent in the absence of backup
production, because the low-type supplier receives no orders. Therefore, for such r the
value of adding backup production can only be positive. On the other hand, for large
r (i.e., r > r̄), the high-type supplier earns informational rent even in the absence
of a backup production option. Introducing a cheap backup production option of
unit cost b < cL/l reduces the economic advantage of being a high-type supplier, by
allowing disruptions to be cheaply remedied. This diminishes the high-type supplier’s
informational rent. Therefore, for small b and large r, the value of backup production
is negative for the high-type supplier.
Value of backup production for the high-type supplier
b0
cH /h cL /l
For small r
For large r
Figure 2.6: Value of backup production for the high-type supplier is negative for
large r (i.e., r > r̄) and small b (b < cL/l), but is always non-negative for small r
(i.e., r ≤ r̄).
Effect of information on the value of backup production. Intuition might
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suggest that, if information asymmetry regarding supplier reliability is eliminated,
then the manufacturer will make better use of the backup production option to man-
age the supply risk. Hence, one may expect the value of backup production to be
larger under symmetric information. However, as shown on the left panel of Fig-
ure 2.7, the value of backup production may be larger or smaller under symmetric
information. Under information asymmetry, the presence of a backup option with a
small unit cost, b, results in a decrease in the informational rent paid to the high-type
supplier. This additional benefit of backup production does not exist under symmet-
ric information. As a result, under small b the value of backup production is greater
under asymmetric information. In contrast, when b is moderate, under asymmetric
information the backup option increases the informational rent paid to the high-type
supplier, thus diminishing the value of backup production.
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Figure 2.7: Value of backup production under symmetric and asymmetric informa-
tion. The left panel plots the values of backup production for r = r0 (marked on the
right panel). On the right panel the shaded portion of region (I) indicates (b, r) pairs
for which the value of backup production is greater under asymmetric information.
The right panel also shows the line b(r), used on the left panel and defined as follows:
for r > r̄, b(r) = cL
l

















In this section, we address research question 4 by investigating the sensitivity of
our earlier results to changes in the underlying business setting, including reliability
parameters, h and l, the fraction of high-type suppliers in the market, α, and the
manufacturer’s contracting flexibility.
Sensitivity to supplier reliabilities, h and l. Suppose we increase h and l
simultaneously, fixing the difference, h − l. This corresponds to the case in which
all suppliers in the market become more reliable while the reliability gap between
the two supplier types remains constant. While one might expect that the value of
information should always decrease as suppliers become more reliable, the following
corollary shows that when unit revenue is relatively small, or backup production is
relatively cheap, the value of information for the manufacturer can actually increase
with supplier reliability.
Corollary 4 (Sensitivity of value of information to supplier reliability). Per Table 2.1,
if the supplier reliabilities l and h increase to l+ ε and h+ ε, respectively (while h− l
remains constant), then in the interior of regions (I), (IV) and (V) the value of
information for the manufacturer increases, while in the interiors of regions (II) and
(III) the value of information for the manufacturer decreases.
The intuition for the behavior in regions (I), (IV) and (V) can be gleaned from
Table 2.1. In regions (IV) and (V), only channel loss is incurred due to the manufac-
turer not ordering from the low-type supplier. The more reliable the low-type supplier
becomes, the larger this channel loss and, hence, the larger the value of information.
On the other hand, in region (I), only informational rent is incurred. In the part of
region (I) where backup production is very cheap (b < cL/l), the low-type supplier
does not utilize regular production at all, and its unit production cost is fixed at
the cost of backup production. As the high-type supplier’s reliability, h, increases,
its reliability advantage also increases, which drives up the informational rent and,
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hence, the value of information.
Using Table 2.2, we next examine how the value of backup production changes.
The next corollary follows from the fact that the manufacturer’s need for backup
production diminishes as suppliers become more reliable.
Corollary 5 (Sensitivity of value of backup production to supplier reliability). Per
Table 2.2, if the supplier’s reliabilities h and l increase to h + ε and l + ε, respec-
tively (while h − l remains constant), then the value of backup production for the
manufacturer decreases.
Sensitivity to reliability gap, h− l. Here, we fix the low-type’s reliability,
l, and increase the high-type’s reliability, h. This corresponds to an increase in the
reliability gap, with the high-type supplier becoming more reliable. The following
corollary describes how the value of information and value of backup production
depend on the reliability gap.
Corollary 6 (Sensitivity to supplier reliability gap). Per Proposition 3 and Table 2.1,
if h increases and l is fixed, then
1. The value of information for the manufacturer increases.
2. The value of backup production for the manufacturer decreases, and the absolute
value of backup production for the high-type supplier increases.
Intuitively, as the two supplier types become increasingly different, information
about the supplier’s type becomes more critical. In addition, as the high-type sup-
plier becomes even more reliable, the probability that backup production is used
to fulfill the order decreases. Consequently, the value of backup production for the
manufacturer diminishes.
Sensitivity to the fraction of high-type suppliers in the market, α. Recall
that the value of information for the manufacturer is αγ+(1−α)δ, where informational
rent γ and channel loss δ do not depend on α, the probability of drawing a high-type
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supplier (see Table 2.1). In regions (I) and (III), where only informational rent is
incurred (channel loss is zero), the effect of informational rent is magnified due to an
increase in α, and the value of information becomes larger. In regions (IV) and (V),
where only channel loss is incurred (informational rent is zero), the effect of channel
loss is diminished due to a decrease in 1− α, and the value of information decreases.
In region (II), value of information can move either way in α, depending on whether
channel loss or informational rent is larger. These observations are formalized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 7 (Sensitivity of value of information to α). Per Table 2.1, if α increases
to α+ ε, then in the interior of regions (I) and (III), the value of information for the
manufacturer increases, while in the interiors of regions (IV) and (V) the value of
information for the manufacturer decreases. In region (II) the value of information
increases if (h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH) > (1− l)(r − b) and decreases otherwise.
Using Table 2.2, we examine how the value of backup production changes with α.
One may expect that, if the fraction of more reliable suppliers in the market increases,
disruptions will become less likely and, hence, the value of backup production will
decrease. This intuition holds under symmetric information, but not necessarily under
asymmetric information, as Corollary 8 illustrates.
Corollary 8 (Sensitivity of value of backup production to α). Per Table 2.2, as α
increases to α + ε, the value of backup production for the manufacturer decreases in
region (I) and increases in regions (II) and (IV).
To understand why the value of backup production increases in the fraction of
high-type suppliers when the cost of backup production is moderate (in regions (II)
and (IV)), recall that the manufacturer asks only the high-type supplier to use backup
production in these regions. Therefore, in these regions, the benefit of backup produc-
tion is realized only if a high-type supplier is drawn, and an increase in the fraction of
high-type suppliers, α, enhances the value of backup production for the manufacturer.
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Sensitivity to manufacturer’s contracting flexibility. We now discuss the
effects of the manufacturer’s contracting flexibility on its contracting decisions and
its profit, using three types of manufacturers:
1. Informed manufacturer, who knows the supplier’s type prior to contracting.
The informed manufacturer’s problem is the symmetric-information problem
(discussed in §2.4).
2. Partially-informed and discriminating manufacturer, who does not know the
supplier’s type prior to contracting, but knows that there are two supplier types
and has the flexibility of offering a menu of contracts. This manufacturer’s
problem is the asymmetric-information problem (discussed in §2.5).
3. Partially-informed and non-discriminating manufacturer, who is identical to
the partially informed and discriminating manufacturer, except for being con-
strained to offer a single contract. The manufacturer could either be legally
bound to offer a single contract or limited by its procurement department’s
resources to monitor and enforce multiple supplier-specific contacts.
As shorthand, we will refer to the latter two manufacturer types as discriminating
and non-discriminating, respectively. We have already defined mathematical models

















In the above expression, I{A} is the indicator of an event A. The manufacturer offers
a single contract (X, q, p). A type-i supplier, i ∈ {H,L}, chooses to participate if
πi(X, q, p) ≥ 0. The optimal contract is stated in Proposition 4 and is characterized
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Figure 2.8: Left panel: optimal contract offered by the non-discriminating manu-
facturer. Right panel: expected profits of the three manufacturer types (r is fixed
to be r0, marked on the left panel). The non-discriminating manufacturer earns a
smaller profit than the discriminating manufacturer only when b is moderate (i.e.,
(b, r) is in region (II)).
Proposition 4. The optimal contract offered by the non-discriminating manufacturer
is summarized in the following table
Region Penalty Quantity Transfer payment
(I) and (IIa) any p ∈ (b, r) q = 1 X =

b b < cL/l
cL + (1− l) b b ≥ cL/l
(III) and (IIb) any p = cL/l q = 1 X = cL/l
(IV) and (IIc) any p ∈ (b, r) q = 1 X = cH + (1− h) b
(V) any p ∈ [cH/h, b] q = 1 X = cH + (1− h) p
By comparing Propositions 3 and 4 and using Corollary 3, we notice that the op-
timal contracts offered by the discriminating and non-discriminating manufacturers
coincide in regions (I) and (III). Furthermore, the contracts offered by the two man-
ufacturer types coincide for the high-type supplier in regions (IV) and (V). In these
two regions, the low-type supplier does not participate with either manufacturer type.
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In region (II), where the discriminating manufacturer does use its power to discrimi-
nate between the two supplier types, the non-discriminating manufacturer does not
have that option and falls back on one of three kinds of contracts: the contracts in
subregions (IIa), (IIb), and (IIc) coincide, respectively, with the contracts offered by
the discriminating manufacturer in regions (I), (III), and (IV).
The right panel of Figure 2.8 shows the expected profits of the three manufacturer
types. The difference between the profits of the discriminating and informed manu-
facturer types equals the value of information for the manufacturer, discussed in §2.6.
Interestingly, the profits of the discriminating and non-discriminating manufacturer
types are different only in region (II). This happens because only in region (II) the
discriminating and non-discriminating manufacturers induce suppliers to take dif-
ferent actions. It follows that, in our model, the ability to discriminate pays off for
the manufacturer only if the backup production option is moderately expensive. The
reasoning for this is akin to that provided after Figure 2.4 to explain why information
is most valuable when backup production is moderately expensive.
2.8. Extension: Manufacturer’s Backup Production Option
So far, we have assumed that only the supplier has access to backup production
capacity. It is also possible that the manufacturer has its own backup production
option, the implications of which we investigate in this section.6
To the model we have been using so far, we add the ability of the manufacturer
to use its own backup production at unit cost bM . If both the supplier and the manu-
facturer have access to the same third-party backup source, then the manufacturer’s
cost of accessing this source, bM , may be higher or lower than the supplier’s cost,
b, depending, for example, on the relative bargaining powers of the supplier and the
manufacturer versus the third party. For example, if the manufacturer has more
6For example, in the Beckman Coulter v. Flextronics example we cited earlier, after Flextronics
failed to deliver the promised units, Beckman Coulter was able to convert one of its existing prototype
production lines for full-scale production.
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bargaining power than the supplier when negotiating the contract for the alternative
supply source, it can secure a lower price, resulting in bM < b. It is also possible
that, instead of having its own backup production option, the manufacturer asks the
supplier to run the supplier’s backup production even if the original contract did not
call for it. For instance, in region (II), if the low-type supplier experiences a disrup-
tion and according to the contract would not deliver, perhaps the manufacturer could
simply pay the supplier b and ask the supplier to run backup production. In such a
case, bM could be equal to b, but it is more likely that bM > b due to administrative
costs, for instance, the cost of verifying that a disruption indeed occurred. Verifica-
tion prevents the supplier from claiming to have had a disruption, and consequently
demanding the b payment from the manufacturer for backup production, regardless
of whether there was actually a disruption or not.
As before we assume that the cost of backup production exceeds the effective cost
of regular production for the high-type supplier, bM ≥ cH/h. To the contracting and
execution stages of the original problem (see the timeline in Figure 3.1), we append a
manufacturer recourse stage in which the manufacturer may run its backup produc-
tion. In the recourse stage, the manufacturer chooses si, i = H,L, the total product
supply that will be available to it at the stage’s conclusion. In the execution stage,
given a contract from the manufacturer, (Xi, qi, pi) i = H,L, the supplier’s produc-
tion decisions, y∗i and z
∗
i , are unaffected by the manufacturer’s backup production
option and are the same as those described in Proposition 1. In the contracting stage
the manufacturer designs the contract menu (Xi, qi, pi), i = H,L, and offers it to the
supplier.
To find the optimal contract menu we invoke the following intuitive observations.
Suppose the unit revenue for the product is fixed at some r = r0. First, if the
manufacturer’s backup production cost is greater than the revenue, bM > r0, the
manufacturer’s backup production option is economically infeasible and none of this
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chapter’s previous results change. Second, if bM ≤ r0, the optimal contracts under
symmetric and asymmetric information are, respectively, given by Propositions 2 and
3, where r is replaced by bM . Consequently, all of the subsequent analysis (value of
information, value of supplier backup production, etc.) goes through with bM playing
the role of r. To understand why, we observe that if the quantity delivered by the
supplier, y, is less than demand, D, the manufacturer pays bM(D − y)+ when the
manufacturer’s backup production option is available, and “pays” r(D−y)+ (via lost
revenue) when such an option is absent. Thus, mathematically, bM plays the same
role in this model as r played in equations (2.3a) and (2.4). (Proposition 5 in the
appendix of this chapter formalizes this argument.)
Addressing research question 1 we notice from Corollary 2 that asymmetric infor-
mation increases the risk of non-delivery from the supplier. This effect increases the
manufacturer’s reliance on its own backup production option.
Addressing research question 2 we examine how introducing the manufacturer’s
backup production option affects the manufacturer’s value of information. Recall
from Figure 2.5 that the value of information increases in r, the unit shortfall cost
in the absence of the manufacturer’s backup production option. As pointed out
earlier, the presence of the manufacturer’s backup production option reduces the
manufacturer’s unit shortfall cost from r to bM < r. By making the manufacturer
less sensitive to shortfall, the manufacturer’s backup production option reduces the
value of information. Thus, addressing research question 3, the manufacturer’s backup
production option is a substitute for information. In particular, this means that the
value of the manufacturer’s backup production option is greater under asymmetric
information. This is in contrast to the supplier’s backup production option, which
can be either a substitute or a complement for information. Intuitively, the supplier’s
backup production option can increase the high-type supplier’s reliability advantage,
thus increasing the informational rent, whereas the manufacturer’s backup production
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option has no such effect.
Similarly, the manufacturer’s backup production option is a substitute for the
supplier’s backup production option. This is because the value of the supplier’s
backup production option increases in the unit shortfall cost (see Table 2.2, where
the shortfall cost equals r). The introduction of the manufacturer’s backup production
option reduces this shortfall cost from r to bM < r, thereby reducing the value of the
supplier’s backup production option.
2.9. Concluding Remarks
In a supply chain, lack of visibility into supplier reliability impedes the manufac-
turer’s ability to manage supply risk effectively. This chapter examines a situation
where the supplier’s reliability is either high or low and is its private information, and
the supplier has two options to respond to a disruption: use backup production, or
pay a penalty to the manufacturer for non-delivery. When designing a procurement
contract, the manufacturer must anticipate which of these options the supplier would
choose, and how this would affect the manufacturer’s expected procurement costs,
use of its own backup production option, and sales revenues. To our knowledge, this
chapter is among the first in operational risk management to consider asymmetric
information about supplier reliability.
We model the manufacturer’s contracting decisions as a mechanism design prob-
lem, and derive closed-form expressions for the optimal menu of contracts that elicits
the supplier’s private information. We observe that the manufacturer faces a key
tradeoff when designing the contract for the low-type supplier: pay high informa-
tional rent to the high-type supplier, or suffer channel loss. Informational rent comes
from the high-type supplier’s incentive to exploit its reliability advantage over the
low-type supplier, and it depends on the low-type supplier’s actions in response to
a disruption. In controlling this incentive, the manufacturer offers to the low-type
supplier a contract that would be suboptimal under symmetric information, result-
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ing in the channel loss. This tradeoff between informational rent and channel loss
determines how the manufacturer manages its supply risk.
We answered four main research questions in this chapter. Addressing research
question 1 (How do a manufacturer’s risk-management strategies change in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information about supply reliability? ), we find that asymmetric
information can have a pronounced effect on the manufacturer’s risk-management
strategy. While information asymmetry encourages the use of the manufacturer’s
backup production option, it discourages the use of the supplier’s backup production
option. In particular, information asymmetry may cause the manufacturer to stop
using the backup production of a less reliable supplier, while continuing to use the
backup production of a more reliable supplier. Additionally, the manufacturer may
stop ordering from the less reliable supplier altogether.
Addressing research question 2 (How much would the manufacturer be willing to
pay to eliminate this information asymmetry? ), we obtain a closed-form expression
for the value of information. We find that the manufacturer would be willing to pay
the most for information — that is, asymmetric information is of the greatest concern
for managers — when the supplier’s backup production is moderately expensive. In
this case, the manufacturer predicates the supplier’s use of backup production on
the supplier’s type. In contrast, when the supplier’s backup production is cheap or
expensive, the manufacturer’s decision to induce the use of backup production does
not depend on the supplier’s type.
Addressing research question 3 (Are risk-management tools more, or less, valu-
able when there is information asymmetry? ), asymmetric information enhances the
benefits the manufacturer derives from its own backup production option. The effect
of information on the value of the supplier’s backup production option is more in-
tricate. For the manufacturer, information asymmetry makes the supplier’s backup
production option more valuable provided it is moderately expensive, and less valu-
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able when it is cheap, but the value is always positive. On the flip side, for the
supplier, under symmetric information, the value of its backup production option is
always zero. However, under asymmetric information, the value of the backup pro-
duction option for the high-type supplier is positive provided backup production is
moderately expensive, but is negative when it is cheap. Cheap backup production for
the supplier erodes the high-type supplier’s reliability advantage over the low-type
by reducing the cost of remedying supply disruptions. Therefore, an already reliable
supplier may be reluctant to embrace the addition of cheap backup production into
the supply base.
Addressing research question 4 (How do answers to the above questions depend
on changes in the underlying business environment, such as supply base heterogene-
ity, or the manufacturer’s contracting flexibility? ), we find that, as the reliability gap
between the two supplier types increases due to an improvement in the reliability
of the high-type supplier, information becomes more valuable for the manufacturer.
Interestingly, the value of information may increase even as both supplier types si-
multaneously become more reliable. Therefore, higher reliability need not be a sub-
stitute for better information. The high-type supplier’s benefit (or disbenefit) from
its backup production option is magnified as its reliability improves. In particular,
an improvement in the reliability of the high-type supplier may actually enhance its
benefit from backup production. Finally, we find that the flexibility to offer a menu of
two contracts to the supplier benefits the manufacturer only if supplier backup pro-
duction is moderately expensive. Thus, a manufacturer who does not want to exert
the effort to offer a menu of contracts need not do so if supplier backup production
is cheap or very expensive.
The above findings were derived through closed-form analysis, facilitated by sev-
eral simplifying assumptions. We assumed the manufacturer’s demand, D, is common
knowledge. Maskin and Tirole (1990) (Section 4, Proposition 11) proved that if (i) the
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principal (the manufacturer) also has private information, (ii) the principal’s infor-
mation cannot directly affect the agent’s payoffs, and (iii) the agent’s and principal’s
payoffs are quasi-linear in the transfer payment, then the principal derives no benefit
from its private information; in other words, without loss of optimality one can focus
on the situation in which the information about the principal is public. Applied to
our model, this means that when the manufacturer has private information about its
demand, it can do no better than when this information is public.
Another assumption on demand is that it is deterministic. We conjecture that
the main tradeoffs identified in this chapter would remain if demand were stochastic,
however, the details of how these tradeoffs play out would change. This analysis
would be far more complicated owing to the monotonicity condition and bunching
(Laffont and Martimort, 2002, pages 39, 140), meaning the contract design problem
cannot be separated into independent subproblems for the high and low types.
We expect that increasing the number of discrete supplier types would also not
substantially change the main qualitative insights documented in answers one through
four above, although it would make the analysis more tedious. Having more than two
supplier types or allowing a continuum of types may again create problems with
monotonicity conditions. For an illustration of principal-agent problems with three
agent types, please refer to Laffont and Martimort (2002). For a general treatment
of mechanism design with N agent types, see Lovejoy (2006). For a discussion of
detailed monotonicity conditions under a continuum of types, see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991), pages 266 – 268.
We also assume linear backup production costs, and restrict the manufacturer to
offer linear penalty schedules to the supplier. As a result, the supplier would either
run backup production or pay a penalty, but not both simultaneously. We can show
that under general, concave backup production costs and concave penalty schedules
for shortfall, the supplier’s production decisions are unchanged and, consequently, all
47
of our results continue to hold. An example of a concave penalty schedule (backup
production cost) is a fee-plus schedule, whereby the supplier pays a fixed fee plus
an additional fee per unit of shortage (backup production quantity). Convex backup
production costs are also possible in practice, however, incorporating them into the
model makes the analysis significantly more difficult.
We modeled supply risk using a random yield framework. One could also model
supply risk arising from supplier lead time uncertainty. Under certain conditions the
two approaches are equivalent: For example, for a manufacturer whose selling season
is short relative to the variability in supply lead times, a delay is tantamount to a
disruption and the backup option corresponds to the ability of the supplier to expedite
the production (and the delivery). A more general model would have to introduce
the manufacturer’s sensitivity to delivery delays and the ability of the supplier to
speed up (at a cost) depending on the forecast of the remaining production time.
One might also wish to model the supplier’s decision to slow down production (at a
cost savings). With such features, the supplier’s problem becomes a rather intricate
stochastic control problem, compounding the difficulty of finding the manufacturer’s
optimal menu of contracts. We leave this interesting and challenging topic for future
research.
In this chapter, we assume that the cost of regular production is perfectly cor-
related with the supplier type and the expected backup production cost is public
information. Allowing imperfect correlation between supplier reliability and its cost,
or extending information asymmetry to backup production, would require solving a
multi-dimensional screening problem. Such problems have been solved for rather few,
special cases (see Kostamis and Duenyas, 2007). We leave the study of this problem
to future research as well.
48
2.10. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The supplier’s problem is given in (3.2). We first derive




{p (q − y)+ + b (y − ρ z)+}.
Because the objective function is piecewise linear in y, we focus on the corner point
solutions, y ∈ {0, ρ z, q}. If p < b, the optimal delivery quantity is y∗(z) = ρ z. If
b < p, the optimal delivery quantity is y∗(z) = q. If b = p, the supplier is indifferent
between the two choices. To break the tie, we assume that the supplier prefers paying
a penalty, that is, y∗(z) = ρ z.
Given the optimal delivery quantity y∗(z) as described above, we next derive the
optimal size of the regular production run, z∗, by solving
min
z≥0
{c z + Eρ [p (q − ρ z)+]} if b ≥ p,
min
z≥0
{c z + Eρ [b (q − ρ z)+]} if p > b.
If b ≥ p, by evaluating the expectation, the optimization problem reduces to
min
z≥0
{c z + θ p (q − z)+}+ (1− θ) p q.
From above, we observe that, if p < c/θ, the optimal solution is z∗ = 0, and, if
p > c/θ, we have z∗ = q. When p = c/θ, we let z∗ = q to break the tie. Analogously,
if p > b, the optimal solution is z∗ = 0 for b < c/θ and z∗ = q for b ≥ c/θ. The
expressions for the supplier’s expected profit are derived by substituting z∗ and y∗(z∗)
into the objective function of problem (3.2). 
Proof of Proposition 2. To find the optimal contract under symmetric informa-
49











r Emin(y∗L, D)−XL + pLE(qL − y∗L)+
]

subject to πH(XH , qH , pH) ≥ 0, πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ 0,
XH ≥ 0, XL ≥ 0, qH ≥ 0, qL ≥ 0, pH ≥ 0, pL ≥ 0.
We apply the supplier’s optimal profit function πi(Xi, qi, pi) = Xi − ci z∗i − piE(qi −
y∗i )
+ − bE(y∗i − ρi z∗i )+, i ∈ {H,L}, to the manufacturer’s objective function and
separate the terms that depend on (XH ,qH , pH) and (XL, qL, pL), respectively. The





r Emin(y∗H , D)− πH(XH , qH , pH)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H)+
}
(2.8a)




r Emin(y∗L, D)− πL(XL, qL, pL)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L)+
}
. (2.8b)
Observe that, for i ∈ {H,L}, reducing Xi decreases πi(Xi, qi, pi) and increases the
objective value. Therefore, for a given qi and pi, it is optimal to set Xi equal to its
lowest possible value, which is given by Xi = ci z
∗
i + piE(qi− y∗i )+ + bE(y∗i + ρi z∗i )+,




r Emin(y∗H , D)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H)+
}
(2.9a)
+ (1− α) max
qL≥0, pL≥0
{
r Emin(y∗L, D)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L)+
}
(2.9b)
Xi = ci z
∗
i + piE(qi − y∗i )+ + bE(y∗i + ρi z∗i )+, i = H,L. (2.9c)
We now solve problem (2.9b), where a low-type supplier is drawn. In the following
table, each combination of the constraint on pL and the condition on b versus cL/l
corresponds to a case in Proposition 1. For each combination of constraint and
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condition, the following table provides the objective function obtained by substituting
z∗L and y
∗
L (from Proposition 1) into (2.9b).
Constraint on pL Condition Objective function
A = {pL : pL > b}
b < cL/l r min(qL, 1)− b qL
b ≥ cL/l r min(qL, 1)− cL qL − (1− l) b qL
B = {pL : b ≥ pL, pL < cL/l} 0
C = {pL : b ≥ pL, pL ≥ cL/l} b ≥ cL/l l r min(qL, 1)− cL qL
For each constraint and condition, we find the optimal qL. Because in all cases
the objective function is piecewise linear in qL, we restrict our attention to corner-
point solutions, where qL = 0 or 1. When the two solutions yield the same objective
function value, we let qL = 0, following the convention that the manufacturer breaks
the tie in favor of smaller transfer payments. For instance, if pL ∈ A and b ≥ cL/l, it
is optimal to set qL = 1 if r − cL − (1 − l) b > 0, or qL = 0 if r − cL − (1 − l) b ≤ 0,
and pL can take any value in A. The constrained optimal (qL, pL) and the objective
function value in each of the four cases are summarized in the following table:




r − b > 0 1
any pL ∈ A
r − b
r − b ≤ 0 0 0
b ≥ cL/l
r − cL − (1− l) b > 0 1 r − cL − (1− l) b
r − cL − (1− l) b ≤ 0 0 0
B 0 any pL ∈ B 0
C b ≥ cL/l
r − cL/l > 0 1
any pL ∈ C
l r − cL
r − cL/l ≤ 0 0 0
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Next, to find the optimal qL and pL for problem (2.9b) we first consider the case
b ≥ cL/l and r > b. In this case, we have r > cL/l and r − cL − (1 − l) b > 0.
Therefore, if pL ∈ A, the objective function value is r − cL − (1− l) b. If pL ∈ B, the
objective value is 0. If pL ∈ C, the objective value is l r − cL. Thus, by comparing
the three values, we conclude that when r > b > cL/l, the optimal objective value is
r − cL − (1− l) b, obtained by setting pL ∈ A and qL = 1. For other values of r and
b, the analysis is similar.
The solution procedure for problem (2.9a) is analogous to that for problem (2.9b),
with cL and l being replaced by cH and h. (Recall that we assume that b > cH/h and
r > cH/h.)
To derive the optimal transfer payment Xi, we substitute the type-i supplier’s
decisions y∗i and z
∗
i under the optimal (qi, pi) into equation (2.9c). Moreover, without
loss of optimality, we restrict pH < r and pL < r whenever possible. This completes
the solution to problem (2.9). 
Proof of Proposition 3. To solve problem (2.3), we use the form (2.4) of the ob-
jective function (2.3a) (see §2.5). The following is the roadmap of the proof. To
solve problem (2.4, 2.3b–2.3f), we first reduce it to an equivalent problem over de-
cision variables qH , pH , qL, and pL. Then, we relax the monotonicity constraint in
the equivalent problem and show that the optimal solution to the relaxed problem is
indeed feasible.
To reduce problem (2.4, 2.3b–2.3f) to the equivalent problem, we use the following
three steps.
1. Rearrange the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints (2.3b–
2.3e). Recall Γ(q, p) reflects the reliability advantage of the high-type supplier.
From its definition (Definition 3),
πH(XL, qL, pL) = πL(XL, qL, pL) + Γ(qL, pL), and
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πL(XH , qH , pH) = πH(XH , qH , pH)− Γ(qH , pH).
Substituting these two equalities into incentive compatibility constraints (2.3b)
and (2.3c) yields Γ(qH , pH) ≥ πH(XH , qH , pH)−πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ Γ(qL, pL). The
latter inequality, together with Γ(qL, pL) ≥ 0 and πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ 0, implies
that the individual rationality constraint for the high-type, πH(XH , qH , pH) ≥ 0,
is redundant. Thus, constraints (2.3b–2.3e) are equivalent to
Γ(qH , pH) ≥ πH(XH , qH , pH)− πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ Γ(qL, pL), (2.10a)
πL(XL, qL, pL) ≥ 0. (2.10b)
2. Identify a set of constraints that is equivalent to (2.10) at optimality. The
manufacturer’s objective function (2.4) suggests that, for any given qi and pi,
i ∈ {H,L}, the objective function is maximized if Xi is chosen such that the
supplier’s profit πi(Xi, qi, pi) is minimized. Hence, by (2.10), at optimality XH
must be chosen such that πH(XH , qH , pH)−πL(XL, qL, pL) = Γ(qL, pL), and XL
must be chosen such that πL(XL, qL, pL) = 0. Constraint set (2.10) degenerates
to
Γ(qH , pH) ≥ Γ(qL, pL), πH(XH , qH , pH) = Γ(qL, pL), πL(XL, qL, pL) = 0,
(2.11)
where constraint Γ(qH , pH) ≥ Γ(qL, pL) is commonly called the monotonicity
constraint in the economics literature.
3. Replace the constraints (2.3b–2.3f) with (2.11) and substitute πH(XH , qH , pH) =
Γ(qL, pL) and πL(XL, qL, pL) = 0 into the objective function (2.4). Problem (2.4,
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α[r Emin(y∗H , D)− Γ(qL, pL)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρ z∗H)]
+ (1− α)[r Emin(y∗L, D)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρ z∗L)]

subject to Γ(qH , pH) ≥ Γ(qL, pL) (monotonicity)
qH ≥ 0, qL ≥ 0, pH ≥ 0, pL ≥ 0,
(2.12)
where the optimal XH and XL can be found by setting πH(XH , qH , pH) =
Γ(qL, pL) and πL(XL, qL, pL) = 0, that is,
XH = Γ(qL, pL) + cH z
∗
H + pH E(qH − y∗H)+ + bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H)+, (2.13a)
XL = cL z
∗
L + pLE(qL − y∗L)+ + bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L)+. (2.13b)
To solve problem (2.12), we first temporarily relax its monotonicity constraint,
hoping that the constraint is non-binding at the optimal solution. The relaxation
is easier to solve in that we can rearrange the objective function and solve it as















Lemma 1 below solves problem (2.14). The lemma divides the (b, r) plane into
regions (I) through (V) shown in Figure 2.3, and characterizes the optimal solution
and the objective function of (2.14) in each region.
Next, to satisfy the monotonicity constraint, Γ(qH , pH) ≥ Γ(qL, pL), we choose
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the optimal solution in Lemma 1 to be such that pH ≥ pL whenever qL > 0. The
outcome satisfies the monotonicity constraint, because Γ(q, p) is increasing function
in both q and p (see Corollary 1), qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL.
Finally, we calculate XH , XL and the manufacturer’s realized profits, π
∗
M |H and
π∗M |L. XH and XL can be calculated using equations (2.13a) and (2.13b). π
∗
M |H and
π∗M |L are equal to the expressions in the two pairs of square brackets, respectively, in
(2.4), that is,
π∗M |H = r Emin(y
∗
H , D)− Γ(qL, pL)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H), and
π∗M |L = r Emin(y
∗
L, D)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L). 
Lemma 1. We divide the plane of (b, r), where b > cH/h and r > cH/h, into the
following five regions, as shown in Figure 2.3:
Region Condition Defining inequalities
(I)
b < cL/l (1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH) > 0
b ≥ cL/l
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)]
> {(1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)]}+
(II)
r > b, (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)] > 0
and (1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)]
≤ (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)]
(III) r ≤ b and (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)] > 0
(IV)
b < cL/l r > b and (1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH) ≤ 0
b ≥ cL/l
r > b, (1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)] ≤ 0
and (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)] ≤ 0
(V)
b < cL/l r ≤ b
b ≥ cL/l r ≤ b and (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)] ≤ 0
In each of the five regions, the optimal solutions and the objective function of
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problems (2.14a) and (2.14b) are:





qH = 1, pH ∈ (b, r)
qL = 1, pL ∈ (b, r)
α[r − cH − (1− h)b]




qH = 1, pH ∈ (b, r)
qL = 1, pL ∈ (b, r)
α[r − cH − (1− h)b]
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l)b]




qH = 1, pH ∈ (b, r)
qL = 1, pL = cL/l
α[r − cH − (1− h)b]
(1− α)(l r − cL)




qH = 1, pH ∈ [cH/h, b]
qL = 1, pL = cL/l
α(h r − cH)
(1− α)(l r − cL)




qH = 1, pH ∈ (b, r)
qL = 0, pL ∈ [0, r)





qH = 1, pH ∈ [cH/h, b]
qL = 0, pL ∈ [0, r)
α(h r − cH)
0
Proof of Lemma 1. We first solve problem (2.14a) for the optimal (qH , pH). This
problem is identical to problem (2.9a) under symmetric information. Please refer to
Proposition 2 for the optimal qH , pH , and objective function value.
Now we solve problem (2.14b) for the optimal (qL, pL). In the following table,
each combination of the constraint on pL, and the condition on b versus cL/l, corre-
sponds to a case in Corollary 1 that follows Proposition 1. For each combination of
constraint and condition, the following table provides the objective function obtained
by substituting z∗L, y
∗
L (from Proposition 1) and Γ(qL, pL) (from Corollary 1) into
(2.14b).
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Constraint Condition Objective function
A = {pL : pL > b}
b < cL/l (1− α)[r min(qL, 1)− b qL]− α(h b− cH) qL
b ≥ cL/l
(1− α)[r min(qL, 1)− cL qL − (1− l) b qL]
−α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)]qL
B = {pL : b ≥ pL, pL < cH/h} 0
C = {pL : b ≥ pL, cL/l > pL ≥ cH/h} −α (h pL − cH) qL
D = {pL : b ≥ pL, pL ≥ cL/l} b ≥ cL/l
(1− α)[l r min(qL, 1)− cL qL]
−α[(h− l) pL + (cL − cH)]qL
For each constraint and condition, we find the optimal qL and pL. We restrict
our attention to corner-point solutions, where qL = 0 or 1. The constrained optimal
(qL, pL) and the objective function value are summarized in the following table:




(1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH) > 0 1
any pL ∈ A
(1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH)
(1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH) ≤ 0 0 0
b ≥ cL/l
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]
− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)] > 0
1
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]
− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)]
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]
− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)] ≤ 0
0 0
B 0 any pL ∈ B 0
C 0 any pL ∈ C 0
D b ≥ cL/l
(1− α)(l r − cL)
− α[(h− l) (cL/l) + (cL − cH)] > 0
1 cL/l
(1− α)(l r − cL)
− α[(h− l) cL
l
+ (cL − cH)]
(1− α)(l r − cL)
− α[(h− l) (cL/l) + (cL − cH)] ≤ 0
0 any pL ∈ D 0
To find the optimal qL and pL for problem (2.14b) under b ≥ cL/l, we compare the
constrained objective function values when pL is in A, B, C, and D. The following
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expression of the optimal objective function value captures the comparison:
max{0, (1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)],
(1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l) (cL/l) + (cL − cH)]}.
For instance, if the second element in the curly brackets is strictly greater than the
other two, the optimal (qL, pL) under constraint A and condition (1−α)[r− cL− (1−
l) b] − α[(h − l) b + (cL − cH)] > 0 is optimal for problem (2.14b). (That is, qL = 1,
and pL ∈ A.) The analysis for the other cases are analogous. Under b < cL/l, we
compare the objective function values when pL is in A, B, and C. Analogously, we
use the following expression to represent the optimal objective function value:
max{0, (1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH)}.
Without loss of optimality, we restrict pH < r and pL < r whenever possible. The
result follows by applying the optimal solutions for problems (2.14a) and (2.14b) to
all five regions defined. 
Proof of Corollary 2. By Proposition 1, the manufacturer receives qL if the low-
type supplier uses backup production, or receives ρL qL if the low-type supplier pays a
penalty in the event of a disruption. We compare the expected quantities received by
the manufacturer under symmetric information and under asymmetric information in
regions (I) through (V). The result follows. 
Proof of Corollary 3. The result follows from Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4. To solve problem (2.7), we begin by applying equalities
X = πi(X, q, p) + ci z
∗
i + pE(q − y∗i )+ + bE(y∗i − ρi z∗i )+, i = H,L (2.15)
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α[r Emin(y∗H , D)− πH(X, q, p)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H)] I{πH(X,q,p)≥0}




Proposition 1 shows that, given a contract (X, q, p), a supplier with a higher
probability of success always earns a larger expected profit, that is, πH(X, q, p) ≥
πL(X, q, p). A contract (X, q, p) such that πH(X, q, p) < 0 will induce no participation,
leading to zero profit of the manufacturer. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that at least the high-type supplier would participate under the optimal contract, and,
therefore, we restrict our attention to feasible (X, q, p) such that πH(X, q, p) ≥ 0.
We find the optimal solution to problem (2.16) using the following procedure. We
first solve the problem under constraints πL(X, q, p) ≥ 0, when both supplier types
would accept the contract. We then solve it under constraint πH(X, q, p) ≥ 0 >
πL(X, q, p), when only the high-type supplier would accept the contract. Finally, we
compare the two maxima to identify the global optimal solution.
Lemma 2 solves problem (2.16) under constraint πL(X, q, p) ≥ 0. Let θ̄ =
αh + (1 − α)l, the average probability of successful regular production run. The
optimal objective function is πN2M (superscript “N” indicates the manufacturer is non-




max{r − cL − (1− l) b, α h (r − cH/h), θ̄(r − cL/l)} b ≥ cL/l
max{r − b, α h (r − cH/h)} b < cL/l.
(2.17)
We next solve problem (2.16) under πH(X, q, p) ≥ 0 > πL(X, q, p). This problem is
equivalent to problem (2.8a) under symmetric information, and its optimal solution is
given by problem (2.9a) in the proof of Proposition 2. We denote its optimal objective
value as πN1M (superscript “1” indicates only one supplier type – high-type – would
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participate), where
πN1M = max{α[r − cH − (1− h) b], α h (r − cH/h)}. (2.18)
To identify the global optimum of problem (2.16), we compare πN1M and π
N2
M (see
Lemma 3 for details). The result follows. 
Lemma 2. The optimal solution to problem (2.16) subject to πL(X, q, p) ≥ 0 is:
When b ≥ cL/l,
• If r− cL− (1− l) b > max{αh (r− cH/h), θ̄(r− cL/l)}, then X = cL + (1− l)b,
q = 1, p ∈ (b,∞), πN2M = r − cL − (1− l) b.
• If αh (r− cH/h) ≥ max{r− cL− (1− l) b, θ̄(r− cL/l)}, then X = cH/h, q = 1,
p = cH/h, π
N2
M = αh (r − cH/h).
• If θ̄(r−cL/l) ≥ r−cL−(1−l) b and θ̄(r−cL/l) > αh (r−cH/h), then X = cL/l,
q = 1, p = cL/l, π
N2
M = θ̄(r − cL/l).
When b < cL/l,
• If r − b > αh (r − cH/h), then X = b, q = 1, p ∈ (b,∞), πN2M = r − b.
• If αh (r−cH/h) ≥ r−b, then X = cH/h, q = 1, p = cH/h, πN2M = αh (r−cH/h).





α[r Emin(y∗H , D)− πH(X, q, p)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H)]
+ (1− α)[r Emin(y∗L, D)− πL(X, q, p)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L)]

subject to πL(X, q, p) ≥ 0.
From Definition 3, we have πH(X, q, p) = πL(X, q, p) + Γ(q, p) and πL(X, q, p) = 0
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α[r Emin(y∗H , D)− Γ(q, p)− cH z∗H − bE(y∗H − ρH z∗H)]
+ (1− α)[r Emin(y∗L, D)− cL z∗L − bE(y∗L − ρL z∗L)]
 . (2.19)
Note that decision variable X vanishes from the above program, and can be evaluated
using equation (2.15), with i = L and πL(X, q, p) = 0.
Now we solve problem (2.19) for the optimal (q, p). In the following table, each
combination of the constraint on p, and the condition on b versus cL/l, corresponds
to a case in Corollary 1 that follows Proposition 1. For each combination of con-
straint and condition, the following table provides the objective function obtained by
substituting z∗L, y
∗
L (from Proposition 1) and Γ(q, p) (from Corollary 1) into (2.19).
Constraint Condition Objective function
A = {p : p > b}
b < cL/l r min(q, 1)− b q
b ≥ cL/l r min(q, 1)− cL q − (1− l) b q
B = {p : b ≥ p, p < cH/h} 0
C = {p : b ≥ p, cL/l > p ≥ cH/h} αh [r min(q, 1)− p q]
D = {p : b ≥ p, p ≥ cL/l} b ≥ cL/l θ̄r min(q, 1)− α(h− l)p q − cL q
Next, for each constraint and condition, we find the optimal q and p. We restrict
our attention to corner-point solutions, where q = 0 or 1. The constrained optimal
(q, p) and the objective function value are summarized in the following table:
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r − b > 0 1
any p ∈ A
r − b
r − b ≤ 0 0 0
b ≥ cL/l
r − cL − (1− l) b > 0 1 r − cL − (1− l) b
r − cL − (1− l) b ≤ 0 0 0
B 0 any p ∈ B 0
C 1 cH/h αh (r − cH/h)
D b ≥ cL/l
r − cL/l > 0 1 cL/l θ̄(r − cL/l)
r − cL/l ≤ 0 0 any p ∈ D 0
To find the optimal solution to problem (2.19) and its objective function value,
πN2M , we compare the constrained optimal objective function values for p in A, C, and
D when b ≥ cL/l, and for p in A and C when b < cL/l. The result follows. 
Lemma 3. The following is the relationship between πN1M and π
N2
M :
Regions (I), (IIa), (IIb), and (III) πN2M > π
N1
M
Region (IV) and (IIc) πN2M ≤ πN1M
Region (V) πN2M = π
N1
M
Proof of Lemma 3. Region (I). Recall that region (I) is defined in Lemma 1 by
(1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH) > 0 b < cL/l (2.20a)
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)] >
{(1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)]}+ b ≥ cL/l. (2.20b)
We first evaluate πN1M , which is presented in (2.18). Note that region (I) satisfies
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inequality r > b, which implies
α[r − cH − (1− h) b] > αh (r − cH/h). (2.21)
We apply this inequality to (2.18), and obtain πN1M = α[r − cH − (1− h) b].
We now evaluate πN2M , which is presented in (2.17). The value of π
N2
M is uniquely
determined by inequalities (2.20) and (2.21). To see this, we first note that, for
b < cL/l, [LHS (2.20a) + LHS (2.21)] > [RHS (2.20a) + RHS (2.21)]. It can be
verified that [LHS (2.20a) + LHS (2.21)] = r − b, and [RHS (2.20a) + RHS (2.21)]
= αh (r−cH/h). Hence, we have r−b > αh (r−cH/h). Applying the above inequality
to (2.17) determines the value of πN2M when b < cL/l, that is, π
N2
M = r− b for b < cL/l.
Analogously for b ≥ cL/l, we have [LHS (2.20b) + LHS (2.21)] > [RHS (2.20b) +
RHS (2.21)]. It can be verified that [LHS (2.20b) + LHS (2.21)] = r − cL − (1− l) b
and [RHS (2.20b) + RHS (2.21)] = max{αh (r − cH/h), θ̄(r − cL/l)}. The second
equation follows from the following equality:
θ̄(r − cL/l) ≡ αh (r − cH/h) + (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)].
Hence, we have inequality r − cL − (1 − l) b > max{αh (r − cH/h), θ̄(r − cL/l).
Applying this inequality to (2.17), we identify the value of πN2M when b ≥ cL/l, that
is, πN2M = r − cL − (1− l) b for b ≥ cL/l. Comparing πN1M and πN2M yields
πN2M − πN1M =

(1− α)(r − b)− α(h b− cH) b < cL/l
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]
−α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)] b ≥ cL/l.
By inequalities (2.20a) and (2.20b), we must have πN2M − πN1M > 0.
The analysis is similar for regions (III), (IV), and (V).
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Region (II). In this region, the sign of πN1M −πN2M can be either positive or negative.
Recall that region (II) is defined by a set of inequalities:
r > b, θ̄(r − cL/l) > αh (r − cH/h), and
(1− α)[r − cL − (1− l) b]− α[(h− l) b+ (cL − cH)]
≤ (1− α)(l r − cL)− α[(h− l)(cL/l) + (cL − cH)].
As in the discussion for region (I), the first inequality implies πN1M = α[r−cH−(1−h) b].
The second inequality implies that πN2M = max{r− cL− (1− l) b, θ̄(r− cL/l)}. To the
left of line 6 in region (II) (see Figure 2.8), πN2M = r−cL− (1− l) b. When (b, r) is also
to the left of line 2 (region (IIa)), πN2M > π
N1
M . To the right of line 6, π
N2
M = θ̄(r−cL/l).
When (b, r) is also to the right of line 7 (region (IIb)), πN2M > π
N1
M as well. 
Proposition 5. If the manufacturer has access to its own backup production option at
unit cost bM , the optimal menu of contracts offered by the manufacturer is as follows:
• When bM ≥ r, the optimal menu of contracts is the same as the optimal menu
of contracts in the absence of the manufacturer’s backup production option. In
particular, the optimal menu of contracts is given by Proposition 2 under sym-
metric information, and Proposition 3 under asymmetric information.
• When bM < r, the optimal menu of contracts can be derived from the optimal
menu of contracts in the absence of the manufacturer’s backup production op-
tion. In particular, replacing revenue r with bM in Propositions 2 and 3 gives
the optimal menu of contracts under symmetric and asymmetric information,
respectively.
Proof. We present the proof for the asymmetric information case. The analysis is
similar for the symmetric information case.
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To find the optimal menu of contracts, we maximize the following objective, sub-























When the manufacturer’s backup production option is economically infeasible,
bM ≥ r, the manufacturer will not exercises it, that is, si ≡ y∗i , i = H,L. The objec-
tive function (2.22) is then identical to the objective function (2.3a). Problem (2.22,
2.3b–2.3f) is identical to problem (2.3).
Now consider the case where the manufacturer’s backup production option is
economically feasible, bM < r. Observe that at the optimal solution, si = D and
D− y∗i = D−min{D, y∗i }. Hence, si− y∗i = D− y∗i = D−min{D, y∗i } at the optimal





α [bM Emin(y∗H , D)−XH + pH E(qH − y∗H)+]
+ (1− α)[bM Emin(y∗L, D)−XL + pLE(qL − y∗L)+]
+ (r − bM )D. (2.23)
Note that the group of terms in the pair of curly brackets in (2.23) is the same as
(2.3a), with r replaced by bM . 
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Chapter 3
Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a
Dual-Sourcing Option
3.1. Introduction
The average US manufacturer spends roughly half its revenue procuring goods
and services (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). While outsourcing production of a critical
component can offer cost advantages for the manufacturer, it can also introduce the
risk that a supplier’s failure to deliver will halt the manufacturer’s production. A
supplier’s facility might suffer from fire, flood, or an earthquake. A labor strike
or financial bankruptcy might shut down supplier operation (see Babich, 2007, for
examples). Changes in a supplier’s ownership status can also trigger disruptions. For
example, after it purchased Dovatron in April 2000, Flextronics announced that it
would completely shut down Dovatron’s low-volume specialty circuit board facility in
Anaheim as part of restructuring to focus on low-mix, high-volume products. As a
result of Flextronics’s decision, Beckman Coulter Inc., a medical device manufacturer
who single-sourced a critical component from Dovatron’s Anaheim facility, lost its
supplier. The supply disruption cost Beckman Coulter millions of dollars.1
To mitigate such risks, manufacturers often employ a dual-sourcing option:2 they
1For more details, see www.callahan-law.com/verdicts-settlements/fraud-beckman-coulter
/index.html.
2In this chapter, we refer to the case in which there is only one supplier in the supply base as
single-sourcing, and the case in which there are two suppliers as dual-sourcing. In the case of dual-
sourcing, we refer to the manufacturer’s action of ordering from only one supplier as sole-sourcing,
and the action of ordering from both as diversification.
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widen a critical component’s supply base to include more than one supplier. Prac-
titioner surveys (Wu and Choi, 2005) identify two main benefits of a dual-sourcing
option. First, a dual-sourcing option enables the manufacturer to reduce risk by di-
versifying its supply, that is, by simultaneously ordering the component from two
suppliers. Second, a dual-sourcing option encourages competition among suppliers,
resulting in lower procurement costs for the manufacturer.
Previous research assumes that the manufacturer and suppliers have identical
knowledge about the possibility that a supplier experiences a disruption. However,
suppliers might be privileged with better information about their susceptibility to
disruptions. For instance, Dovatron likely enjoyed better information than Beckman
Coulter had about Dovatron’s acquisition by Flextronics. A supplier might also out-
source sub-components to second-tier suppliers without telling the manufacturer it is
doing so, creating risks of disruptions caused by second-tier suppliers.3
Intuitively, asymmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities might change the
way the manufacturer mitigates disruption risks. For instance, Beckman Coulter
might have sought to diversify its circuit board supply had it known that Dovatron
was in talks with Flextronics and that a restructuring might follow. Conversely, em-
ploying risk-mitigating strategies might make the manufacturer more or less sensitive
to asymmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities. In this chapter, we seek to
understand how the use of a dual-sourcing option is affected by asymmetric informa-
tion about suppliers’ reliabilities and how the value of information is affected by the
dual-sourcing option.
To this end, we utilize a stylized, one-period model with a manufacturer and two
suppliers. Each supplier privately knows whether it is a high or a low reliability-type
3This is what happened to Menu Foods in March 2007. Its supplier ChemNutra outsourced
production of wheat gluten, an ingredient in the pet food, to a Chinese supplier Xuzhou Anying
Biologic Technology Development Co. Ltd.. In an effort to increase its profit margin, Xuzhou Anying
introduced melamine into wheat gluten, resulting in deaths of numerous pets. More examples are
provided in Chapter 2.
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supplier. The manufacturer seeks to contract with one or possibly both suppliers for
production. In addition to setting quantity and payment terms, contracts ensure that
the suppliers have an incentive to deliver by specifying penalties for non-delivery.4 As
an alternative to the penalty clause, one could use a canonical, two-part tariff (fixed
plus variable payment) contract and obtain the same equilibrium outcome as in our
contract with penalty clause. Either the variable payment or the penalty provides an
incentive to the supplier to deliver. The manufacturer maximizes its expected profit,
and in so doing must strategically account for each supplier’s incentive to misrepresent
their reliability. Using a mechanism design approach, we solve this model (detailed in
§3.3), and explore the effect of asymmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities
on a manufacturer’s application of a dual-sourcing option to mitigating disruption
risks. Next, we highlight some of our findings and briefly describe the chapter’s
organization.
§3.4 presents the benchmark model of symmetric information. In §3.5 we analyze
how asymmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities changes the manufacturer’s
use of its dual-sourcing option. Asymmetric information pushes the manufacturer
towards sole-sourcing (and away from diversification) as a way to leverage supplier
competition and limit each supplier’s ability to misrepresent its reliability. Moreover,
as the reliabilities of both the high and low supplier-types decrease, a manufacturer
will diversify more under symmetric information, but may diversify less under asym-
metric information. Thus, even if diversification is a useful tool under symmetric
information for a manufacturer facing a supply base whose overall reliability has de-
clined, the same need not be true under asymmetric information about suppliers’
reliability.
In §3.6 we study the manufacturer’s value of information about suppliers’ relia-
bilities. It is conceivable that better information about suppliers’ reliabilities could
4In practice, such penalties are commonly referred to as “liquidated damages”, e.g., Corbin
(2007).
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be obtained by the manufacturer, at least for risk factors the manufacturer can iden-
tify and learn about. For instance, the manufacturer might audit the suppliers for
bankruptcy risk, the soundness of their fire prevention measures, structural earth-
quake proofing, or location relative to flood-prone coastlines. We find that informa-
tion about reliability, which would likely be costly to obtain, is most beneficial for the
manufacturer when the item’s value is high. In such a case, the manufacturer forgoes
leveraging competition and instead uses diversification to help mitigate the overall
risk of non-delivery. Surprisingly, we also find that information may become more
valuable even as a high-type supplier’s reliability becomes closer to that of a low-
type, because in such a case supply diversification becomes more important. Thus,
more similarity between supplier reliability types (having “less to learn” about the
suppliers’ true reliabilities) should not be seen as a substitute for information.
In §3.7 we examine the value of the dual-sourcing option for the manufacturer,
that is, the incremental benefit the manufacturer enjoys by having a supply base
with two suppliers instead of one. Expanding the supply base can be difficult and
time-consuming for the manufacturer. For example, it took Beckman Coulter months
of searching and testing before Dovatron was discovered and deemed capable of pro-
ducing the specialty circuit boards that Beckman Coulter needed (see Footnote 1).
Furthermore, this process may not reveal full information about the suppliers. Beck-
man Coulter was shocked to learn in May 2000 of Dovatron’s impending closure of
the Anaheim plant (see Footnote 1). Thus, the manufacturer might like to know
when it is most beneficial to have either an additional supplier (the dual-sourcing
option) or better information (symmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities),
or both. We find that better reliability information and the dual-sourcing option
are substitutes when the manufacturer’s value for the item being procured is low.
However, information and the dual-sourcing option become complements when the
manufacturer’s value for the item being procured is high, at which point having two
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suppliers whose reliabilities are known makes the dual-sourcing option more valuable
for the manufacturer.
In §3.8 we examine the possibility that the suppliers’ disruption probabilities are
correlated, for instance, the suppliers share vulnerabilities to the same underlying
risk factors such as earthquakes or floods. We find that as the two suppliers’ dis-
ruptions become more correlated, the manufacturer finds diversification less desirable
and, hence, relies more on sole-sourcing and leveraging supplier competition. Due
to increased competition, the suppliers have smaller incentives to misrepresent their
reliabilities, and thus asymmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities is less of a
concern for the manufacturer. In §3.9 we provide concluding remarks. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
3.2. Literature Review
The work in this chapter contributes to the important and fast growing research
and applications area of supply disruptions management (see review papers by Klein-
dorfer and Saad, 2005; Tang, 2006a). We study multi-sourcing as the risk-mitigation
tool. This tool is commonly used in operations, and examples of recent articles that
consider it are Babich et al. (2005); Tomlin (2006); Tomlin and Wang (2005); Dada
et al. (2007); Federgruen and Yang (2007). These papers focus on the risk-reduction
benefits of multi-sourcing due to diversification. However, as we highlight in this
chapter, multi-sourcing has additional strategic benefits, because it encourages com-
petition among suppliers. Babich (2006) and Babich et al. (2007) also found that,
similar to our results, the manufacturer must strike the balance between diversifica-
tion and competition.
Unlike the majority of papers on supply risk (including the ones mentioned in
the paragraph above), we model the practical situation where the suppliers are better
informed about the likelihoods of supply disruptions than the manufacturer is. In this
setting, the manufacturer makes diversification decisions not only for risk management
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but also to control suppliers’ incentives, which leads to new insights (e.g., as discussed
in the Introduction). Note that our work in this chapter is different from those
in procurement and economics literatures, where asymmetric information is about
suppliers’ costs (e.g., Dasgupta and Spulber, 1989; Corbett, 2001; Beil and Wein,
2003; Elmaghraby, 2004; Kostamis et al., 2009; Wan and Beil, 2008). As discussed in
Chapter 2, asymmetric information about disruptions affects not only procurement
cost but also the manufacturer’s risk profile. Our work is not unique in studying
asymmetric information about supply risks. Examples of other papers that do the
same are Tomlin (2008); Gurnani and Shi (2006); Lim (1997); Baiman et al. (2000).
The latter three, unlike our work, do not use multi-sourcing. Tomlin (2008) studies
multi-sourcing, but relies on Bayesian updating over time as a mechanism for the
manufacturer to learn the supplier’s reliability, whereas we invoke optimal incentive-
compatible contracts instead.
The work closest to this chapter is Chapter 2. In that model, the manufacturer
sources from one supplier and uses backup production options to manage supply dis-
ruption risk. The supplier’s reliability (the likelihood of disruption) is its private in-
formation. The manufacturer designs a menu of incentive contracts to reveal the sup-
plier’s private information. This chapter studies a wholly different risk-management
tool: dual-sourcing. Our findings broaden the understanding of how asymmetric
information about suppliers’ reliabilities interacts with the manufacturer’s risk man-
agement policies.
Another related paper is Chaturvedi and Mart́ınez-de-Albéniz (2008). They as-
sume that the supplier’s reliability and cost are its private information and study
a procurement auction with multi-sourcing. Similar to us, they find that under
asymmetric information the manufacturer diversifies less. However, there are sev-
eral important differences between the two papers including the following. We focus
explicitly on valuing the manufacturer’s dual-sourcing option as a risk-management
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tool and relating this value to asymmetric information about supply risk. Our penalty
in the contract between the manufacturer and a supplier is variable, depending on the
size of the shortfall in the delivery from the supplier. We find that as the suppliers
become less reliable the manufacturer could actually stop diversifying under asym-
metric information about suppliers’ reliabilities, which we believe will not happen in
their model. In addition, we study the case in which the suppliers’ disruptions are
correlated.
3.3. Model
We model a stylized supply chain with a manufacturer and two suppliers. The
suppliers’ production processes are subject to random disruptions. When a disruption
occurs, the production process yields zero output and the supplier delivers nothing.
For instance, fire could destroy inventory and halt production, or contamination could
force a pharmaceutical firm to scrap vaccines. There are two types of suppliers in
the market: high reliability (H ) and low reliability (L). The two supplier types differ
from each other in their likelihoods of disruptions and their costs of production,
with low-reliability suppliers being more prone to production disruptions. Let tn ∈
{H,L} denote the type of supplier n = 1, 2. The commonly known probability
of a supplier being of high-type is αH , and the probability of a supplier being of
low-type is αL, where αH + αL = 1. We assume that the two suppliers’ types are
independent of one another.5 To capture the manufacturer’s lack of visibility into
the suppliers’ reliabilities and costs, we assume that a supplier’s reliability type is its
private information, unknown to the manufacturer and the other supplier.6
In keeping with our assumption that a disruption results in non-delivery, we rep-
resent supplier-n’s proportional random yield as a Bernoulli random variable, and
5See §3.9 for discussion of dependent types.
6Our results can be extended to the case where the suppliers perfectly know the type of each
other.
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1 with probability θtn
0 with probability 1− θtn ,
(3.1)
where θH = h and θL = l, h > l. For the time being, we assume that the two suppliers’
production disruption processes are independent of each other, that is, ρt11 and ρ
t2
2
are independent (§3.8 relaxes this assumption). The probability θtn is a measure of
supplier-n’s reliability. Notice that a supplier’s reliability depends only on its type.
A production attempt costs a type-t supplier (t ∈ {H,L}) ct per unit regardless of
whether it is successful or not. Although we allow cH and cL to be different, the high-
type is assumed to be more cost-efficient than the low-type, that is, the expected cost
of successfully producing one unit is smaller for high-type suppliers: cL/l > cH/h.7
The manufacturer incurs a setup cost for ordering from a supplier, denoted by K,
in addition to the cost of purchasing parts. The setup cost can be the cost of trans-
ferring technology to the supplier, or administrative costs incurred to manage the
procurement process. We assume the parts from the two suppliers are perfect substi-
tutes, for example, the suppliers produce the part to the manufacturer’s specifications
or the part is standardized.
The manufacturer uses the parts to produce a product and sells it to meet demand.
To focus on the effects of supply risk, we assume that the manufacturer faces a
demand, D, that is known at the time the manufacturer places its orders. When
supplier deliveries do not cover the entire demand D, the manufacturer loses r per unit
shortfall. The value r represents the manufacturer’s revenue per item, or alternatively
its per item recourse cost to secure a backup supply.8
7Note that, for one unit of input going into production, the expected output of a type-t supplier
is θt. Hence, were repeated production attempts allowed, the expected cost of successfully producing
one unit would be ct/θt.
8For instance, after its supplier Dovatron’s production was shut down, Beckman Coulter created
their own in-house specialty circuit board production line, which cost them 2.1 million dollars to
construct (see Footnote 1).
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To govern its relationship with the two suppliers, the manufacturer uses a pair of
contracts, one for each supplier. Each contract consists of a transfer payment, X, an
order quantity q, and a non-delivery unit penalty, p. The penalty serves to hold the
supplier liable in case of disruption.
Intuitively, the manufacturer would like the transfer payments, order quantities
and penalties to depend on the suppliers’ true reliabilities. However, the manufacturer
does not know the suppliers’ true reliabilities, and instead—as is standard in the
economics literature—we assume that the manufacturer offers several contract options
(a contract “menu”) from which the suppliers choose. To find the manufacturer’s
optimal contract menu, we apply the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) and focus
on the class of incentive-compatible direct-revelation menus. Under such a contract
menu, both suppliers will truthfully report their reliability types to the manufacturer.
For simplicity in the analysis, we assume that the suppliers cannot collude.9
The contract menu is a modeling construct that captures the general practice of
tailoring contracts to specific suppliers in a procurement process. In particular, the
contract menu captures two salient features of a typical contracting process. First,
the contract for a supplier (e.g., the size of non-delivery penalty) is tailored according
to the reliability risk perceived by the manufacturer. Thus, a high- and a low-type
suppliers can end up with different contracts. Second, the contract for one supplier
depends on the reliability of the other supplier, both of whom compete for business
from the manufacturer: intuitively, a supplier’s likelihood of receiving an order de-
creases as the other supplier becomes more reliable. Therefore, the contract for one
supplier must be a function of the reliability types of both suppliers.
Thus, the contract menu in this model consists of four pairs of contracts, each
9For instance, the suppliers might not even know who they are competing against. Jap (2003)
surveys implementations of reverse auctions for procurement and notices that most bidding events
are anonymous.
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pair corresponding to one of four combinations of supplier types:
{
[Xn(tn, tn), qn(tn, tn), pn(tn, tn)], n = 1, 2
}
for t1, t2 ∈ {H,L},
where n indicates the supplier other than supplier n (e.g., if n = 2, then n indicates
supplier 1). To ease the notation, we use the shorthand notation (Xn, qn, pn)(tn, tn)
to denote the contract.
We consider a single-period problem in which the manufacturer has only one con-
tracting opportunity. The timing of events is shown in Figure 3.1. The problem
can be divided into two stages: contracting and execution. At the beginning of the
contracting stage, nature selects the types of the two suppliers and reveals each sup-
plier’s type to that supplier only. Next, the manufacturer offers a menu of contracts
to the suppliers. The suppliers make their participation decisions and then report
their types to the manufacturer. Based on their reports, the manufacturer chooses a
pair of contracts from the contract menu and assigns them to the respective suppliers.
This concludes the contracting stage. In the execution stage, the suppliers receive
their transfer payments from the manufacturer, run production, make delivery, and
pay a penalty, if necessary.
Nature reveals 
the types to 
the suppliers
The manufacturer offers 
a menu of contracts to 
the suppliers
The suppliers make 
participation decisions 











chooses a pair of 
contracts 
Figure 3.1: Timing of events.
We solve the problem by working backward from the execution stage. The next
subsection presents the analysis of the supplier’s execution stage decisions.
3.3.1 Supplier’s Production Decisions
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To simplify the notation in this subsection, we suppress subscript n for the sup-
pliers. In the execution stage, given a contract (X, q, p) from the manufacturer, a
supplier of type t ∈ {H,L} chooses the size of its production run, z, to maximize its
expected profit. Subsequently, if the production output, ρtz, is less than the order
quantity q, the supplier pays a penalty p per unit of shortfall (q − ρtz)+. (The +
operation is defined such that x+ = x if x > 0 and x+ = 0 if x ≤ 0.) The following is
supplier n’s optimization problem:10
πt(X, q, p) = max
z≥0
{
X − ct z − pE(q − ρt z)+
}
. (3.2)
When choosing the size of production run, z, the supplier trades off the cost of
production, ctz, against the expected non-delivery penalty, pE(q−ρt z)+. Notice that
the choice of z is independent of the transfer payment X, and, hence, the optimal z
depends on q and p only (although X affects the supplier’s participation decision).
Let zt(q, p) denote the optimal size of the production run, given contract (X, q, p).
The lemma below presents the supplier’s optimal production run size and optimal
expected profit. As the lemma shows, the supplier will produce the entire order
quantity as long as its expected cost of successfully producing one unit, ct/θt, is lower
than the penalty, p.
Lemma 4. For a given contract (X, q, p), the supplier’s optimal production size,
zt(q, p), and expected profit, πt(X, q, p), are:
Case zt(q, p) πt(X, q, p)
(1) p < ct/θt 0 X − p q
(2) p ≥ ct/θt q X − ct q − (1− θt)p q
In case (1) of Lemma 4, where the penalty is even lower than the expected cost of
successfully producing one unit, the supplier makes no production attempt. As we
10This is a special case of the supplier’s problem (2) in Chapter 2.
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will see later, this situation never arises under the manufacturer’s optimal contract
menu.
Lemma 4 shows that the supplier’s expected profit is increasing in its reliability, θt.
(In this chapter, we use increasing and decreasing in the weak sense.) Thus, a high-
type supplier earns a larger expected profit than a low-type supplier if both suppliers
are offered the same contract. We define a high-type supplier’s reliability advantage
over a low-type supplier to be the difference between their optimal expected profits
under the same contract.
Definition 3. Under contract (X, q, p), the supplier’s reliability advantage for being
of high-type as opposed to low-type is Γ(q, p)
def
= πH(X, q, p)− πL(X, q, p).
Notice that Γ is not a function of the transfer payment, X, because it cancels out in
the calculation. Applying the expression for the supplier’s optimal profit in Lemma 4
to the definition yields:
Γ(q, p) =

0 p < cH/h
(h p− cH)q cL/l > p ≥ cH/h
[(h− l) p− (cH − cL)]q p ≥ cL/l .
(3.3)
Using equation (3.3), Γ(q, p) can be shown to be positive for all q ≥ 0 and p ≥ 0,
increasing in p, q, and h, and decreasing in l. These properties of Γ(q, p) will be
instrumental in developing insights about the effects of asymmetric information on
the manufacturer’s procurement actions.
3.3.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Design Problem
We now explore the manufacturer’s decisions in the contracting stage. Recall
that we model the manufacturer’s decisions as a mechanism design problem, and, by
the Revelation Principle, we focus on incentive-compatible direct-revelation contract
menus.
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Recall that tn and tn are the reliability types of supplier n and supplier n. At the
beginning of the contracting stage, the manufacturer, who does not know the suppli-
ers’ types, designs and offers a contract menu to maximize its expected profit. Let
sn, sn ∈ {H,L} denote the types reported by supplier n and the other supplier upon
observing the contract menu offered by the manufacturer. (Notice that if sn 6= tn, then
the supplier is misrepresenting itself.) Based on the reported types, supplier n receives
a contract (Xn, qn, pn)(sn, sn), runs production of optimal size z
tn
n [(qn, pn)(sn, sn)] and
earns a profit of πtnn [(Xn, qn, pn)(sn, sn)] (see Lemma 4). At the time supplier n is
reporting its type, it does not know the type of the other supplier and hence supplier-




πtnn [(Xn, qn, pn)(sn, tn)]
}
, where the expectation
is taken over supplier-n’s type.
The manufacturer designs its contract menu to optimize its expected profit while
inducing the suppliers to report their true reliability types. The manufacturer’s con-
















2 [(q2, p2)(t2, t1)]
}
−X1(t1, t2) + p1(t1, t2)E
[
q1(t1, t2)− ρt11 z
t1
1 [(q1, p1)(t1, t2)]
]+
−K 1{q1(t1,t2)>0} (3.4a)
−X2(t2, t1) + p2(t2, t1)E
[
q2(t2, t1)− ρt22 z
t2





Subject to For n = 1, 2
(I.C.) ΠHn (H) ≥ ΠHn (L), ΠLn(L) ≥ ΠLn(H) (3.4b)
(I.R.) ΠHn (H) ≥ 0, ΠLn(L) ≥ 0 (3.4c)
qn(tn, tn) ≥ 0, pn(tn, tn) ≥ 0, for t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}.
The manufacturer’s objective function (3.4a) is the manufacturer’s expected rev-
enue minus the transfer payments to the two suppliers minus the setup costs of
ordering from the suppliers plus the expected penalties received, weighted by the
probabilities of drawing different supplier types.
Constraints (I.C.) are incentive compatibility constraints for high-type and low-
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type supplier-n, respectively. The left-hand-side of each of these constraints is supplier-
n’s expected profit when it truthfully reports its type, given that supplier-n’s type is
unknown. The right-hand-side is supplier-n’s expected profit when it misrepresents
itself. The constraints ensure that supplier n finds it optimal to report its true type.
Constraints (I.R.) are the individual rationality constraints for high-type and low-
type supplier-n. These constraints ensure that supplier-n’s expected profit is greater
than its reservation profit, which is normalized to zero. This assumption is common
in the mechanism design field, and is adopted in both the economics (e.g., Myerson,
1981; Che, 1993) and operations management (e.g., Lim, 1997; Corbett et al., 2004)
literatures.
For problem (3.4), we have assumed that neither supplier perfectly knows the
other supplier’s reliability type, leading to a Bayesian mechanism. For general mech-
anism design problems in which the payoff functions of the principal and the agents
are quasilinear in the transfer payments (as in our model), the optimal dominant-
strategy mechanism is also an optimal Bayesian mechanism (Mookherjee and Re-
ichelstein, 1992). That is, the set of optimal Bayesian mechanisms subsumes the set
of optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms. We later show that in our model we can
choose a Bayesian-mechanism optimal contract menu such that it is also an opti-
mal dominant-strategy mechanism. Consequently, the optimal Bayesian mechanism
outcome could be implemented regardless of the suppliers’ beliefs about each other,
and the mechanism remains optimal even if the suppliers perfectly know each other’s
reliability type.
3.4. Optimal Contracts under Symmetric Information
To provide a benchmark we first solve a variant of problem (3.4) in which sup-
pliers’ reliabilities are common knowledge. We refer to this variant as the symmetric
information model and use it to explore the effect of asymmetric information. The
incentive compatibility constraints (3.4b) are no longer required. The individual ra-
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tionality constraints (3.4c) become
πHn [(Xn, qn, pn)(H, tn)] ≥ 0 and πLn [(Xn, qn, pn)(L, tn)] ≥ 0, for n ∈ {1, 2}, tn = H,L.
Given two suppliers with types t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}, we refer to the more reliable sup-
plier as the primary supplier, and the less reliable one as the secondary supplier. If
both suppliers are of the same reliability type, we use the convention of designating
supplier 1 as the primary supplier. Hereafter, we use subscripts m and m to indi-
cate the primary and the secondary suppliers. The following proposition states the
manufacturer’s optimal procurement actions, illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Proposition 6. Under symmetric information, given the reliability types of the pri-
mary and secondary suppliers, tm and tm, there exist two thresholds, r̃
tm and r̃tm,tm
(given in Table 3.1), such that the manufacturer does not order from either supplier
if r ≤ r̃tm, orders only from the primary supplier if r̃tm < r ≤ r̃tm,tm, and or-
ders from both suppliers if r > r̃tm,tm. The manufacturer’s optimal contract menu,
{(X̃∗n, q̃∗n, p̃∗n)(tn, tn), n = 1, 2}, t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}, is provided in Table 3.2.





















































Our optimal contract analysis did not restrict the size of the non-delivery penalty.
However, punitive penalties which exceed the damages the buyer expects to incur
from supplier non-delivery are generally not enforceable in US courts (Corbin, 2007).
It is therefore important to note that the optimal contract does not require puni-






























Figure 3.2: The manufacturer’s op-
timal procurement actions under sym-
metric information in relation to the
revenue, r. The label 0 marks the re-
gions where a supplier receives no or-
der, and the label D marks the regions
where a supplier receives an order of
size D. The manufacturer orders only
from the primary supplier if the rev-
enue, r, is small, and diversifies if r is
large.
Primary Secondary r̃tm r̃tm,tm






























Table 3.1: Expressions for thresholds r̃tm and r̃tm,tm separating revenue into intervals
within which the manufacturer does not order from either supplier, orders from only
the primary supplier, or orders from both suppliers, under symmetric information.
the optimal penalties and associated transfer payments. One can check that the
smallest optimal penalty p̃∗n equals its corresponding optimal transfer payment X̃
∗
n,
in which case the penalty clause boils down to recovering the payment already made
to the supplier. Consequently, the manufacturer could implement the optimal con-
tract simply by specifying a transfer payment contingent on successful delivery. This
setup circumvents penalties altogether and thus obviates the need to consider penalty
enforceability.
We now continue the discussion of Proposition 6. Given two suppliers of known
types, once the unit revenue, r, becomes sufficiently large, the manufacturer will
diversify, that is, it will order from both suppliers. Observe from Figure 3.2 that
having two suppliers with different types makes it less appealing for the manufacturer
to diversify, i.e., r̃HL > r̃HH and r̃HL > r̃LL. Intuitively, if one supplier is of high-type
and the other of low-type, the secondary supplier is less reliable compared to the case
where both suppliers are of high-type. Similarly, if one supplier is of high-type and the
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r ≤ r̃H Both - No contract -
r̃H < r ≤ r̃HH Supplier 1 [c




Supplier 2 - No contract -
r > r̃HH








High-type supplier-m and low-type supplier-m
r ≤ r̃H Both - No contract -
r̃H < r ≤ r̃HL Supplier m [c




Supplier m - No contract -
r > r̃HL









r ≤ r̃L Both - No contract -
r̃L < r ≤ r̃LL Supplier 1 [c




Supplier 2 - No contract -
r > r̃LL








Table 3.2: The optimal contract menu under symmetric information. r̃tm and r̃tm,tm
are defined in Table 3.1.
other of low-type, the primary supplier is more reliable compared to the case where
both suppliers are of low-type. Either way, the additional value from the secondary
supplier is smaller when the suppliers have different types.
Per Proposition 6, under symmetric information the manufacturer extracts all
channel profit. Therefore, the channel’s profit is also maximized at the manufacturer’s
optimal contract menu. We let πt1,t2C [(q1, p1), (q2, p2)] be the channel’s profit under
a pair of contracts {(X1, q1, p1), (X2, q2, p2)}, when the two suppliers are of types
t1 and t2. Note that π
t1,t2
C is independent of the transfer payments X1 and X2,









2)(t2, t1)]. The channel loses a profit when {(q1, p1), (q2, p2)}
are different from the channel-optimal contract terms in Proposition 6. We define the
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channel loss as:
Definition 4. The channel loss under a pair of contracts {(X1, q1, p1), (X2, q2, p2)},
when the two suppliers’ types are t1 and t2, is












C [(q1, p1), (q2, p2)].
3.5. Optimal Contracts under Asymmetric Information
In this section we explore the manufacturer’s contract design problem (3.4) un-
der asymmetric information. We first explain the tradeoff underlying the manufac-
turer’s contracting decisions in the face of privately informed suppliers. Proposition 7
presents the optimal contract menu. We then compare the optimal contract menus
under symmetric and asymmetric information to identify the effect of asymmetric
information.
The manufacturer’s tradeoff. Incentive problems arise when the suppliers
have private information. Recall that the optimal contract menu under symmetric




n)(tn, tn), n = 1, 2, t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}, is designed so
that the manufacturer extracts the entire channel profit and leaves zero profit to
the suppliers. Under asymmetric information, if the manufacturer offered the same
contract menu, then a high-type supplier would have an incentive to misrepresent
itself. For example, if supplier n is a high-type supplier, it would claim to be a low-




n)(L, tn). This contract, which yields
zero profit to a low-type supplier, would bring high-type supplier-n a strictly positive




n)(L, tn)] (see Definition





n)(tn, tn), n = 1, 2, t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}, it would have to make an incentive





the manufacturer may offer a different contract menu to reduce this incentive pay-
ment, which nonetheless may not optimize the channel profit. The resulting channel
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loss (see Definition 4) will then be borne by the manufacturer. Hence, in designing
the contract menu, the manufacturer must strike a balance between the incentive
payment to a high-type supplier and the channel loss.
The optimal contract menu. The next proposition describes the optimal con-
tract that achieves this goal. Using the analytical results in Proposition 7, we illustrate
the manufacturer’s optimal procurement actions on the right panel of Figure 3.3. We
continue to use the convention that when both suppliers are the same type, supplier
1 is designated as the primary supplier.
Proposition 7. Under asymmetric information, given the reliability types of the pri-
mary and secondary suppliers, tm and tm, there exist two thresholds, r
tm and rtm,tm
(given in Table 3.3), such that the manufacturer does not order from either supplier
if r ≤ rtm, orders only from the primary supplier if rtm < r ≤ rtm,tm, and or-
ders from both suppliers if r > rtm,tm. The manufacturer’s optimal contract menu,
{(X∗n, q∗n, p∗n)(tn, tn), n = 1, 2}, t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}, is presented in Table 3.4. Without
loss of optimality, we choose the optimal transfer payments X∗n(tn, tn) such that the
optimal contract menu is also a dominant-strategy mechanism.
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Similar to our observation following Proposition 6, the manufacturer could im-
plement the optimal contract under asymmetric information simply by specifying a
transfer payment contingent on successful delivery.
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Primary Secondary rtm rtm,tm
High-type High-type rH = r̃H rHH = r̃HH

































Table 3.3: Expressions for thresholds rtm and rtm,tm separating revenue into intervals
within which the manufacturer does not order from either supplier, orders from only


























































Figure 3.3: The manufacturer’s optimal procurement actions in relation to the rev-
enue, r, under symmetric information (the left panel) and asymmetric information
(shaded with solid color on the right panel). The difference between the manufac-
turer’s procurement actions under symmetric and asymmetric information is shown
on the right panel. Under asymmetric information, the manufacturer forgoes ordering
from the low-type supplier when r falls in the intervals corresponding to the dotted
bars.
Effect of asymmetric information on ordering decisions. Compared to the
symmetric information case, as the right panel of Figure 3.3 shows, the thresholds for
ordering from the low-type supplier, be it a primary or secondary supplier, are higher
under asymmetric information. In particular, the manufacturer stops diversifying
when max{rL, r̃LL} ≤ r < rLL and both suppliers are of low-type, or r̃HL ≤ r < rHL
and the two suppliers are of different types. Under symmetric information, the manu-
facturer sole-sources when the anticipated revenue brought by the secondary supplier
does not outweigh the additional ordering costs. However, under asymmetric infor-
mation there is an additional benefit to sole-source, which pushes the manufacturer
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r ≤ rH Both - No contract -
rH < r ≤ rHH Supplier 1 [c
H + (1− h)p∗1]D D any p∗1 ∈ [ c
H
h , r)
Supplier 2 - No contract -
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H
h , r)
Supplier 2 - No contract -
rL < r ≤ rHL Supplier 1 [c
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Low-type supplier-1 and high-type supplier-2
r ≤ rH Both - No contract -
rH < r ≤ rLL Supplier 1 - No contract -
Supplier 2 [cH + (1− h)p∗2]D D any p∗2 ∈ [ c
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h )D D any p
∗















h )D D any p
∗




r ≤ rL Both - No contract -
rL < r ≤ rLL Supplier 1
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Supplier 2 - No contract -
r > rLL n = 1, 2 c
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Table 3.4: The optimal contract menu under asymmetric information. rtm and
rtm,tm are defined in Table 3.3.
to diversify less. If the manufacturer will not order from a secondary supplier of
low-type, then a high-type supplier knows that pretending to be of low-type might
backfire – it could lose the order. Thus, when the manufacturer rolls back diver-
sification, the suppliers find themselves in more intense competition, reducing their
incentives to misrepresent themselves.
As a consequence of forgoing ordering from a low-type supplier, the manufacturer
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receives less supply under asymmetric information. Thus, we have the following result:
Corollary 9. The total quantity received by the manufacturer from the two suppliers
under symmetric information first-order stochastically dominates that received under
asymmetric information.
Sensitivity to supply-base reliability. A worsening of reliability in the sup-
ply base may have different effects on the use of diversification under symmetric and
asymmetric information. One may intuitively expect that whenever the supply base
becomes less reliable, the manufacturer will find it more attractive to diversify. In-
deed, with symmetric information under a mild restriction on supplier reliabilities,
h+ l > 1, the manufacturer may start diversifying when the supply base becomes less
reliable, but will never stop diversifying. However, under asymmetric information,
the opposite may be true: a worsening of reliability may cause the manufacturer to
stop diversifying under asymmetric information. These observations are formalized
in the following corollary.
Corollary 10. Suppose the non-disruption probabilities are such that h+ l > 1. Con-
sider the optimal contract pair offered to one high- and one low-type suppliers. Under
asymmetric information, there exist h, l and unit revenue r such that the manufac-
turer diversifies, but if both h and l decrease by some ε ∈ (0, l) the manufacturer will
stop diversifying. Under symmetric information, the manufacturer would never stop
diversifying in response to a reliability decrease.
The explanation of this result lies in high-type suppliers’ incentives to misrepresent
themselves. When both supplier types are sufficiently unreliable (as made precise in
the proof of the above corollary), a further reduction in their reliabilities leads to
an increase in a high-type supplier’s reliability advantage, which in turn translates
into a larger incentive payment from the manufacturer. Even though a worsening
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Table 3.5: Informational rents earned by high-type supplier-n, γn(r), n = 1, 2.
would be critical for meeting demand, the manufacturer can find it attractive to stop
diversifying in order to circumvent a ballooning incentive payment for the high-type
supplier.
Sensitivity to the production cost gap, cL − cH. To explore the effect of
the cost gap between the two supplier types, we fix cL and increase cH . As one would
expect, under symmetric or asymmetric information the manufacturer orders less from
the high-type supplier as cH increases (r̃H , r̃HH , rH , and rHH increase, see tables 3.1
and 3.3). However, interestingly, under asymmetric information the manufacturer
finds diversifying with the low-type supplier more attractive (rHL and rLL decrease,
see table 3.3) as cH increases. This is because, as the high type’s production cost
increases, the gap between effective costs of the supplier types (cL/l−cH/h) decreases
and there is less need to control the high-type’s incentives to misrepresent its true
type.
Informational rents and channel loss. We use Proposition 7 to compute
the suppliers’ incentive payments and the channel loss under the optimal contract
menu. These results will be crucial in analyzing the value of information. Follow-
ing standard information economics terminology, we refer to high-type supplier-n’s
expected incentive payment under the optimal contract menu as its informational










The optimal penalty p∗n(L, tn) and optimal order quantity q
∗
n(L, tn) are given by
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Proposition 7. Table 3.5 presents the closed-form expressions for γn(r), n = 1, 2,
revealing that a high-type supplier’s informational rent increases in the revenue, r.
In particular, as revenue increases it becomes important for the manufacturer to
avoid lost sales, encouraging the manufacturer to order from a low-type supplier and
thereby allowing a high-type supplier to exploit its reliability advantage.
Given the optimal contracts for two suppliers of types t1 and t2 under asym-















r > 0 0
Revenue, r δHL(r) or δLH(r)
r̃HL < r ≤ rHL
[
(1− h)l r − cL
]
D −K
All other r 0
Revenue, r δLL(r)
r̃L < r ≤ rL (l r − cL)D −K
r̃LL < r ≤ rLL
[
(1− l)l r − cL
]
D −K
All other r 0
Table 3.6: The channel loss under the optimal contract menu, δt1,t2(r).
Table 3.6 provides a closed-form expression for the channel loss, δt1,t2(r), t1, t2 ∈
{H,L}. Under the optimal contract menu, channel loss is strictly positive when-
ever asymmetric information causes the manufacturer to stop ordering from a low-
type supplier from whom it would order under symmetric information. For example,
given two suppliers, one of high-type and the other of low-type, if revenue r is such
that r̃HL < r ≤ rHL, then introducing asymmetric information causes the man-
ufacturer to stop ordering from the low-type supplier, resulting in a profit loss of[
(1− h)l r − cL
]
D −K, equal to channel loss δHL(r).
3.6. Value of Information
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Section 3.5 shows that asymmetric information about suppliers’ reliabilities changes
the manufacturer’s procurement actions and causes losses in the manufacturer’s and
the channel’s profits. These losses can be avoided by acquiring information, which
could be costly and, thus, needs to be justified by the benefits of having such informa-
tion. In this section, we study the value of information for the suppliers, channel and
manufacturer, where the value of information for an entity is defined to be the differ-
ence between its expected profits in symmetric and asymmetric information models.11
For a high-type supplier, the value of information is the negative of its informa-
tional rent (Table 3.5). For the channel, the value of information equals channel loss
(Table 3.6) weighted by the probability of drawing suppliers of types t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}.
From the manufacturer’s perspective, information about suppliers’ reliabilities creates
value by eliminating both informational rent and channel loss. Hence, the manufac-
turer’s value of information equals the sum of the informational rents paid to the two
suppliers (each weighted by the probability that the supplier is of high-type) and the



















Value of information 
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Figure 3.4: The values of information for the manufacturer increases in the revenue,
r.
Figure 3.4 plots the manufacturer’s value of information versus r, revealing that as
the revenue increases, the manufacturer’s value of information increases, alternating
between regions where it is strictly increasing and regions where it is flat. For example,
when r̃L < r ≤ rL, given two low-type suppliers, the manufacturer would order from
11Recall from Proposition 7 that in the asymmetric information model, even if a supplier perfectly
knows the other supplier’s reliability type, it would receive the same contract and thus earn the
same profit. Therefore, in this model there is no value for the suppliers only to acquire information
about the reliability type of the other supplier.
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one of them under symmetric information, but would strategically not order at all
under asymmetric information. Hence, the manufacturer incurs channel loss, which
becomes all the more costly as r continues to increase. This explains the increase in
the value of information as r increases from r̃L to rL. Once r is slightly above rL, the
channel loss becomes so onerous that the manufacturer starts ordering from one of
the two low-type suppliers even under asymmetric information. While this strategic
decision allows the manufacturer to avoid channel loss, it risks incurring informational
rent if a high-type supplier is drawn. The information rent does not change with r, so
the value of information levels off. This behavior repeats itself as r increases further.
Overall, as revenue increases, the manufacturer becomes more willing to order to
avert lost sales, allowing more opportunities for the high-type supplier(s) to exploit
their private information and thus enhancing the value of information.
Sensitivity of the manufacturer’s value of information to reliability gap,
h− l. Intuitively, one may expect that the manufacturer’s value of information
increases if the reliability gap between the two supplier-types expands, because high-
type suppliers would have stronger incentives to misrepresent their reliabilities. In
fact, in the case where there is only one supplier in the supply base, the manufacturer’s
value of information increases as the reliability gap increases (see Corollary 6 in
Chapter 2). However, we find that in the dual-sourcing model the value of information
may decrease, depending on the size of revenue, r.
Corollary 11. Suppose that the low-type’s reliability, l, is fixed. If max{r̃HL, cL/l2} <
r ≤ rHL, then the manufacturer’s value of information is decreasing in h.
Note that when l > 1
2
, we have r̃HL > cL/l2. Therefore, when l > 1
2
, for all r̃HL <
r ≤ rHL the value of information is decreasing in h. To see the intuition behind
Corollary 11, note that when r̃HL < r ≤ rHL, asymmetric information causes the
manufacturer to strategically forgo diversification when facing one high- and one low-
type supplier. Doing so puts the manufacturer in peril of regretting its decision to
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not contract with a secondary supplier, but intuitively this risk diminishes as the
high-type supplier (the primary supplier) becomes more reliable.
Corollary 11 implies that, even as the reliability gap between the high and low
reliability supplier-types shrinks, meaning there is seemingly less gleaned by learning
the supplier’s true type, information is actually more valuable. Thus, more simi-
larity between supplier reliability types (having “less to learn” about the suppliers’
reliabilities) should not be seen as a substitute for information.
Sensitivity to the production cost gap, cL − cH. As before, we fix cL and
increase cH . We find that as the effective cost advantage of the high type over the
low type, (cL/l − cH/h), decreases, the high type has less incentive to misrepresent
its true type. Consequently, the value of information for the manufacturer decreases.
3.7. Effect of Dual-Sourcing Option
In this section, we analyze the manufacturer’s benefit of acquiring the dual-
sourcing option. We find that the dual-sourcing option increases the manufacturer’s
expected profit while reducing the informational rent of a supplier. We further show
that the benefit of the dual-sourcing option for the manufacturer could be enhanced
or diminished by improved information about the suppliers. In Appendix 3.10, we ex-
amine a benchmark model with a single supplier in the supply base, while retaining all
other assumptions of our main model (§3.3). To differentiate from the sole-sourcing
case in the dual-sourcing model, we hereafter refer to this model as the single-sourcing
model.
3.7.1 Effect of the Dual-Sourcing Option on the Informational Rent
We now examine how the manufacturer’s dual-sourcing option affects a high-type
supplier’s informational rent. Without loss of generality, we assume that the supplier
in question is the one that is favored in case of a tie in the dual-sourcing model (i.e.,
supplier 1). We compare the informational rent extracted by high-type supplier-1
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when it is the only supplier against the rent when it is one of two suppliers that the
manufacturer can order from. The result is presented in Table 3.7.
Revenue, r Reduction in informational rent








r ≤ rL or r > rHL 0
Table 3.7: Reduction in informational rent extracted by high-type supplier-1 if the
manufacturer switches from single-sourcing to dual-sourcing.
From Table 3.7, the dual-sourcing option reduces the high-type supplier’s infor-
mational rent, if and only if the revenue, r, is such that rL < r ≤ rHL. In region
r > rHL, the revenue is large enough that even when there are two suppliers both of
them will receive an order regardless of their reliability types. Hence, when a high-
type supplier is one of two suppliers, it has just as much incentive to misrepresent
itself as it does when it is the only supplier. This explains why the dual-sourcing
option does not change the high-type supplier’s profits when r > rHL.
In region rL < r ≤ rHL, under the single-sourcing model, the manufacturer will
order from a supplier regardless of its reliability type. Therefore, a high-type supplier
will earn informational rent, because it can always pretend to be of low-type and still
receive an order. In contrast, under the dual-sourcing model, a low-type supplier will
not receive an order if the other supplier is of high-type. Given the manufacturer’s
reluctance to order from a low-type supplier, the high-type suppliers now know that
pretending to be of low-type comes with the risk of not receiving an order. Thus, by
not ordering from a low-type supplier, the manufacturer in effect creates competitive
pressure that limits the high-type suppliers’ incentive to misrepresent themselves.
This competition manifests itself in the reduction of supplier 1’s informational rent,
shown in Table 3.7.
Finally, when r ≤ rL, the revenue is low enough that a low-type supplier does
not receive an order with or without the dual-sourcing option. Hence, in this re-
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gion, the high-type supplier has no incentive to misrepresent itself and cannot earn
informational rent, regardless of whether or not the dual-sourcing option exists.
3.7.2 Value of the Dual-Sourcing Option for the Manufacturer
We now compute the manufacturer’s values of the dual-sourcing option in the
symmetric and asymmetric information models, and then compare them to examine
the effect of asymmetric information on the benefit of having a dual-sourcing option.
We define the value of the dual-sourcing option for the manufacturer as the difference
between its expected profits in the dual-sourcing and single-sourcing models, given
by (3.5) and (3.9) for the symmetric information model, and (3.6) and (3.10) for the
asymmetric information model.
Symmetric information. Consider the scenario where in the single-sourcing
model the only supplier is of low-type and in the dual-sourcing model the additional
supplier is of high-type. In this scenario, the manufacturer enjoys one of two kinds of
benefits by moving from the single-sourcing model to the dual-sourcing model. First,
if revenue is high and the manufacturer orders from both suppliers in the dual-sourcing
model, then the manufacturer benefits from diversification, reducing the probability
of lost sales. Second, if revenue is low and the manufacturer chooses to order from
only one supplier in the dual-sourcing model, the manufacturer enjoys the benefit of
having access to the more efficient, high-type supplier. In the other scenarios, where
either the single supplier is of high-type or both suppliers in the dual-sourcing model
are of low-type, the dual-sourcing option does not yield benefits of having access to
a more reliable supplier. Nonetheless, the dual-sourcing option continues to generate
diversification benefits when the revenue is large enough.
Asymmetric information. The value of the dual-sourcing option under asym-
metric information is similar to that under symmetric information. One important
difference, however, is that the manufacturer yields informational rent(s) to the high-
type supplier(s), and the dual-sourcing option may increase or decrease the total
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informational rent to be paid by the manufacturer. On one hand, the dual-sourcing
option has the potential to reduce the informational rent paid to a supplier. As dis-
cussed in §3.7.1, this happens when a manufacturer with the dual-sourcing option
chooses not to order from a low-type supplier, thus putting a competitive pressure
on high-type suppliers. On the other hand, in cases where the dual-sourcing option
enables the manufacturer to order from two high-type suppliers, the manufacturer
may have to pay informational rents to both suppliers, reducing the appeal of the
dual-sourcing option. Thus, it is not necessarily obvious whether the dual-sourcing
option is more or less valuable under asymmetric information compared to under
symmetric information. We next explore this comparison.
Information and the value of the dual-sourcing option for the manu-
facturer. Proposition 8 below formalizes the comparison between the values of the
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Figure 3.5: The values of the dual-
sourcing option for the manufacturer
under symmetric and asymmetric in-
formation. The value of the dual-
sourcing option under asymmetric in-
formation is greater than under sym-
metric information for r̃L < r < r0,
but is smaller for r > r0.
Proposition 8. Information and the dual-sourcing option are substitutes when the
revenue is small and are complements when the revenue is large. Specifically, there ex-
ists a value r0, r
HL > r0 > r̃
LL, such that, for r > r0, the manufacturer’s value of the
dual-sourcing option is larger under symmetric information than under asymmetric
information; the converse is true for r̃L < r < r0.
Intuitively, one may expect that the manufacturer would always benefit more from
the dual-sourcing option under symmetric information because the manufacturer’s
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ability to identify the suppliers’ types may help it take better advantage of the option.
Proposition 8 shows that information reduces the value of the dual-sourcing option
when revenue, r, is small (i.e., r̃L < r < r0), but increases the value of the dual-
sourcing option when revenue, r, is large (i.e., r > r0).
This observation is a manifestation of the manufacturer’s tradeoff between the
benefit of supplier competition and the benefit of diversification. When the revenue
is small, the competition effect dominates and hence the manufacturer prefers not to
order from a secondary supplier. This reduces the informational rent extracted by
a high-type supplier. Because this benefit is absent under symmetric information,
the dual-sourcing option is more valuable under asymmetric information. When the
revenue is large, the benefit of diversification becomes larger than the benefit of
competition, and hence the manufacturer finds it useful to diversify. The resulting
inflation of informational rents makes the dual-sourcing option less valuable under
asymmetric information.
3.8. Codependent Supplier Production Disruptions
Thus far we assumed that the two suppliers’ production disruption processes are
independent. In reality, they could be correlated due to common infrastructure, ge-
ographic proximity, similar production technologies, overlapping supply bases and
other factors. In this section we extend our model and analysis to capture codepen-
dence between the two suppliers’ disruption processes.
3.8.1 Model and Optimal Contract Menu
We capture codependence between the two suppliers’ disruption processes by al-
lowing the Bernoulli yield random variables of the two suppliers to be statistically
dependent. If the two suppliers are of reliability types, t1, t2 ∈ {H,L}, we may repre-
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 ωt1,t2(1, 1) ωt1,t2(1, 0)
ωt1,t2(0, 1) ωt1,t2(0, 0)
 , (3.7)
where ωt1,t2(x1, x2) = P{ρt11 = x1, ρt22 = x2}, x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}, is the joint probability
that the yield rates of the two suppliers’ production runs are x1 and x2, respectively.
Matrix Ωt1,t2 can be uniquely characterized by one of its four elements and the two
suppliers’ marginal probabilities of successful production, P{ρt11 = 1} = θt1 and
P{ρt22 = 1} = θt2 , because θt1 = ωt1,t2(1, 1) + ωt1,t2(1, 0) and θt2 = ωt1,t2(0, 1) +
ωt1,t2(1, 1).12 We choose the two suppliers’ joint success probability, ωt1,t2(1, 1), to
be the indicator of the level of codependence between the two suppliers’ disruption
processes. The larger ωt1,t2(1, 1), the greater the codependence.
The manufacturer’s contract design problem under asymmetric information is









in (3.4a), is now an expectation over Ωt1,t2 , the joint probability distribu-
tion of ρt11 and ρ
t2
2 . To obtain an analytical solution, we assume that ω
HL(1, 1)/l >
ωHH(1, 1)/h. This assumption is equivalent to the following restriction on the condi-
tional probability of high-type supplier-1 producing successfully, given that supplier
2 produced successfully:
P{ρH1 = 1|ρL2 = 1} > P{ρH1 = 1|ρH2 = 1}. (3.8)
In words, high-type supplier-1’s probability of successful production conditional on
supplier 2 producing successfully is decreasing in supplier-2’s reliability. For exam-
ple, consider a situation where the two suppliers are located in the same region and
12In the exhaustive set of joint probability matrices, {ΩHH ,ΩHL,ΩLH ,ΩLL}, matrix ΩLH is the
transpose of ΩHL, because we assumed that the two suppliers are symmetric if they are of the same
type.
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share an unreliable infrastructure and where a supplier’s reliability increases in its
experience of working with this infrastructure. Production success of an inexperi-
enced supplier-2 provides a stronger signal than success of an experienced supplier-2
regarding the chance that the other supplier (supplier 1) will succeed as well.
Proposition 9. Given that the two suppliers’ disruption processes are codependent
and condition (3.8) holds, the manufacturer’s optimal contract menu and the sup-
pliers’ profits under symmetric and asymmetric information are as given in Proposi-
tions 6 and 7, respectively, with the thresholds r̃tm,tm and rtm,tm redefined per Table 3.8.
The manufacturer’s expected profits under symmetric and asymmetric information are
obtained by replacing (1−h)h, (1−h)l and (1−l)l in (3.5) and (3.6) with h−ωHH(1, 1),










































Table 3.8: Expressions for thresholds r̃tm,tm and rtm,tm when the suppliers’ disrup-
tions are codependent.
To obtain the optimal contract menu and the profits of the suppliers and the
manufacturer, we can simply rewrite the joint probabilities (1 − h)h, (1 − h)l and
(1−l)l in the thresholds of revenue and profits in the previous sections as h−ωHH(1, 1),
l − ωHL(1, 1) and l − ωLL(1, 1), respectively.
3.8.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We analyze how the manufacturer’s ordering decisions, the supply chain firms’
profits, and the value of information for the manufacturer change as the codepen-
dence between the two suppliers’ disruption processes increases. To model an in-
crease in codependence, we increase at least one of the three joint success proba-
bilities, ωHH(1, 1), ωHL(1, 1) and ωLL(1, 1), by a small amount ε, while keeping the
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others fixed. We further restrict the increment ε to be such that the resulting level of
codependence does not violate inequality (3.8).
The manufacturer’s diversification decision. From Proposition 9, the thresh-
olds for the manufacturer to diversify in both symmetric and asymmetric information
models, r̃HH , r̃HL and r̃LL; rHH , rHL and rLL, increase as codependence increases.
In other words, greater supplier codependence makes diversification statistically less
valuable and pushes the manufacturer towards sole-sourcing, in both symmetric and
asymmetric information models.
The supply chain firms’ profits under asymmetric information. As the
joint success probabilities, ωHH(1, 1), ωHL(1, 1) or ωLL(1, 1), increase, both the manu-
facturer’s expected profit (3.6) and the high-type suppliers’ informational rents (pro-
vided in Table 3.5, with rLL and rHL redefined as in Proposition 9) decrease in the
asymmetric information model. To explain this observation, we note that greater
codependence makes diversification less valuable for the manufacturer. This reduces
the manufacturer’s profit in both symmetric and asymmetric information models. Un-
der asymmetric information, however, greater codependence also causes an increase
in supplier competition, leading to a reduction in the informational rents extracted by
the high-type suppliers. This compensates for the reduction in the benefit of diver-
sification for the manufacturer, making the manufacturer’s profit under asymmetric
information less sensitive to an increase in codependence than under symmetric in-
formation.
Manufacturer’s value of information. We replace joint probabilities (1−h)h,
(1 − h)l and (1 − l)l in the expression for the manufacturer’s value of information
with h− ωHH(1, 1), l − ωHL(1, 1) and l − ωLL(1, 1). As codependence increases, the
manufacturer’s value of information decreases. Thus, as the two suppliers’ disruptions
become more correlated, the manufacturer becomes less concerned with asymmetric
information despite the fact that higher codependence between supplier disruptions
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makes the supply base less reliable overall. To see why, recall that greater codepen-
dence makes diversification less desirable, leading to increased supplier competition.
This in turn reduces the suppliers’ incentives to misrepresent their reliability, and
hence reduces the value of information for the manufacturer. The managerial impli-
cation is that strategic actions to reduce codependence between supplier disruptions
(e.g., sourcing from different geographic regions) should not be seen as a substitute
for obtaining better information about suppliers’ reliabilities.
3.9. Concluding Remarks
Supply disruptions lead to significant losses in shareholders’ value (Hendricks and
Singhal, 2003). A common operational tool for controlling supply disruption risks
is placing orders with several suppliers (diversification), so that if one of the sup-
pliers experiences a problem, others might still deliver parts to the manufacturer.
However, working with several suppliers is administratively expensive, and managers
must carefully weigh the benefits of diversification against its costs. This tradeoff
depends on a number of factors such as whether suppliers are located in the same
geographical area (and are exposed to the same causes of disruptions) and how much
the manufacturer would lose if a disruption did occur. Furthermore, this chapter
shows that another important factor is whether suppliers are better informed than
the manufacturer about the disruption likelihood.
First, we observe that a dual-sourcing option (the option of the manufacturer to
order from one or two suppliers) has several benefits, with the risk-reduction due
to diversification being just one of them. The other important benefit comes from
competition. Consistent with the extant economics and operations literatures, we
find that suppliers use their private information about their reliabilities to extract
informational rents from the manufacturer. If the manufacturer orders from both
suppliers (i.e., diversifies) then it pays high rents to both suppliers, which leads to
very high effective diversification costs. On the other hand, if the manufacturer
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commits to ordering from only one of the two suppliers, the competition between
suppliers keeps these rents down. Thus, we find that asymmetric information about
suppliers’ reliabilities pushes the manufacturer away from diversification and towards
sole-sourcing. As a consequence, the additional cost that asymmetric information
imposes on diversification may cause the manufacturer to cease diversifying even
as the supply base reliability erodes, which would never happen under symmetric
information.
Second, diversification is still used by the manufacturer under asymmetric in-
formation about suppliers’ reliabilities, but only if the manufacturer’s costs in case
of a disruption are very high. Because diversification results in high informational
rents, manufacturers that choose to diversify have a strong incentive to learn about
suppliers’ reliabilities, for example, by investing in long-term relationships with sup-
pliers, sending representatives to supplier factories, etc. In contrast, when costs of
disruptions are low and consequently the manufacturer orders from only one supplier,
competition between suppliers is very effective in curtailing informational rents and
the manufacturer would not gain much by knowing everything suppliers know. Thus,
in such cases, arm’s-length relationships between the manufacturer and the suppliers
are more tenable. Moreover, we find that information may become more valuable
even as a high-type supplier’s reliability becomes closer to that of a low-type, because
in such a case supply diversification becomes more important. Thus, surprisingly,
more similarity between supplier reliability types (having “less to learn” about the
suppliers’ true reliabilities) should not be seen as a substitute for information.
Third, having less information about supplier reliability does not necessarily de-
crease the value of a dual-sourcing option for the manufacturer. If disruptions costs
are low, this option is more valuable for a manufacturer who is not as knowledgeable
as the suppliers, because it enables such a manufacturer to leverage competition to
drive down suppliers’ informational rents.
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Fourth, introducing codependence between supplier disruptions does not alter any
of the above insights, but adds new findings. Although greater supplier codependence
reduces the manufacturer’s profit, it also heightens supplier competition by making
suppliers more similar. Consequently, the decrease in the manufacturer’s profit due
to greater supplier codependence is less severe under asymmetric information (where
competition is more vital) than under symmetric information. In fact, greater code-
pendence between supplier disruptions reduces the suppliers’ incentives to misrep-
resent their reliabilities and reduces the value of information for the manufacturer.
Hence, strategic actions to reduce supplier codependence (such as choosing suppli-
ers from different regions) should not be seen as a substitute for learning suppliers’
reliabilities.
To spotlight the main features of our model we omitted both salvage value and
disposal costs for the manufacturer. It is straightforward to see that incorporating
a salvage value would make diversification more attractive. Because, as we already
discussed, the value of information about suppliers’ reliabilities increases in the man-
ufacturer’s propensity to diversify, a larger salvage value translates into a larger value
of information. Analogously, because disposal costs discourage diversification, infor-
mation about reliabilities becomes less valuable in the presence of disposal costs.
We believe that if we extended our analysis to include multi-sourcing, the effects
of competition, the benefits of selecting the best available supplier(s), and additional
costs of diversification due to informational rents would continue to shape the solution
of the manufacturer’s problem. In fact, our insights suggest that with more suppliers
these effects will intensify and the manufacturer will rely more on competition and
less on diversification. However, there will be many more combinations of suppliers
that are candidates for receiving an order, increasing the complexity of the analysis.
In our model each supplier can be one of two possible types, and the manufac-
turer’s demand is known at the time it places its order. While we suspect that having
102
more than two supplier types or modeling random demand would leave the spirit
of our insights unchanged, we believe that the analysis would become substantially
more complex. In particular, the monotonicity condition, which enables the incentive
compatibility conditions to be verified, might be violated, making the derivation of
the optimal contract very cumbersome.
In our model, the high-type supplier was assumed to have a lower expected cost






. There could be settings where the cost
relationship is reversed, namely the low-type supplier has a lower cost of successfully









, the monotonicity condition again








, our analysis carries through by reversing the labels “high” and “low”.
This makes l > h, but interprets the “high” type supplier as again being the supplier
with the lower expected cost of successfully producing one unit.
Finally, we assumed that the supplier types are independent. Applying the results
from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, page 292), if the suppliers’ types in our model were
correlated, the manufacturer could implement the same contract as if the supplier
types were public information. Additionally, as in Maskin and Tirole (1990) (also
see discussion in Chapter 2), we could allow the demand or unit revenue to be the
manufacturer’s private information, but the manufacturer would not do any better
than if the demand and unit revenue information were public.
In future work, it could be interesting to consider the effects of supplier collusion
on the contract design and the value of the dual-sourcing option. Colluding suppliers
could agree to misreport their types to the manufacturer, receive higher payments, and
then split the resulting benefits. Therefore, we expect that supplier competition will
be weakened in the presence of supplier collusion, pushing the manufacturer towards
diversification. At the same time, informational rents could be significantly higher
if the manufacturer diversifies, pushing the manufacturer away from diversification.
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Therefore, it is difficult to say, a priori, if collusion will encourage or discourage
diversification.
This chapter establishes a number of trends between diversification and informa-
tion about supplier reliability. Future research could also study a risk-averse manufac-
turer, making objective function (3.4a) an argument of a non-linear utility function.
Intuitively, one might expect risk aversion to encourage diversification, which, as the
results of this chapter suggest, would make information about suppliers’ reliability
more valuable.
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3.10. Appendix: Single-Sourcing Model (Benchmark)
Lemma 5 below summarizes the manufacturer’s ordering decisions, the manufac-
turer’s profit, and the supplier’s profit at the optimal contract menu under symmetric
and asymmetric information. Thresholds r̃H , r̃L, rH and rL are defined in Proposi-
tions 6 and 7.
Lemma 5. In the symmetric information model with a single supplier, at the optimal
contract menu, the manufacturer will order from the high-type supplier if and only if
r > r̃H , and will order from the low-type supplier if and only if r > r̃L. The expected
profits of both the high-type and the low-type suppliers are zero. The expected profit
of the manufacturer is
αH
[




(l r − cL)D −K
]+
. (3.9)
In the asymmetric information model with a single supplier, at the optimal contract
menu, the manufacturer will order from the high-type supplier if and only if r > rH ,
and will order from the low-type supplier if and only if r > rL. The expected profit





D, for r > rL, and equals zero for r ≤ rL. The
expected profit of the manufacturer is
αH
[


















Proof. Omitted. Compared to the dual-sourcing model, the manufacturer’s optimiza-
tion problem in the single-supplier model changes in a straightforward way. Proofs
of the results for the single-supplier model are similar to that for Proposition 7. 
3.11. Appendix: Proofs of Statements
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Proof of Lemma 4. The supplier’s objective function (3.2) is piecewise linear. We
focus on the corner-point solutions: z = 0 or q. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Omitted. The case with symmetric information is a spe-
cial case of that with asymmetric information; see proof of Proposition 7. 
Proof of Proposition 7. From the supplier’s optimal profit (3.2), the manufac-
turer’s transfer payment to supplier n net of the expected penalty received equals
supplier-n’s optimal profit plus its cost of production. Under contract (Xn, qn, pn)(tn, tn),
this equality has the following form:
Xn(tn, tn)− pn(tn, tn)E
{
qn(tn, tn)− ρtnn ztnn [(qn, pn)(tn, tn)]
}+
= πtnn [(Xn, qn, pn)(tn, tn)] + c
tnztnn [(qn, pn)(tn, tn)].
(3.11)






































Subject to For n = 1, 2
ΠHn (H) ≥ ΠHn (L) (3.12b)
ΠLn(L) ≥ ΠLn(H), (3.12c)
ΠHn (H) ≥ 0, (3.12d)
ΠLn(L) ≥ 0, (3.12e)





πtnn [(Xn, qn, pn)(s, tn)]
}
is supplier-n’s expected profit when it
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reports itself as of type-s, s ∈ {H,L}, where the expectation is taken over supplier-n’s
type.
Here is our plan to solve problem (3.12). First, we reduce the incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality constraints (3.12b–3.12f) to an equivalent set of
constraints, among which there are monotonicity constraints for the two suppliers.
Then, we temporarily relax the monotonicity constraints. We show that the optimal
solution to the relaxation satisfies the monotonicity constraints and, thus, is optimal
for the original problem.
To reduce problem (3.12), we first rearrange the incentive compatibility con-
straints (3.12b) and (3.12c) and the individual rationality constraints (3.12d) and
(3.12e) for supplier n = 1, 2. Applying the definition of a high supplier-type’s reliabil-
ity advantage (Definition 3) under the contract for low-type supplier-n, (Xn, qn, pn)(L, tn),
we represent high-type supplier-n’s expected profit, when reporting itself as of low-
type, as







Similarly, applying Definition 3 with the contract for high-type supplier-n, (Xn, qn, pn)(H, tn),









We substitute these two equalities into the right-hand-side of the incentive compati-
bility constraints, (3.12b) and (3.12c), obtaining










Furthermore, inequalities (3.13a), Γn[(qn, pn)(L, tn)] ≥ 0 (see the discussion following
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(3.3)) and ΠLn(L) ≥ 0 (constraint (3.12e), individual rationality for the low-type)
together imply ΠHn (H) ≥ 0. That is, the individual rationality constraint for high-
type supplier-n (3.12d) is redundant.
Using the new incentive compatibility constraint (3.13) and individual rationality
constraint (3.12e), we then choose Xn(tn, tn) optimally for any given (qn, pn)(tn, tn).
The objective function (3.12a) suggests that the objective is maximized whenXn(tn, H)
and Xn(tn, L) are chosen such that the expected profit of supplier n of type-tn,
Πtnn (tn), is minimized. Thus, at the optimal solution, the individual rationality con-
straint (3.12e) reduces to
ΠLn(L) = 0. (3.14)
Similarly, at the optimal solution the incentive compatibility constraint (3.13a) re-
duces to















, n = 1, 2
(3.16)
which is commonly called the monotonicity constraint in the information economics
literature.
So far, we have reduced the original incentive compatibility and individual ratio-
nality constraints (3.12b–3.12e) to constraints (3.14–3.16). We roll (3.14) and (3.15)
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We expand the summation over t1 and t2 and the expectations over t1 and t2 in






































































































Γ2[(q2, p2)(L,H)]− αHαLΓ2[(q2, p2)(L,L)]
}
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qn(tn, tn) ≥ 0, pn(tn, tn) ≥ 0.
This concludes our first major step of reducing problem (3.12).
Now, we carry on with the second major step: to solve the equivalent prob-
lem (3.18) to find the optimal (qn, pn)(tn, tn). We first temporarily drop the mono-
tonicity constraint (3.16) and solve problem (3.18) with only nonnegativity con-
straints. We move Γn[(qn, pn)(L, tn)] in (3.18) to be with other terms that depend on


























































































































We solve each of the four maximization problems in (3.19). One can show that
setting ztnn [(qn, pn)(tn, tn)] = qn(tn, tn) and pn(tn, tn) ≥ ctn/θtn is without loss of op-
timality. Next, notice from equation (3.3) that Γn[(Xn, qn, pn)(L, tn)] is increasing in
pn(L, tn). Hence, it is optimal to set pn(L, tn) to be its minimum c
L/l, which gives






For each of the four maximization problems in (3.19) we find the optimal or-
der quantities q1(t1, t2) and q2(t2, t1). Because for each of these four maximization
problems the objective function is piecewise linear in the order quantities, without
loss of optimality, we focus on the corner-point solutions only: (q1(t1, t2), q2(t2, t1)) ∈{
(0, 0), (D, 0), (0, D), (D,D)
}
. Comparing the objective function value at these four
corner points reveals the optimal order quantities. We present the optimal solution























θtm(1− θtm)r − ctm
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Problem (3.19a), t1 = t2 = H
When r ≤ rH :
q1(H,H) = 0 q2(H,H) = 0 p1(H,H) ≥ 0 p2(H,H) ≥ 0
When rH < r ≤ rHH :




When r > rHH :







Problem (3.19b), t1 = H and t2 = L
When r ≤ rH :
q1(H,L) = 0 q2(L,H) = 0 p1(H,L) ≥ 0 p2(L,H) ≥ 0
When rH < r ≤ rHL:




When r > rHL:






Problem (3.19c), t1 = L and t2 = H
The solution is identical to the solution for problem (3.19b),
except that the indices of the two suppliers are swapped.
Problem (3.19d), t1 = L and t2 = L
When r ≤ rL:
q1(L,L) = 0 q2(L,L) = 0 p1(L,L) ≥ 0 p2(L,L) ≥ 0
When rL < r ≤ rLL:




When r > rLL:






In Lemma 6, we show that the optimal solution to the relaxation problem (3.19)
in the above table satisfies the monotonicity constraint (3.16) for supplier 1 and
supplier 2, as long as we restrict pn(H, tn) ≥ c
L
l
whenever qn(L, tn) = D at the
optimal solution. Thus, with the additional restriction on pn(H, tn), the optimal
solution to the relaxation is also optimal for the original problem (3.12).
We now compute the optimal transfer payments using (3.11), (3.14) and (3.15).
Without loss of optimality, for tn ∈ {H,L} we choose the optimal payments X∗n(tn, tn)
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q∗n(L, tn)− ρtnn ztnn [(q∗n, p∗n)(L, tn)]
]+
.
Finally, we show that the optimal contract menu (in Table 3.4) satisfies the
dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, which





















n)(H, tn)] ≥ 0, πLn [(X∗n, q∗n, p∗n)(L, tn)] ≥ 0.





n)(H, tn)] ≥ πHn [(X∗n, q∗n, p∗n)(H, tn)]− πLn [(X∗n, q∗n, p∗n)(L, tn)]







n)(L, tn)] ≥ 0 (3.24b)
Using (3.21a) and (3.25), we can verify that the above constraints hold for the optimal
contract. 
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Lemma 6. The optimal solutions to the relaxation (3.19) (in the table above) sat-
isfy the monotonicity constraints (3.16) for supplier 1 and supplier 2, if we restrict
pn(H, tn) ≥ c
L
l
whenever qn(L, tn) = D, for tn ∈ {H,L}.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, for n = 1, 2 and tn = H,L, with the additional
restriction pn(H, tn) ≥ c
L
l
, the optimal solution to (3.19) satisfies
Γn[(qn, pn)(H, tn)] ≥ Γn[(qn, pn)(L, tn)]. (3.25)
When Γn[(qn, pn)(L, tn)] = 0 (i.e., qn(L, tn) = 0), the inequality (3.25) holds trivially.
We now focus on the case when qn(L, tn) = D.
From equation (3.3), Γn(q, p) is increasing in both q and p. Therefore, it suffices
to show that qn(H, tn) ≥ qn(L, tn) and pn(H, tn) ≥ pn(L, tn) for all r. First, it
can be verified that the optimal solution to (3.19) satisfies qn(H, tn) ≥ qn(L, tn) for
all r. Next, recall that when qn(L, tn) = D, pn(L, tn) =
cL
l
is optimal. Since the
assumption in the lemma gives pn(H, tn) ≥ c
L
l
whenever qn(L, tn) = D, we have
pn(H, tn) ≥ pn(L, tn). Inequality (3.25) follows. 
Proof of Corollary 10. We want to show that, for h and l such that h+ l > 1, as
both h and l decrease by ε, in the symmetric information model r̃HL always decreases,
but in the asymmetric information model, there exist h and l, h + l > 1, such that
rHL increases.




Its first-order derivative with respective to l is strictly positive for 2 l+ ν > 1, that is,
h+ l > 1. Therefore, for any h+ l > 1, as both h and l decrease by ε, r̃HL decreases.












(1− l − ν)l
.
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l(2l + ν − 1)− αH
αL
{
cL [2(l + ν)(1− ν − l)− l] + cH l(2l + ν − 1)
}
l3(1− ν − l)2
.
For any cH , cL, K
D
and αH , there exist l and h = l + ν, for some ν > 0, such that
h + l > 1, h > l, cL/l > cH/h and [rHL(l)]′ < 0. To see this, we let h = 1 − ξ + ξ2



























As ξ approaches zero, the right-hand-side of (3.26) approaches zero from below (since
the right-hand-side of (3.26) is polynomial in ξ and its leading term is negative).
Therefore, one can always pick some ξ > 0 that will yield [rHL(l)]′ < 0. Note that
h need not be extremely close to 1 and l need not be extremely small. For instance,
suppose cH = cL, K = 0 and αH > 2αL. At l = 1/2 and ν = 1/8 (i.e., h = 5/8),




) < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 8. We compare the manufacturer’s expected profits under
symmetric information in the dual- and single-sourcing models, (3.5) and (3.9). This
yields the following expression for the manufacturer’s value of the dual-sourcing option
under symmetric information (note that in this expression, the definitions of the
thresholds r̃H , r̃L, r̃LL, r̃HL and r̃HH have been used to replace the positive operators

































Similarly, we compare the expected profits of the manufacturer under asymmetric
information in the dual- and single-sourcing models, (3.6) and (3.10), obtaining the
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The difference between the manufacturer’s value of the dual-sourcing option under




[(l r − cL)D −K]1{r>r̃L} −
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We treat (3.29) as a function of r and show there exists a unique r0 ∈ (r̃LL, rHL),
at which the curve changes from non-negative to strictly negative. Because the lower
bound of the interval, r̃LL, could be either greater or smaller than rL, we consider
two cases: r̃LL ≥ rL and r̃LL < rL.
Case r̃LL ≥ rL. We prove the result by tracing the value of (3.29) for r > r̃L.
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From the tables describing the thresholds r̃L, . . . , r̃HL and rL, . . . , rHL in Proposi-
tions 6 and 7, respectively, and the assumption of the case, we get r̃L < rL ≤ r̃LL <
{rLL, r̃HL} < rHL. One can check that (3.29) is equal to zero at r = r̃L, strictly
positive and strictly increasing in r for r ∈ (r̃L, rL], constant with respect to r for
r ∈ (rL, r̃LL], decreasing in r for r ∈ (r̃LL, rHL] (regardless of the ordering of rLL and
r̃HL) and constant in r thereafter. Also, (3.29) is negative at r = rHL. Thus, there
must exist r0 ∈ (r̃LL, rHL) such that (3.29) changes from non-negative to strictly
negative at r0.
Case r̃LL < rL. Again using the definitions of the thresholds and the assumption
of the case, we know r̃L < r̃LL < rL < rLL < rHL. We utilize two sub-cases, depending
on r̃HL.
Sub-case r̃LL < r̃HL ≤ rL. One can check that (3.29) is zero at r = r̃L, and strictly
positive and strictly increasing in r for r ∈ (r̃L, r̃LL]. As for r ∈ (r̃LL, rL], there are
three possibilities for (3.29): increasing throughout, increasing until r̃HL and then
decreasing thereafter, or decreasing throughout. Additionally, (3.29) is decreasing in
r for r ∈ (rL, rHL] and constant in r thereafter. Therefore, there exists r∗ ∈ [r̃LL, rL]
such that (3.29) is strictly positive at r = r∗ and decreasing for r > r∗. Furthermore,
(3.29) is negative at r = rHL. Thus, there must exist r0 > r
∗ such that (3.29) changes
from non-negative to strictly negative at r0.
Sub-case rL < {rLL, r̃HL} < rHL. Similarly, one can check that (3.29) is zero
at r = r̃L, and strictly positive and strictly increasing in r for r ∈ (r̃L, r̃LL]. As
for r ∈ (r̃LL, rL], there are two possibilities for (3.29): increasing throughout, or
decreasing throughout. For r ∈ (rL, rHL], (3.29) is decreasing (regardless of the
ordering of rLL and r̃HL), and is constant for r > rHL. Therefore, the same logic as
in the previous sub-case establishes the existence of r0. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Omitted. Proofs of the results under codependent disrup-
tions are similar to those for Proposition 7, and are omitted for brevity. 
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Chapter 4
Delegating Procurement under Supply Risk and Asymmetric
Information
4.1. Introduction
When choosing the sourcing strategy, an important decision of the manufacturer
is to decide how much control it assumes over the procurement process. The manu-
facturer may directly contract with suppliers. However, a supplier need not produce
the entire order in house to meet the manufacturer’s requirement—the supplier may
outsource part or all of its production assignment. In anticipation of such action
of the suppliers, the manufacturer may preemptively delegate a part of its procure-
ment decision to a supplier. That is, the supplier may be allowed to decide whether
to produce all in house or to outsource and, in the latter case, how to allocate the
production assignment.
When the suppliers are unreliable, delegating the procurement decision to a sup-
plier could potentially alter the manufacturer’s supply-risk profile and its risk man-
agement strategy. To mitigate supply disruption risk, a manufacturer can use several
suppliers at the same time (diversification). When the manufacturer directly con-
tracts with suppliers, it decides on the number of suppliers to use and allocates orders
among them to achieve the best cost-risk balance. When the manufacturer delegates
procurement to a supplier, it transfers part of its risk management responsibility to
the supplier, but also gives up some of its control over its preparation for a supply
disruption.
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In addition, delegating the procurement decision could potentially alter how much
a manufacturer relies on its information about the suppliers. In practice, suppliers
typically have private information about their costs and abilities to fulfill the require-
ments. As we have shown in Chapters 2 and 3, such asymmetric information could
introduce additional risk to the supply chain. There are occasions where suppliers
have closer relationships among themselves than that with the manufacturer. In such
an occasion, the manufacturer may reduce its information gap with its suppliers by
delegating procurement to a more knowledgeable supplier.
In this chapter, we study the problem of a manufacturer delegating its procure-
ment of a part to one of its two unreliable suppliers, who have private information
about their probabilities of experiencing a disruption. We explore the interaction be-
tween the manufacturer’s supply risk management and its use of delegation strategy.
Specifically, our research questions are:
• How does delegation affect the manufacturer’s risk profile?
• Does delegation increase or decrease the manufacturer’s profit?
• How does asymmetric information about supply risk affect the manufacturer’s
use of delegation?
This chapter is organized as follows. After a review of the related literature, we
introduce the model. We then present the preliminary insights. In the conclusion,
we summarize the findings and discuss our plans for further study on this topic. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix of this chapter.
4.2. Literature Review
The issue of delegating contracting responsibility has been studied in the eco-
nomics literature. For a review of this body of research, we refer the reader to
Mookherjee (2006). In this literature, a class of models invoke the Revelation Prin-
ciple (e.g., Tirole, 1986; Melumad et al., 1992, 1995; Laffont and Martimort, 1998;
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Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004). This approach takes an incentive perspective for
explaining the cost of delegation caused by the principal’s loss of control over the
agents. In our study, we follow this approach and model the manufacturer’s con-
tracting decision as a mechanism design problem. The two suppliers (agents) form
a coalition and the manufacturer (principal) offers an incentive-compatible contract
menu to the coalition. This model corresponds to the model in which the princi-
pal delegates to a middleman who has perfect information about the agents (e.g.,
Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004).
In operations management, there is a sparse literature on delegating procurement
decisions. A recent paper by Kayıs et al. (2007) studies a supply chain of two tiers
of suppliers, where the tier-1 supplier is the sub-assembler and the tier-2 supplier de-
livers a component to the tier-1 supplier. In their model, the suppliers are perfectly
reliable, and the buyer has asymmetric information about the cost of the suppliers. In
our model, the suppliers are unreliable and the manufacturer has asymmetric infor-
mation about the suppliers’ reliabilities. In their model, the two suppliers’ products
are complementary and hence there is no competition between the suppliers. In our
model, the two suppliers produce perfectly substitutable products, and the manufac-
turer can use the two suppliers at the same time to reduce the risk of no delivery.
Their study focuses on the benefit of using a simple contract in delegation, under
which the manufacturer offers the same price-only contract across all supplier types.
In contrast, we study an incentive-compatible contract menu. The use of the con-
tract menu enables us to analyze the change caused by delegation in the suppliers’
incentives and its effect on the manufacturer’s sourcing strategy.
4.3. The Model
The setup of the model is similar to the two-supplier model in Chapter 3. There
are two suppliers, each of which is subject to a random production disruption. There
are two supplier types. The suppliers have private information about their types:
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high reliability or low reliability. For this study, we set the manufacturer’s setup cost
of contracting with a supplier, K, to be zero.
Unlike the model in Chapter 3, here the manufacturer contracts with at most one
supplier, be it supplier 1 or supplier 2. The two suppliers form a centralized coalition,
and the manufacturer anticipates that the suppliers do so. The manufacturer designs
an incentive-compatible contract menu to elicit the coalition’s type information. Each
contract consists of a transfer payment, an order quantity and a non-delivery penalty
that applies to the coalition of the suppliers.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the manufacturer offers a contract menu
to the supplier coalition. The coalition accepts or rejects the offer. Then, if it accepts
the contract, the coalition decides the sizes of the two suppliers’ respective production
runs. The suppliers run production independently. Finally, the coalition collects the
outputs from the suppliers and delivers to the manufacturer.
We solve this problem backwards, starting with the supplier coalition’s problem.
4.3.1 The Supplier Coalition’s Optimal Production Actions
Given the manufacturer’s contract (X, q, p), the supplier coalition chooses the sizes
of the two suppliers’ production runs, z1 and z2, to maximize its expected profit:
π̂t1,t2(X, q, p) = X − min
z1≥0, z2≥0
{












Lemma 7 summarizes the coalition’s optimal production sizes (ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2) and its optimal
expected profit π̂t1,t2(X, q, p):
Lemma 7. Under the manufacturer’s contract (X, q, p), the supplier coalition’s opti-
mal production sizes, (ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2), and its optimal expected profit, π̂
t1,t2(X, q, p), are:
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h (0, 0) X − pq
cH
h ≤ p <
cH
h(1−h) (q, 0) or (0, q) X − c
Hq − (1− h)pq
p ≥ cHh(1−h) (q, q) X − 2c




h (0, 0) X − pq
cH
h ≤ p <
cL
l(1−h) (q, 0) or (0, q) X − c
Hq − (1− h)pq
p ≥ cLl(1−h) (q, q) X − c




l (0, 0) X − pq
cL
l ≤ p <
cL
l(1−l) (q, 0) or (0, q) X − c
Lq − (1− l)pq
p ≥ cLl(1−l) (q, q) X − 2c
Lq − (1− l)2pq
As the non-delivery penalty p increases, the coalition increases the number of
suppliers that run production. Consider the case of t1 = H and t2 = L, for ex-
ample. When the non-delivery penalty is low, p < c
H
h
, neither supplier will run
production. When the penalty is medium, c
H
h
≤ p < cL
l(1−h) , only the high-type sup-
plier will run production of size q. The manufacturer effectively sole-sources. When
the non-delivery penalty is high, p ≥ cL
l(1−h) , both suppliers will produce, and the
manufacturer’s supply is effectively diversified.
A coordinating contract that implements (ẑ∗1, ẑ
∗
2). One may question
whether or not the optimal production sizes of the centralized system, (ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2), are
implementable. That is, whether or not there exists a coordinating contract between
the two suppliers that induce them to produce quantities (ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2). The difficulty in
designing such a contract is that the size of a supplier’s production run need not be
verifiable to the other supplier. Hence, the contract between the two suppliers cannot
be written over the supplier’s production sizes, z1 and z2. We circumvent this issue
by assuming that the suppliers can verify each other’s production outcome, ρt11 z1 and
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ρt22 z2.
We find a coordinating contract, under which the two suppliers share the total
cost of the coalition and run production of sizes (ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2).
Lemma 8. The coalition is coordinated and the two suppliers run production of sizes
(ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2), if they share the coalition’s costs in the following way: after both suppliers
















and shares a fraction of β2 of the total penalty. The fractions,
β1 and β2, satisfy 0 < β1 < 1, 0 < β2 < 1 and β1 + β2 = 1.
Under this contract, supplier 1 bears a fraction of β1 of the total expected cost of
the two suppliers, and supplier 2 bears a fraction of β2. Hence, it is Pareto efficient
for them to run production of sizes (ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2).
4.3.2 The Manufacturer’s Decision under Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information, we invoke the revelation principle and model the
manufacturer’s contracting decision as a mechanism design problem. In this prob-
lem, the principal (the manufacturer) offers an incentive-compatible contract menu
to a “grand agent”, that is, the coalition of the two suppliers. Given that the two
suppliers are identical if they are of the same reliability type, the coalition can be
one of the following three compositions: two high-type suppliers, a high-type and
a low-type supplier, and two low-type suppliers; with probability (αH)2, 2(αHαL)
and (αL)2, respectively. The manufacturer’s contract menu is made up of three con-
tracts: (X, q, p)(H,H), (X, q, p)(H,L) and (X, q, p)(L,L). The contract menu must
be incentive compatible, such that a coalition of any type would have no incentive to
misreport its type.
Compared to a mechanism design problem of a single agent with two types, our
problem has three agent types, and thus involves more complicated incentive compat-
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ibility constraints. The coalition of two high-type suppliers has incentives to pretend
to be a high- and a low-type supplier or be two low-type suppliers. In the economics
literature, the incentive compatibility constraint that prevents the former misrepre-
sentation is called a local incentive compatibility constraint, and the latter is called a
global incentive compatibility constraint. Similarly, the coalition of two low-type sup-
pliers also has a local and a global incentive compatibility constraint. The coalition of
a high- and a low-type supplier has two local incentive compatibility constraints that
prevent it from pretending to be two high-type suppliers or be two low-type suppliers.

































































































4.4. The Manufacturer’s Optimal Contract Menu
In general, it is difficult to solve a mechanism design problem with an agent of
more than two discrete types. However, with two restrictions over the modeling
parameters we manage to find the closed-form optimal solution. First, we assume
124
1− h < (1− l)2. This restriction sets an upper bound over the low-type’s probability
of successful production: l < 1 −
√




















That is, the gap between the effective costs of producing one good unit by the low-
type and the high-type is not too large. These restrictions ensure that the global and
local incentive-compatibility constraints across all three coalition types are slack at
the optimal solution.
We present the optimal solution in Proposition 10, where the critical revenues,










































































Proposition 10. Given that 1− h < (1− l)2 and cH
h(1−h) >
cL
l(1−l) , under asymmetric
information the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity, q̂∗(t1, t2), and the optimal
non-delivery penalty, p̂∗(t1, t2), and the optimal production actions of the coalition,
(ẑ∗1 , ẑ
∗
2), are presented in Table 4.1.
We explain how the manufacturer’s procurement action and the coalition’s pro-
duction actions change as the revenue, r, increases. Take the contract designated for a
coalition of two high-type suppliers as an example. When the revenue is low, r < r̂H ,
the manufacturer does not order. When the revenue is medium, r̂H ≤ r < r̂HH ,
the manufacturer orders from the supplier coalition but sets the non-delivery penalty
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(t1, t2) r q̂




r ∈ [0, r̂H) No contract
r ∈ [r̂H , r̂HH) D cL
l(1−l) (D, 0) or (0, D)
r ∈ [r̂HH ,∞) D cL
l(1−h) (D,D)
(H,L) or (L,H)
r ∈ [0, r̂H) No contract
r ∈ [r̂H , r̂HL) D cL
l(1−l) (D, 0) or (0, D)
r ∈ [r̂HL,∞) D cL
l(1−h) (D,D)
(L,L)
r ∈ [0, r̂L) No contract
r ∈ [r̂L, r̂LL) D cL
l
(D, 0) or (0, D)
r ∈ [r̂LL,∞) D cL
l(1−l) (D,D)
Table 4.1: The manufacturer’s optimal order quantity and penalty and the coali-
tion’s optimal production actions.
to be low, p̂∗(H,H) = c
L
l(1−l) . Under such a medium penalty, only one supplier will
run production, and the manufacturer is effectively sole-sourcing from the coalition.
When the revenue is large, r ≥ r̂HH , the manufacturer orders from the supplier coali-
tion and sets the non-delivery penalty to be high, p̂∗(H,H) = c
L
l(1−h) . Under such a
large penalty, both suppliers will run production, and the manufacturer’s supply is
diversified.
4.5. Analysis
Effect of delegating procurement decision. We compare the manufacturer’s
optimal contract menus and the corresponding production actions of the suppliers
in the direct contracting scheme (as in the two-supplier model in Chapter 3) and
the delegation scheme. We find that the critical revenue for the manufacturer to
diversify with a high- and a low-type supplier is lower in the delegation scheme:
r̂HL < rHL. The inequality implies that delegation may cause the manufacturer to
start diversifying with a high- and a low-type supplier.
This is because, compared to direct contracting, under delegation two high-type
suppliers have a smaller total incentive to pretend to be of a high- and a low-type
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supplier. Under delegation, when the manufacturer induces diversification, the two
suppliers receive one contract and jointly minimize the sum of their costs. The sup-
pliers pay one penalty to the manufacturer only if both of them are unsuccessful with
their production. In contrast, under direct contracting, the suppliers receives two
separate contracts and act independently. Each supplier pays a penalty if its pro-
duction is unsuccessful, regardless of whether or not the other supplier is successful.
Hence, delegation reduces the total penalty paid by and thus the total payment to a
high- and a low-type supplier, making the contract designed for them less attractive
for two high-type suppliers.
However, we find that r̂LL > rLL, that is, delegation may cause the manufac-
turer to stop diversifying with two low-type suppliers. This is because, compared to
direct contracting, under delegation the manufacturer enjoys a larger reduction in
the supplier’s misrepresentation incentives by forgoing diversifying with two low-type
suppliers. Under direct contracting, acting independently, two high-type suppliers
may pretend to be a high- and a low-type supplier, but would not commit to both
reporting to be of low-type. The reason for the latter is that a supplier can gain
competitive advantage by truthfully reporting to be of high-type if the other supplier
reports itself as of low-type. Hence, under direct contracting the only benefit of for-
going diversify with two low-type suppliers is the reduction in the incentive of a high-
and a low-type supplier. In contrast, under delegation the suppliers can coordinate
their type reports, and two high-type suppliers can creditable commit to reporting
to be two low-type suppliers. Hence, under delegation forgoing diversifying with two
low-type suppliers has an additional benefit: it also reduces the misrepresentation
incentives of two high-type suppliers.
The benefits of delegation. Using a numerical study, we compare the manufac-
turer’s profits in the delegation scheme and in the direct contracting scheme to derive
the benefit of delegation. We find that, compared to direct contracting, delegation
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may reduce the manufacturer’s profit when the revenue r is relatively large, but may
increase the manufacturer’s profit when r is relatively small.
Result 1: αH = 0.5, h = 0.85, l = 0.55, cH = 6, and cL = 5















Benefit of Delegation %
Result 2: αH = 0.9, h = 0.65, l = 0.4, cH = 5, and cL = 5

















Value of Delegation %
Figure 4.1: The increase in the manufacturer’s profit due to delegation (the left
panels) and the percentage of increase (the right panels).
Figure 4.1 shows the benefit of delegation as a function of the revenue r. The two
upper panels plot the benefit of diversification with parameters αH = 0.5, h = 0.85,
l = 0.55, cH = 6, and cL = 5, when the critical revenues for diversification are
r̂HH = 47, r̂HL = 71 and r̂LL = 60. In this case, delegation could cause as much as
10% loss of its expected profit. In particular, when r > r̂LL, delegation could cause a
significant loss (see the upper-left panel).
The plots at the top may suggest that delegation would not benefit the manufac-
turer. However, this is not generally true. To better illustrate the case of a positive
benefit of delegation, we set the model parameters to be αH = 0.9, h = 0.65, l = 0.4,
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and cH = cL = 5 and plot the benefit of delegation on the two lower panels in Fig-
ure 4.1. In this case, the critical revenues for diversification are r̂HH = 22, r̂HL = 136
and r̂LL = 880. Roughly in interval r̂HL < r  r̂LL delegation could increase the
manufacturer’s profit, although by a relatively small amount.
An explanation to the above observations is that delegation may increase or de-
crease the total incentive payment to the two high-type suppliers, depending on the
revenue. When the revenue is high, e.g., r > r̂LL, the manufacturer diversifies under
delegation even if the two suppliers are both of low-type. Under delegation, two high-
type suppliers would have a strong incentive to pretend to be two low-type suppliers.
Compared to the direct contracting scheme, the manufacturer must pay them an ex-
tra incentive payment in order to elicit their true types. Hence, delegation reduces
the manufacturer’s profit.
When the revenue is low, e.g., r  r̂LL, the manufacturer does not diversify with
two low-type suppliers under delegation. As in the direct contracting scheme, two
high-type suppliers have no incentive to pretend to be two low-type suppliers. On
the other hand, delegation also reduces two high-type suppliers’ incentive to report
to be a high- and a low-type, because delegation reduces the costs of, and thus the
cost gap between, these two types of the coalition. Hence, delegation increases the
manufacturer’s profit.
Effect of asymmetric information on delegation. Repeating the above analysis
for the case of symmetric information, we find that, under symmetric information,
delegating procurement has no effect over how the manufacturer would induce the
supplier production actions and the manufacturer’s expected profit. That is, dele-
gation affects the manufacturer only when the suppliers’ reliabilities are unknown to
the manufacturer. This is because under symmetric information the suppliers cannot
misreport their types, whether the manufacturer delegates or not.
Because the manufacturer is indifferent of delegation and direct contracting, under
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symmetric information the benefit of delegation is zero. Having information likely in-
creases the benefit of delegation. Hence, we have the following corollary: information
and delegation need not be substitutes. In other words, delegating procurement to a
more knowledgeable supplier need not reduces the importance of information for the
manufacturer.
4.6. Conclusion
In the chapter, we study the problem where the manufacturer delegates procure-
ment when both suppliers are unreliable and have private information about their
reliabilities. Compared to direct contracting (the two-supplier model in Chapter 3),
delegation alters the suppliers’ incentive of misrepresentation. On the one hand, del-
egation increases the suppliers’ incentive to pretend to be two low-type suppliers.
On the other hand, delegation reduces the suppliers’ incentive to pretend to be a
high-type and a low-type.
The change in the suppliers’ incentive due to delegation manifests itself in the
manufacturer’s sourcing strategy. When the suppliers are a high-type and a low-
type, delegation may cause the manufacturer to start inducing diversification, because
delegation decreases the suppliers’ incentive to pretend to be a high-type and a low-
type. In this case, delegation weakens the effect of asymmetric information on the
manufacturer’s use of diversification observed in the two-supplier model in Chapter 3.
When the suppliers are both of low-type, delegation may cause the manufacturer to
stop inducing diversification, because delegation increases the suppliers’ incentive
to pretend to be both of low-type. In this case, delegation enhances the effect of
asymmetric information.
While the suppliers’ reliabilities information is always valuable, it may be ex-
pensive to obtain. As we have shown in the two-supplier model in Chapter 3, the
manufacturer can reduce the importance of information by encouraging competition
between the suppliers. In the model of this chapter, delegation eliminates supplier
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competition and, hence, allows the suppliers to earn larger informational rents. Over-
all, delegation may increase the importance of information for the manufacturer, and
hence delegation need not be a substitute for information.
In the economics literature on delegation, an important question is whether dele-
gation is preferred over direct contracting. In general, direct contracting is superior
to delegation, under which the principal suffers from loss of control (Mookherjee,
2006). This result is obtained under asymmetric information about the agents’ costs.
There are a few exceptions. For example, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) show
that when the two suppliers produce complementary products, with an additional
assumption over the distributions of the suppliers’ cost types, delegation is superior
to direct contracting. In contrast, we assume asymmetric information about the sup-
plier’s reliability and that the suppliers’ products are substitutable. We find that the
manufacturer’s profit under delegation may be greater or smaller than that under
direct contracting, depending on the model parameters.
For future work, we plan to extend the scope of this study. In the current model,
the two suppliers can always form a coalition and the manufacturer anticipates that
the suppliers do so. We plan to consider the situation where there is uncertainty
in the formation process of the coalition by the suppliers. For example, a second
supplier need not be available after the manufacturer contracts with the primary
supplier. In the current model, the manufacturer offers one contract to the coalition.
We can allow the manufacturer to have more contracting flexibility. For example, the
manufacturer may contract with both suppliers, while anticipating that the suppliers
will collaborate with each other. This is a direct contracting problem with colluding
suppliers.
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4.7. Appendix: Proofs of Statements
Proof of Lemma 7. The coalition’s problem (4.1) can be rewritten as:









The maximization program in the right-hand-side of the above equation is a
piecewise linear, concave objective function of z1 and z2, with four corner-points:
(z1, z2) = (0, 0), (q, 0), (0, q) or (q, q). Without loss of optimality, we focus on these
corner-points. The optimal corner-point is the one that obtains the largest objective
value. 
Proof of Lemma 8. We consider a production game of two suppliers. In this game,
the two suppliers simultaneously choose their production sizes z1 and z2. We show




2) is a Nash equilibrium for the game.
Under the cost sharing contract proposed in this lemma, supplier 1 choose its

















+ β1p(q − ρt11 z1 − ρt22 z2)+
}
.
Applying the outer expectation to each term within the curly brackets, and using











(q − ρt11 z1 − ρt22 z2)+
}
.











(q − ρt11 z1 − ρt22 z2)+
}
.
Note that the objective function of each of the two suppliers is a fraction of the
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coalition’s expected total cost.














the coalition’s expected total cost and hence minimizes supplier 1’s expected cost.
Similarly, z2 = ẑ
∗
2 is supplier 2’s best response to supplier 1’s action of z1 = ẑ
∗
1 . 
Lemma 9. For a given contract (X, q, p) by the manufacturer, we define the local
reliability advantage of the coalition of two high-type suppliers, denoted as Γ
HH
HL (q, p),
to be the difference between its expected profit over the expected profit of the coalition




= π̂HH(q, p)− π̂HL(q, p). Sim-
ilarly, we define the local cost advantage of the coalition of a high- and a low-type




= π̂HL(q, p) − π̂LL(q, p). The expressions of ΓHHHL (q, p) and
Γ
HL








h(1−h) ≤ p <
cL
l(1−h) [h(1− h)p− c
H ]q
r ≥ cL
















≤ r < cL
l(1−l) [(h− l)p− (c
H − cL)]q
cL
l(1−l) ≤ r <
cL
l(1−h) [(h− l)p− (c
H − cL)]q − [l(1− l)p− cL]q
p ≥ cL




HL (q, p) and Γ
HL
LL (q, p) are non-negative and monotonic increasing in q. Γ
HL
LL (q, p)
is monotonic increasing in p. When 1−h < (1−l)2, ΓHHHL (q, p) is monotonic increasing
in p.
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Proof. One can derive the expressions of Γ
HH
HL (q, p) and Γ
HL
LL (q, p) using the expres-
sions of the coalition’s optimal profit in Lemma 7. The non-negativity and mono-
tonicity of Γ
HH
HL (q, p) and Γ
HL
LL (q, p) can be verified using the obtained expressions. 
Proof of Lemma 10. First of all, we temporarily neglect the two global incentive
compatibility constraints of the high-high and low-low coalition types. We will later
show that at the optimal solution, these constraints are slack.














− π̂t1,t2 [(X, q, p)(t1, t2)]− ct1 ẑ∗1 − ct2 ẑ∗2
}
. (4.5)
We apply the definitions of the local reliability advantages of high-high and high-
low coalition types, Γ
HH
HL (q, p) and Γ
HL
LL (q, p) (see Lemma 9), and establish the follow-





























































We apply the above equations to the four local incentive compatibility constraints in






























































Following the standard procedure of solving a mechanism design problem, we
identify that the following individual rationality and local incentive compatibility
constraints are binding at the optimal solution:
π̂LL[(X, q, p)(L,L)] = 0 (4.7a)
π̂HL[(X, q, p)(H,L)] = Γ
HL
LL [(q, p)(L,L)] (4.7b)
π̂HH [(X, q, p)(H,H)] = Γ
HH
HL [(q, p)(H,L)] + Γ
HL
LL [(q, p)(L,L)]. (4.7c)
Applying (4.5) and (4.7) to problem (4.2), we reduce it to be (with the two global




















































Subject to local monotonicity constraints:
Γ
HH
HL [(q, p)(H,H)] ≥ Γ
HH
HL [(q, p)(H,L)] (4.8a)
Γ
HL
LL [(q, p)(H,L)] ≥ Γ
HL
LL [(q, p)(L,L)]. (4.8b)
One can check that the solution proposed in this proposition, (q̂∗, p̂∗)(t1, t2), max-
imizes the above problem while the two local monotonicity constraints are relaxed.
Now, we show that (q̂∗, p̂∗)(t1, t2) is optimal to problem (4.2), by showing that
(q̂∗, p̂∗)(t1, t2) satisfies the local monotonicity constraints (4.8) and the two global
incentive compatibility constraints in (4.2), which were intentionally neglected in the
very beginning of the proof.
(q̂∗, p̂∗)(t1, t2) satisfies the local monotonicity constraints (4.8). This is because,
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under restriction 1 − h < (1 − l)2, ΓHHHL (q, p) and ΓHLLL (q, p) are both monotonic
increasing in q and p (see Lemma 9). We have p̂∗(H,H) ≥ p̂∗(H,L) ≥ p̂∗(L,L) and
p̂∗(H,H) ≥ p̂∗(H,L) ≥ p̂∗(L,L).


















Note from the definitions of the local reliability advantages, Γ
HH



























HL [(q, p)(H,H)]− Γ
HL
LL [(q, p)(H,H)].
We apply these two equations together with (4.7a) and (4.7c) to the two global
incentive compatibility constraints, obtaining
Γ
HH










HL [(q, p)(L,L)] + Γ
HL
LL [(q, p)(L,L)] (4.9)
The above inequalities hold for the optimal solution (q̂∗, p̂∗)(t1, t2) because p̂
∗(H,H) ≥
p̂∗(H,L) ≥ p̂∗(L,L) and p̂∗(H,H) ≥ p̂∗(H,L) ≥ p̂∗(L,L); and ΓHHHL (q, p) and ΓHLLL (q, p)




This dissertation studies a manufacturer’s supply-risk management under asymmetric
information about the supplier’s probability of disruption. In the first model (Chap-
ter 2), the manufacturer (buyer) purchases a part from a supplier that is subject to
a random production disruption. The supplier’s reliability (the probability of disrup-
tion) is its private information. The supplier or the manufacturer can use backup
production in the event of disruption. The manufacturer sets a non-delivery penalty
term (or, equivalently, a payment-on-delivery term) to ensure that the supplier has
an incentive to deliver. In the second model (Chapter 3), the manufacturer faces two
suppliers who are subject to random disruptions, the probabilities of which are the
suppliers’ private information. To increase the chance of delivery the manufacturer
can diversify, that is, contract with both suppliers simultaneously. In the third model
(Chapter 4), while there are two suppliers in the supply base, the manufacturer con-
tracts with only one of them, and the two suppliers form a coalition to meet the
manufacturer’s requirement.
In these studies, we model the manufacturer’s contracting decision under asym-
metric information as a mechanism design problem. The manufacturer offers a menu
of take-it-or-leave-it contracts to the supplier(s). The supplier(s) selects the con-
tract(s) it most prefers. The manufacturer designs the contract menu so that a
supplier’s choice of contract reveals its true reliability type to the manufacturer.
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To the best of my knowledge, these studies are among the first in the supply-risk
management literature to explore asymmetric information about supply risk. We now
summarize the main results.
Effect of asymmetric information on supply-risk management tools. In supply-risk
management context, an important question is how asymmetric information about
the supplier’s reliability affects the manufacturer’s use of supply-risk management
tools.
We find that when the supplier’s reliability is its private information, the manufac-
turer is less likely to use the backup production option of the supplier, but more likely
to rely on its own (more costly) backup option. Why does asymmetric information
about supply risk cause the manufacturer to utilize supplier backup production less?
If the supplier is asked to use its backup production in the event of a disruption, the
cost differential between a more reliable supplier type and a less reliable type grows,
since the latter is more likely to suffer a disruption and, hence, more likely to incur
the cost of using backup production. This widening of the cost gap increases the
more reliable supplier type’s incentive to misrepresent itself. Thus, the manufacturer
may choose to forego the backup production option of the less reliable supplier type
to reduce the more reliable type’s misrepresentation incentive.
Similarly, because asymmetric information effectively makes it more costly to do
business with suppliers, diversification becomes more costly and, hence, the manufac-
turer utilizes diversification less. However, even as the supply base reliability worsens,
the manufacturer may stop diversifying under asymmetric information, at the cost of
facing a greater risk of not receiving a delivery. Interestingly, this would not occur if
the suppliers’ reliabilities were known by the manufacture.
Value of information about supplier reliability. Learning about the supplier(s)
is always valuable for the manufacturer. Interestingly, an increase in the reliability
of the supply base may make it even more valuable to learn about the supplier(s)’
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reliability. Therefore, a higher reliability of the supplier(s) need not be a substitute
for better information.
For example, consider the one-supplier model, and suppose that the reliabilities of
both supplier types increase. As we have shown, when the supplier’s type is unknown,
the manufacturer may be forced to forgo using the low-reliability type of the supplier,
in order to avoid paying an incentive payment. As a result, the manufacturer forgoes
the chance of receiving a delivery from the low-type and making a profit. After an
increase in the reliabilities of both types, the manufacturer forgoes a larger chance of
receiving the delivery from the low-type, leading to a greater loss of profit. In other
words, as the reliabilities of both types increase, not knowing the supplier’s type leads
to a larger loss of profit under asymmetric information. Hence, the value of learning
the supplier’s type becomes even larger.
Value of risk management tools under asymmetric information. We have found
that asymmetric information effectively makes it more expensive to use the risk man-
agement tools, namely, backup production option and dual-sourcing option. However,
this does not mean that such tools are no longer as valuable as under symmetric in-
formation.
With the one-supplier model, we find that the value of the supplier’s backup pro-
duction option for the manufacturer is not necessarily larger when it perfectly knows
the supplier’s reliability. In particular, adding a cheap backup production option
diminishes the supplier’s benefit of misrepresenting its reliability (since reliability be-
comes less of a concern). This incentive reduction provides an extra benefit which
does not exist when information is symmetric.
Furthermore, under asymmetric information, as the supply base reliability in-
creases, the backup production option could become more valuable for the manufac-
turer. An increase in the reliability of the supplier may lead to a smaller cost gap
between the more reliable and the less reliable supplier types, when using backup pro-
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duction option. The more reliable type now has a smaller incentive to misrepresent
itself as less reliable, making backup production effectively less costly. As a result,
the manufacturer makes more use of backup production, even though disruptions are
less likely than before.
With the two-supplier model, we find that having a dual-sourcing option (i.e.,
having two potential suppliers) is very valuable for the manufacturer even if it does
not use this option to diversify its supply. Merely having two suppliers allows the
manufacturer to play one supplier against the other to receive better pricing, a com-
petition benefit which is absent when the manufacturer has perfect information about
its suppliers.
Competition and diversification under asymmetric information. In our two-supplier
model, supplier competition arises when the manufacturer commits to sole-sourcing.
The presence of the other supplier affects a supplier’s profit in a way that is akin
to the suppliers bidding against each other for the manufacturer’s business. In the
presence of the other supplier, a high-reliability supplier would risk not winning the
order if it pretends to have low reliability, given that the other supplier could be of
a high reliability. This reduces the high-reliability supplier’s incentive to pretend to
be of low reliability. Hence, compared with the single supplier model, competition
between suppliers in a two-supplier model causes the suppliers to earn smaller profits.
Competition and diversification can work against each other, and the manufac-
turer’s preference over supplier competition and diversification depends on the degree
of codependence between the causes of the suppliers’ disruptions. We find that the
manufacturer prefers low correlation between the the suppliers’ disruption processes,
when the benefit of diversification is large. In our model, because the manufacturer
is the Stackleberg leader, who designs the allocation mechanism, the suppliers have
no pricing power beyond making “participate/do not participate” decision. Hence,
higher correlation across the suppliers’ disruption processes does not increase the
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manufacturer’s benefit from competition between the suppliers, but reduces its benefit
from diversification, if it is used. Therefore, the manufacturer prefers less correlation
across the suppliers’ disruptions, in order to make diversification more valuable.
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